Turkish-Syrian rapprochement a dead electoral card

There is no doubt that the rapprochement between the Turkish and Syrian regimes has been covered by the media more than necessary, and has been paid much attention due to considerations related to it being the most important issue currently included in the Syrian list. This attention meant the Turkish turn towards reconciliation with Syria, knowing that it is supposed to be dealt with from where it ended, not from where it has recently started.

All intelligence and media reports talked about indirect relations between the Turkish and Syrian regimes. In the past, this relationship was evident in the security level, and perhaps this is evidenced by the move of Turkish military bases with great freedom near the areas where the Syrian government forces are present without showing any reaction. Over time, this proposition began to appear in the media, and it also carried a strategic dimension to a large extent for the Turkish state, especially as it determined the positioning of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and its political future in Turkey.

If we look not far from this, the series of calls by Turkish officials for reconciliation with the Syrian government have never been in favor of the Syrian opposition, in which Erdogan claims to defend and protect it. Rather, he was keen to achieve his own interests through it, by seizing the various Syrian wealth from the stolen Syrian factory machines and looting antiquities in occupied Afrin on one hand, and to achieve the sustainability of the Syrian government to keep it in power in its most important weaknesses in 2015 on the other hand.

From this perspective, the Turkish state has facilitated the process of the Syrian government’s control of the Syrian opposition areas with Russian support through de-escalation agreements, which would have made a demographic change in the areas previously controlled by the opposition in the Syrian capital, Damascus, and southern Syria, by bringing Iranian militias. In return, the occupied city of Afrin was subjected to a demographic change which is the largest of its kind on the level of the Syrian map by receiving the mercenaries of the armed Syrian opposition who left the capital, Damascus and its countryside. The matter did not stop at this point; rather, the Syrian opposition mortgaged itself to the Turkish state, so that did not achieve any progress in the Syrian political process. As a result, the Syrian people hated it. It became an easy prey for the Turkish state in light of the growing role of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), especially during its entry into the occupied city of Afrin. The Turkish state has announced that it has no preconditions for any talks with the Syrian government, and it can discuss partial or complete withdrawal from Syrian territory because it realizes that the Syrian opposition is a losing card, and it was not reliable when compared to the benefits of the Turkish interior in terms of winning the election bet. As for the Syrian government, it stipulated that the Turkish state withdraw from the lands it controls and from the M4 Highway, whose impact will be reflected in ending the isolation of the Syrian government. This means that the Turkish state and its project to establish a safe zone with a width of 35 km, i.e. to the M4 Highway, will be managed by the Syrian government, which is something that, although it did not bless it – to hit the AANES – but it also accepts it.

Whatever the orientation of these approaches between the Syrian and Turkish regimes, which are taking place – at least – at the security level now with Russian mediation, the countries concerned with the Syrian issue have expressed different positions towards it. Russia, which calls for such a measure, is trying to give the Turkish state an electoral ticket in May, while the Syrian government is exerting political pressure on the opposition to isolate it from its Turkish supporter and achieve a new victory. Russia is trying by all means to seize the lion’s share of the gains if this actually happened. As for Iran, it supports these orientations on the grounds that if this happens, it will achieve an economic and military openness for Syria that will contribute to easing some of the economic hardship, which means that it will not have to support the Syrian government financially enough, if we take into account that its economy is also suffering from sanctions imposed by the West.

In contrast, the US appears to be the only country to reject this rapprochement between the Turkish state and the Syrian government in any way. Rather, it rejects any role for the Syrian government in normalizing relations with its regional or Arab surroundings. The American logic of this rejection is that the Syrian regime is still not yet qualified to be accepted and integrated with its surroundings, especially since it is responsible for many bloody massacres of its people, as well as the displacement of half of its people. If it must accept normalization – as it wants – then, it will have to start conducting a comprehensive Syrian dialogue with all communities of the Syrian people in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, which has not happened and will not happen as long as it has this chauvinistic mentality.

Assuming this rapprochement leads to a meeting at the level of the presidents of the Turkish state and the Syrian government, what is the future of the relationship between them?

Erdogan is facing a powerful coalition that mainly aims to block the path to the presidency. This is what he called the “Coalition of Six”, which was established in February 2022 and includes six parties, all of which are not only secular or nationalist, but also include conservative parties. The Turkish opposition announced its intention to amend the constitution and return to the parliamentary system in the event of winning the elections. It also pledged to return to Turkey’s secular path and raise the issue of returning Syrian refugees to their country. This means that the elections will determine the future of Turkish politics as a whole, not just the future of the country’s leaders. Accordingly, Erdogan is trying to end all the thorny files that impede his re-election. In turn, the Syrian government requires accepting rapprochements at a higher level if the Turkish state fulfills its obligations to withdraw from Syrian territory, return refugees, end its support for factions that Damascus calls terrorists, open the M4 Highway between Aleppo and Latakia, and hand over wanted persons from the opposition as well.

In view of these intersections and tensions between them, it can be said that Assad’s conditions are mostly sovereign, security and economic, and the Turkish state will not miss this opportunity to hijack the negotiating card from Assad in favor of the Syrian opposition. This gives him a step forward in this political file, while the Syrian government will present an electoral card to Erdogan to win the elections without any trouble. The Syrian government is well aware of these moves and would not venture into the Turkish embrace were it not for pressure from Moscow and Tehran, not to mention that they are efforts drawn in wasted time in light of the Syrian government’s current indifference to them, although all indications of rapprochement indicate that it is dead before it happens at a major diplomatic level. However, if it happens, it will be after the end of the Turkish elections, amid speculation that the Turkish opposition will come to power, which means a better option for rapprochement for the Syrian government.