Israeli response to Iran and the nature of Iran’s retaliation

After the killing of Ismail Haniyeh (leader of Hamas), Hassan Nasrallah (leader of Hezbollah), and officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Crops (IRGC) and Quds Force (QF), Iran responded to Israel. The number of missiles launched by Iran reached hundreds, and Israel and its allies intercepted these missiles. However, Israel’s response was not immediate; it absorbed the strike and announced that it would respond at the appropriate time. Israeli and American meetings, along with communications between the U.S. president and the Israeli prime minister about the response and the target bank, have made the world anticipate the nature of Israel’s retaliation and the locations it may target. Will it be “nuclear reactors, military bases involved in attacking Israel, oil installations, or high-ranking military figures in the Iranian army?”

These meetings and the target bank have put Iran in danger, pushing it to also identify a target bank in Israel in case Israel retaliates and targets vital Iranian installations. Iran has set its sights on “Israeli offshore oil and gas fields in the Mediterranean, oil export ports, and the Israeli nuclear reactor.”

The strategy Israel has adopted in response to Iran, by making it wait and anticipate the nature of the Israeli response, has caused Iran to stumble and fear damage to its vital installations. Israel will not be alone, as the United States, the United Kingdom, and their bases spread across the Middle East will stand by it.

So, why has Israel’s response been delayed? Will it strike Iran? What will the nature of Iran’s response be? And what are the potential consequences?

Delay of Israel’s response

Is Israel afraid of an Iranian response if it targets its vital installations, or is it concerned about the outbreak of a wider regional war in the Middle East? Or is Israel delaying its response to pressure Iran into making concessions on certain issues?

Israel could have responded to Iran at the same moment the Iranian response stopped, but it may fear that the conflict could expand beyond control. Along with the United States, Israel wants to ensure that all crises remain under control, so they can manage them and prevent them from escalating, thus not allowing Russia, China, or any other opposing party to exploit the situation. A broader conflict in the Middle East would not benefit either Israel or the U.S., as the Middle East is a region of American influence, and the crises there must be carefully managed.

On the other hand, Israel’s delay in responding may be aimed at extracting significant concessions from Iran, particularly in Lebanon, concerning Hezbollah. This could involve disconnecting Iran from Hamas (or more broadly from Palestine, not just Hamas). Such a scenario could signal the beginning of Arab countries distancing themselves from the Palestinian cause, or lead to the disarmament of Hezbollah or its removal north of the Litani River.

In Syria, this delay could push Iran to withdraw its militias, marking the first stage of resolving the Syrian crisis. The second stage would involve forcing Turkey to withdraw its forces from the occupied northern Syria and handing over its mercenaries to the regime through a reconciliation between the two sides. This would not be difficult for the U.S. and Israel after removing Iran from Syria, as they could give the green light to the regime, Russia, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to liberate northern Syria from occupation. This would drag Turkey into a war of attrition with the regime and Russia, a situation Turkey fears as it would be left alone in the Syrian crisis.

In this way, Russia and the U.S. would rid themselves of the regional powers, “Iran and Turkey,” in Syria and neutralize their role in delaying a resolution to the Syrian crisis. The Syrian issue would then be on the path to an international solution, one that aligns with the ambitions of these powers—”the U.S., Russia, and Israel”—in Syria.

Israeli response

Despite the delay, which may be due to the U.S. and Israel carefully studying all possible outcomes and consequences of Israeli strikes on Iran, an Israeli response is inevitable. Israel will not forgo its right to retaliate. However, the extent of damage caused by Israeli strikes will depend on Iran’s position:

• If Iran does not make concessions to Israel and the U.S.: Israeli strikes will be strong and could inflict significant damage on vital Iranian installations. This could lead to an unexpected Iranian response against Israel and American interests in the region. Such a scenario would not benefit any party, as Iran, being a central state, already faces many internal problems and may not be able to control them if the U.S. and the West support the internal opposition. This would, in turn, threaten the regime of the Supreme Leader in Iran. On the other hand, Israel and the U.S. could face stronger strikes targeting Israel’s vital installations and American interests in the region, leading to an escalation that spirals out of control.
• If Iran makes concessions to Israel and the U.S.: In this case, Israeli strikes on Iranian sites would be anticipated and less damaging. The Iranian response would also be predictable and would serve U.S. and Israeli interests in the region. Thus, the damage to Iran’s vital installations will depend on Iran’s stance and the concessions it is willing to make to Israel and the U.S.

What will Iran’s response look like after receiving the Israeli strike? The U.S. and Israel are not just waiting for Iran’s concessions but also for the nature of its response. Iran’s reaction will be as significant as the concessions it offers. It is expected that Iran’s response will ultimately serve U.S. interests in the region, particularly in the Gulf states and Egypt.

Shape of Iran’s response

The Iranian regime is part of the global capitalist policy in the region, similar to the modern Turkish state founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Iran will not take any action that could harm Israeli or Western interests in the region unless it serves them.

Iran has identified a target bank within Israel, focusing on Israeli gas and oil fields in the Mediterranean, airbases, and nuclear reactors. However, the question remains: Is Iran capable of targeting and inflicting significant damage on these vital Israeli installations, or will its strikes be ineffective, limited, and unfocused? Alternatively, will Iran strike through its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen? Additionally, the visit of the Iranian president to Qatar following Iran’s response to Israel on October 1 could be seen as part of a process of making concessions to Israel in exchange for Israel’s response.

But how will global capitalism exploit Iran’s response to serve its agenda in the region?

Iranian response serving U.S. and Israeli agendas in the region

The U.S. and Israel may actually need an Iranian response if Israel strikes Iran, just as they needed the events of October 7 to implement their policy in Gaza, aimed at destroying and ending Hamas as the governing force there. An Iranian response to Israel might not be inevitable if Israel carries out its threat of striking Iran. Instead, Iran might target maritime navigation in the Persian Gulf by seizing some oil tankers and threatening shipping, similar to how the Houthis have targeted ships bound for Israel under the pretext of defending Gaza. This has significantly impacted the Suez Canal, causing Egypt to lose billions of dollars as global maritime traffic shifted from the Red Sea towards the Cape of Good Hope (around Africa). Additionally, Iran could target U.S. bases in northern and eastern Syria (east of the Euphrates).

If Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen target maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf, this would ultimately serve U.S. and Israeli interests. Such attacks would harm the economies of the Gulf states more than they would harm Western interests in the region. The Gulf states would face a major economic crisis, and Iranian proxies might also target U.S. interests in the Gulf. All of this could push the Arab states toward Israel, accelerating normalization and the formation of an Arab-Israeli alliance (an “Arab NATO”) under U.S. leadership. This project, initiated by former U.S. President Donald Trump through the “Abraham Accords” and the creation of a military alliance, seeks to subjugate the region to global capitalism and maintain the existing world order.

The crises that arise, and the creation of new ones, may have unintended consequences. Russia and China have ambitions in the region and could exploit these situations as global powers capable of resolving conflicts, encouraging some Arab states to turn to them as reliable partners to achieve balance in their international relations. Relying solely on one side would exacerbate crises, potentially dragging the Middle East into large regional wars.

In this context, the ongoing crises in the Middle East are the result of central regimes. These regimes have not lived up to their responsibilities, failed to ensure peaceful coexistence within their societies or with neighboring states, and have been unable to manage or resolve regional crises in a way that benefits the region’s peoples. To address their internal problems and avoid submission to major powers, these regimes must focus on “democratic modernity” as a solution to escape the crises of the Middle East. These crises are fueled by global capitalist modernity, aided by some regional powers such as the Turkish occupation state, Iran, and even Qatar, which is aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.