Syria occupies a strategically significant geopolitical position, serving as a bridge between the Arabian Gulf and Europe while also possessing a coastline along the Mediterranean Sea, often referred to as “West Asia’s gateway to the Mediterranean.” The country is rich in underground resources, and studies have confirmed the abundance of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean. One of the key factors contributing to the Syrian crisis, which has persisted for nearly fourteen years, has been the competition over gas transportation routes through Syrian territory.
Following the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, at the hands of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), Syria became the focus of regional and global powers, each seeking a share of its resources and strategic advantages. Among the most prominent regional actors are Turkey and Israel, both of which share borders with Syria—Turkey to the north and Israel to the southwest. Turkey has historically maintained strong ties with extremist groups, including HTS, since their emergence in Syria. With the group now in control of Damascus, Turkish officials—ranging from foreign ministers to defense and intelligence personnel, as well as business leaders—have engaged in frequent visits to Syria. These interactions suggest an urgent effort by Turkey to secure agreements and privileges with the new regime while simultaneously working to maintain the structure of governance.
Turkey has attempted to negotiate a maritime border demarcation agreement with Syria, but its efforts have been met with international rejection. Meanwhile, Ankara is striving to deepen its influence across all sectors of the Syrian state. Turkey’s ambitions are rooted in two primary justifications:
- Historical Claims: Turkey views Syria as a former Ottoman province and asserts that, based on the “National Pact” (Misak-ı Milli), northern Syria was historically part of the Turkish state, thus justifying its expansionist aspirations.
- National Security Concerns: Turkey, like many global powers, invokes national security as a broad pretext for intervention. One of its primary concerns is the Kurdish issue. Despite a long history of cooperation with the Kurds, Ankara has been relentless in suppressing Kurdish autonomy wherever it emerges. Following the establishment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (which Turkey claims to be a Kurdish entity), Ankara has sought to undermine the self-administration’s influence. The partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the U.S.-led international coalition, which remains committed to combating terrorism, has only intensified Turkey’s hostility.
Previously, Turkey attempted to normalize relations with the former Assad regime in exchange for dismantling the autonomous administration. Now, under the new regime, Turkey outwardly claims to support Kurdish rights while simultaneously working to incite discord in Kurdish-controlled areas, target the SDF, and extend its influence over strategic locations such as the Tishrin Dam. Moreover, Turkey aims to insulate itself from the winds of political change that have swept through the Middle East, toppling authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring.
The unfolding events in the Middle East align with the broader framework of the “Greater Middle East Project,” a geopolitical strategy orchestrated by the United States, Western powers, and Israel. Within this context, Turkey believes that establishing military bases deep inside Syria will grant it leverage against Israel and deter the West from including Turkey in their plans for regional transformation. Additionally, Ankara perceives military bases as bargaining chips in future negotiations concerning issues related to President Erdogan and his party. For instance, securing a military foothold in Palmyra would enable Turkey to destabilize Syria and the region while using it as a launchpad to attack Kurdish self-administration areas. Turkey also seeks to support tribal militias, such as the so-called Tribal Army led by Ibrahim al-Hifl, which was previously backed by the Assad regime and Iran, as well as to reactivate ISIS sleeper cells scattered across the Syrian desert. Many militants within the HTS still adhere to ISIS ideology and, in some cases, are former ISIS members—evident in the massacres committed in Syria’s coastal regions against the Alawite community and their subsequent redeployment toward Kurdish-held areas.
Israel’s strategic posture has also evolved significantly since October 7. Previously, it maintained a largely indirect role, targeting Iranian and affiliated militia presence in Syria. However, with the Assad regime’s collapse and the HTS’ ascension to power in Damascus, Israel now perceives Turkish expansionism—reminiscent of Iranian influence—as a new strategic threat. Israel is particularly alarmed by Turkey’s close ties to radical jihadist groups, including the HTS, which shares ideological roots with al-Qaeda and ISIS. The growing influence of jihadist factions in Syria poses a direct threat to Israel’s national security. Consequently, Israel regards Turkish neo-Ottoman ambitions as no less perilous than Iranian-backed militias in Syria and is closely monitoring Turkish movements, jihadist organizations, and the newly formed Syrian government.
Israel may encourage Arab states to assert greater influence in Syria to counterbalance Turkish expansion. However, given Turkey’s geographic proximity and its strong relationship with the HTS and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, Ankara holds a strategic advantage. Nevertheless, Israel, backed by its political, military, and intelligence capabilities—alongside unwavering Western and American support—remains the primary obstacle to Turkey’s ambitions.
Israel is determined to prevent Turkey from establishing deep military bases in Syria, acquiring strategic weaponry (such as air defense systems or ballistic missiles), or allowing any regional actor to gain a foothold in Syria that could pose a future threat. The question remains: Will Syria become the battleground for a Turkish-Israeli confrontation? And what would be the consequences of such a conflict for Syria and the broader region?
The Israeli-Turkish conflict in Syria
Turkey is traditionally considered an ally of Israel, with longstanding intelligence, security, military, and economic ties between the two nations. Despite President Erdogan’s vocal criticism of Israel—often perceived as Turkish propaganda aimed at garnering Arab and Sunni Muslim support—Turkey’s actions tell a different story. The modern Turkish state’s foundation and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has remained in power for nearly a quarter of a century, cannot be separated from its strategic alignment with Israel and the United States. Erdogan’s political longevity has, in part, been contingent on his deference to these powers. His visit to Tel Aviv, the wreath he laid on the grave of Zionist movement founder Theodor Herzl, and Turkey’s status as the first country to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital all serve as testaments to this alignment. Furthermore, Erdogan’s role in aiding Israel during its military operations in Gaza underscores Turkey’s unwavering cooperation.
However, Erdogan’s ambitions have at times deviated from the trajectory set for Turkey as a Western ally and NATO member. Actions such as blocking the U.S. from using Turkish territory to invade Iraq in 2003, purchasing the S-400 air defense system from Russia, and coordinating with Russia and Iran throughout the Syrian crisis have strained Turkey’s relations with the U.S. Moreover, Turkey’s threats against U.S. forces in northern and eastern Syria, coupled with its military offensives against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF—Washington’s key partner in counterterrorism efforts—have further exacerbated tensions between Ankara and Washington. These moves are primarily driven by Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, particularly its claims over Syrian and Iraqi territories under the so-called “National Pact” (Misak-ı Milli), aspirations that have only intensified following the collapse of the Syrian regime.
Israel, meanwhile, has a distinct strategic vision for Syria and the broader Middle East. Its goal is to establish itself as the central power in the region, ensuring that all neighboring states remain within its sphere of influence. Consequently, Israel is unwilling to tolerate the emergence of strong rival powers, such as Iran and Turkey. It perceives Turkey’s alignment with the Muslim Brotherhood, its close ties with Qatar, and its support for radical jihadist groups—particularly in Syria—as direct threats to its national security. The growing jihadist influence in Syria poses a significant challenge to Israel, which is why, since the fall of the Assad regime, it has been systematically targeting and eliminating military sites and weapons stockpiles that could endanger its security. Israel is particularly concerned that Turkey’s establishment of a military base deep inside Syria, such as in Palmyra, would complicate efforts to neutralize Syria as a security threat and disrupt U.S. counterterrorism strategies in the region.
Any potential Israeli-Turkish conflict, however, would leave Turkey at a significant disadvantage. In terms of military size and armament, a direct confrontation between the two is unlikely, as Turkey lacks both the strategic autonomy and political will to launch an attack on Israel. Moreover, Israel enjoys unwavering support from the United States and much of Western Europe. The real determinant in this power struggle is not military strength but rather political and economic leverage. Turkey, unlike Israel, lacks the political and economic means to undermine its adversary. On the contrary, Turkey’s vulnerabilities—including the Kurdish issue, internal opposition movements, and an unstable economy—render it the weaker party in any prolonged confrontation. Consequently, Ankara has sought to mitigate these weaknesses through increased coordination with Iran, including potential support for Hezbollah. With the Kurdish issue gaining international prominence, Turkish-Iranian cooperation in Syria—particularly against the Autonomous Administration and the SDF—may intensify. Turkey is also engaging with Iraq, Jordan, and Syria to form a regional alliance under the pretext of combating ISIS, potentially as an alternative to the U.S.-led coalition that currently backs the SDF.
Turkey’s broader strategy of strengthening ties with Iran, negotiating defense agreements with Syria’s new regime, and deepening relations with Russia and BRICS nations is ultimately aimed at countering Western influence, particularly the “Greater Middle East Initiative.” Ankara seeks to establish itself as a dominant regional power, capable of challenging Western hegemony.
However, rather than consolidating its position, these maneuvers may further alienate Turkey from the West, increasing the likelihood of it being labeled a “rogue state” by Israel and the United States. The recent visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Washington was not solely about severing U.S. ties with the SDF; it was also an attempt to gauge U.S. sentiment toward Turkey and explore the possibility of an Erdogan-Trump meeting. However, the diplomatic reception Fidan received—both in terms of protocol and media coverage—reflects the deteriorating state of U.S.-Turkish relations. Given the Trump administration’s staunch support for Israel, Washington is unlikely to tolerate any challenges to Israel’s regional strategy, particularly as Israel continues to serve as the principal executor of U.S. plans for the “Greater Middle East Initiative.”
The U.S. and Israel view time as a crucial factor, especially in light of the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry. Erdogan’s regional ambitions—his aspirations to position Turkey as an energy hub for Europe and transform it into a global power—have disrupted U.S. timelines for countering the rising Chinese threat, which is increasingly encroaching on American spheres of influence in the Middle East and beyond.
However, rather than leading to open conflict, the Turkish-Israeli power struggle may ultimately result in a series of political bargains. In the end, Turkey may be compelled to relinquish some of its ambitions in exchange for securing its own political stability. This could involve ensuring the continued dominance of the AKP and extending Erdogan’s presidency for another four years—potentially through early elections—by sidelining his main political rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition candidate from the Republican People’s Party (CHP).
The Impact of the Israeli-Turkish conflict on Syria
The repercussions of the ongoing Turkish-Israeli conflict on Syria are closely tied to the policies of Ahmad al-Sharaa. Domestically, his approach focuses on expelling or combating non-Syrian elements within jihadist organizations, preventing them from assuming high-ranking positions that could facilitate the spread of jihadist ideology within the ranks of the new Syrian army or broader society. Additionally, his policies involve recognizing the diverse components of the Syrian people and amending the interim constitution.
Externally, al-Sharaa’s policies are linked to granting Turkey military and economic privileges in Syria, including signing strategic agreements that could provide Turkey with military bases deep inside Syrian territory, forming a defensive military alliance, demarcating maritime borders, or other concessions that he might extend to Turkey’s occupying forces in Syria.
Turkey holds significant influence over Al-Shara’s decisions. Given its territorial ambitions in Syria, Ankara may push him to accept its directives regarding the rights of various Syrian factions. Such moves could impact Western perceptions of al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim leader and affect both his government and his organization, HTS. Additionally, these policies could contribute to maintaining sanctions on Syria. Should al-Sharaa deviate from the designated path—by endorsing radical jihadist ideology, empowering jihadist elements in military and security positions, turning Syria into a base for such groups, or signing strategic agreements with Turkey that threaten Israeli national security—the U.S. and Israel would work to remove him from power. In such a scenario, a new leader and government would be appointed, annulling all agreements made with Turkey, similar to what occurred with Russian influence in Syria and agreements signed under the previous regime. However, as of now, al-Sharaa’s administration remains under control and continues to serve U.S. and Israeli interests.
Thus, the survival of this regime hinges on Ahmad al-Sharaa’s ability to navigate the Turkish-Israeli conflict in Syria and maintain a neutral stance while addressing American demands concerning the broader political process, jihadist organizations, and foreign fighters.
In this context, despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements asserting that a confrontation with Turkey in Syria is inevitable—and his warning to Erdogan about forming an alliance with an extremist Syrian regime—military conflict remains unlikely as long as Turkey remains aligned with the West. However, Turkey’s internal instability, including mass protests following the arrest of Istanbul’s mayor and Erdogan’s key election rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu, poses a growing threat to Erdogan’s rule. To safeguard his position, Erdogan may be compelled to make concessions, such as reassessing Turkey’s military presence in Syria, accepting changes in the Syrian regime’s structure, and negotiating with the SDF. In exchange, he may seek assurances that Western powers will not support the Turkish opposition, prosecute him, or reopen human rights cases concerning violations against dissidents. Additionally, Erdogan may aim to secure an extension of his presidency through early elections in Turkey.
Ultimately, this conflict is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. However, if Turkey persists in its current Syria policy, it will face increasing international isolation, along with growing political, economic, and military pressures. These challenges could significantly impact Turkey’s internal stability and the future of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Erdogan’s leadership.
