Russian-Turkish Relations between Tactics and Strategy

Russian-Turkish relations are historic and at the highest political and economic levels, the economic exchange is considered one of the most important aspects of interest to the two countries. Some economic institutions in the two countries have stated that this exchange exceeded 30 billion US dollars, and after the two parties signed a road map for economic cooperation in August, 2022. There are expectations that this exchange will reach 100 billion US dollars in future.

As for political and military relations, they extend to the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, and in most of their stages there were hostile relations that were evident in the Russian-Turkish wars, due to Russia’s desire to control the Balkan countries and the common border crossings, straits and waterways, especially with the decline of the Ottoman Empire in Its dying period before World War I, and the Janissary army entrenched itself on the side of the Axis powers against the Allied countries that included Russia, which would later lead the countries of the Soviet Union.

Modern Turkey’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952 was tantamount to determining its strategic positioning. The Warsaw Pact was the force and military alliance parallel and confronting this alliance, the features of which will become clear later in determining the areas of strength, weakness, and confrontation.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the beginning of new relations:

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations between the Russian Federation and Turkey began to improve, especially at the commercial level. Trade between the two countries became active at the highest levels in the exchange of experiences and information, then Russia became the largest energy supplier to Turkey. However, the political visions of the two countries were far apart, especially in strategic matters. This can be seen in the thorny files shared between the two countries. Most notable:

At the level of the Syrian file: With the beginning of the Syrian movement in 2011 and the spark of the Syrian revolution, the policy of political blocs began. Despite the development of relations between the two countries in recent years, the increase in the volume of trade exchange and the activation of the movement of border crossings, Turkey was one of the first countries to intervene in the internal affairs of the neighboring state. The Turkish regime adopted a policy of direct support for the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Syria, and then the radical Islamic movements (sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly), all of this to overthrow the regime in Syria and bring Islamic groups to power there.

While the Russian approach was to keep this regime as it is, and after the military intervention of the coalition countries against the terrorist organizations in Syria, the Syrian airspace became open for the Russian element to arrive and roam the Syrian lands through direct military intervention, and the Syrian arena and its lands became a field of confrontation and direct friction between the two countries. Indeed, a Russian Sukhoi 24 plane was shot down by Turkish air defenses within Turkish airspace on November 24, 2015. Relations between them became tense as a result, and as a reaction to what happened in Aleppo and its fall into the hands of the Syrian regime and the expulsion of militants loyal to the Syrian opposition from it. What “made matters worse” was the assassination or killing of the Russian ambassador in Ankara on December 19, 2016 by extremist Islamists. All of these reasons, in addition to the contradictory vision between the Russian and Turkish views on ways to resolve the Syrian issue, were among the contradictions between the two parties.

Regarding the Libyan file: Turkish intervention in Libya began in an open manner. This is through direct support for the “Fayez al-Sarraj” group, logistically, politically, and even militarily, while Russia was supporting the Benghazi group represented by “Khalifa Haftar.”

Regarding the Caucasus file: Turkey openly supports Azerbaijan, while Russia supports Armenia despite its recent abandonment. This is due to side negotiations and understandings related to northwestern Syria.

At the Egyptian level: Russia is considered one of the biggest supporters of President Sisi, while Turkey was adopting a policy of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, demanding their return to elected civilian rule, and calling Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s rise to power “A Military Coup”.

At the Ukrainian level and its ongoing war: Since Turkey is a member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and its army is considered the second largest army in it, it is obligated to adopt the general policy of the alliance, and therefore Turkey is considered practically against the Russian war in Ukraine, but despite this, Turkey has formed a fair amount of space to stand in a (somewhat) neutral corner and plays the role of a strong mediator most of the time, as happened in the deals to export Ukrainian grains to some countries of the world, and the Russians handing over Ukrainian leaders to Turkey as a reliable mediator, with the expectation that they will be handed over to Ukraine after the end of the war, but Turkey handed them over a kind of resentment on the Russian side, which Turkey later remedied. Also, the recent approval by the Turkish side for Sweden and Finland to join NATO has disturbed bilateral relations, but due to mediation, Turkey and the lack of a suitable alternative to it in playing the role of mediator with Ukraine and the West, the Russians look at this pivotal role and take it into account.

Why does Russia follow a flexible policy towards Turkey?

Despite the downing of the Russian plane in Syria by Turkey, and the killing of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, as we mentioned previously, relations between Russia and Turkey have returned to their almost normal form in record time. And tensions and differences between them have been removed, for several reasons that concern both parties, and can Summarized as follows:

– For Russia, Turkey is considered a regional country with diplomatic weight, and it can be relied upon on many issues in order to play the role of mediation or indirect communication with the West.

– As for Russian policy in general, it is an attempt to neutralize Turkey in its struggle with Western power.

– The possibility of benefiting economically from partnerships with Turkey to circumvent and find loopholes in Western economic sanctions on Russia.

– Direct economic friction with an effective military force within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the possibility of benefiting from such friction.

– Sustainability of benefiting from the “Blue Stream” project, which is a project to extend a giant natural gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey, passing through the Black Sea.

– Russia’s attempt to lure Turkey into the “Eurasian Union” project as an alternative to the European Union.

What does Turkey want from Russia?

Turkey, after its ongoing negotiations with the European Union and failure to achieve what is required, is trying to open corresponding or parallel channels with the other poles, represented by Russia, especially since Putin’s Russia has been trying since the beginning of the current century to break the unipolar policy and break the stereotype of the “policeman of the world” represented by the United States of America. Therefore, economic and military cooperation with this party will be a pressure card and bargaining operations for Turkey against the West, and it will also be part of the policy of creating a balance between the powers that run the world. Turkish aims can also be defined in:

– Neutralizing the Russian opinion in the conflict with the Kurds inside Turkey, and also inside Syria, represented by the Democratic Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces.

– Neutralizing the Russian role in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict; This was clearly demonstrated in the Russian silence during the recent conflict between them and the Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani lands.

– Reducing Turkish economic dependence on the West, and creating alternatives to it through economic cooperation with Russia, China, and those.

Relations in the Military aspect:

Turkey is the second largest army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and this alliance is considered the greatest threat to the Russian Federation (from Russia’s point of view), and therefore any Russian-Turkish rapprochement in the military field constitutes a double danger to both parties. As for the dilemma that the current Turkish president has found himself in, it is the purchase of the Russian defense system represented by the Russian-made S-400 missiles, which are considered the actual antidote to the American F-16 and F-35 aircraft. The problem that Turkey was faced with is to possess the weapon. American and at the same time Russian weapons, which are considered contradictions in principle and content, but in the balance of strategic alliances, there cannot be a strategic alliance between Russia and Turkey. There are several reasons, the most important:

– Turkey is an essential partner of NATO, which Russia considers a dangerous alliance for it.

– Russia is a key partner with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is considered a regional competitor to Turkey on the historical level in the Persian-Ottoman rivalry, and on the Shiite-Sunni ideological level.

– Tensions in Turkish relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. Because of the conflicting files between them, most notably the Syrian file and the support of the International Coalition forces for the Syrian Democratic Forces in confronting terrorism.

– The Turkish goal is to reach full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

– Turkey’s feeling that the West does not view it as an ally or partner except when necessary, and exploits it only according to Western need, without considering mutual interests or taking the Turkish personality into account.

In the result and the final outcome; We can say that Russian-Turkish relations are the result of the convergence of temporary interests that the region is going through and current international policies, which may create a new type of alliances, and that personal relations between the leaders of the two countries play – to some extent – a major role in consolidating relations between them, which It may develop or last longer than some of them expect. In any case, since there is no direct confrontation between Russia and NATO (which is unlikely at the present time), this relationship will continue between the two, but in any case, we do not see it in the medium or long term as a strategic alliance, but rather as a kind of alliance. From a coup against the Turkish strategy of moving away from Western alliances and their long-term relations.