Difficult peace between Damascus and Ankara

It may be useful, first, to present a summary of the main outputs – according to several sources and news agencies – of the recent meeting that took place in Moscow and brought together the defense ministers of Turkey-Syria-Russia.

We can summarize the most important of these outputs in the following points:

• The ministers agreed to form a group of joint committees, including individuals from defense and intelligence officials, to start their work in Moscow, and follow up on their meetings in Ankara and Damascus.
• The three ministers agreed on a joint mechanism to enable and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Syria.
• The three ministers developed a joint vision for the elimination of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
• Turkey’s commitment to respect the sovereignty of the Syrian borders and to agree to a gradual withdrawal from the lands it has occupied in Syria.

It is worth noting that this conciliatory path between Ankara and Damascus began more than six years ago, following the meeting that took place between the Turkish and Russian presidents in St. Petersburg. Among its results was the occupation of Jarablus, the evacuation of Aleppo in 2016, the occupation of al-Bab, east of Aleppo, in 2017, the occupation of the city of Afrin, north of Aleppo, in 2018, the evacuation of Ghouta and Rif Dimashq from militants, and finally the occupation of Ras al-Ain (Serekaniye) and Tel Abyad in 2019.

Russia and its role in sponsoring this path

Russia – after ruling out a military solution and the failure of the new military operation in northern Syria – wants to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan electoral support, through a political achievement. Turkey is the best and strongest way for it to circumvent the European sanctions against it after the Ukraine war. Therefore, it is keen to keep the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power, and to provide it with the necessary support, by sponsoring the reconciliation process with the Syrian regime, especially after Turkey became an important crossing point for the export of grain from Russia to the countries of the world, and a center for Russian oil refining and gas export as well.

Russia, then, faces a real test, with the approaching Turkish presidential elections. It is working hard to support the Turkish president at the expense of the opposition, which seeks to restore Turkey’s relations with NATO and the United States of America.

Timing and its importance

Inevitably, the date of the approaching presidential elections in Turkey is closely linked to this track, as Erdogan wants to gain the satisfaction of the Turkish interior, hoping to win the next round of elections at any cost.

What the Turkish president is currently planning – with the election date approaching – is to show the Turkish interior that he wants to put final solutions to the problems in Turkey, including the issue of Syrian refugees, improve relations with neighboring countries, including Syria, and preserve Turkey’s national security, through coordination with the Syrian regime to eliminate the great danger that besets Turkey, which is the Kurdish presence on its borders.

Today, with the approaching electoral battle, there are thorny issues that weigh heavily on the Turkish political scene, foremost of which is the issue of foreign policy and the relationship with Syria. Therefore, we see the Turkish media mobilized to promote the idea that Erdogan is the safety valve to protect the Turkish national security, and that his failure to win a new term will mean the loss of Turkey, the return of terrorism, and the spread of chaos. Therefore, Erdogan is trying to anticipate events and create a major event for the electoral contest, and he will definitely not spare any means in his final battle.

Turkish intentions and reliability    

Certainly, we can say that it is not possible to put the papers for resolving the Syrian crisis on the table without the presence of Turkey or an active role for it, as it is one of the most prominent factors of intractability. However, all of Turkey’s efforts and endeavors, until this moment, have never progressed in the course of a solution. All that Turkey wants is to reach political formulas to end the issues through security understandings. It changes its methods and tactics only to reach the same previous goals, and it always demands a conciliatory security path that revolves around its national security and a reformulation of the 1998 Adana Agreement.

Perhaps this thread is what facilitated bringing it together with the Syrian regime, as they both tend to this perception based on a security solution, which could be resolved through an alliance leading to the suffocation of the SDF, and bartering over the fate of the occupied territories and the political and military opposition.

Within this imagining of a solution, many issues remain on the table, including, the fate of the opposition and the Syrian coalition – understandings about armed factions – Turkish withdrawal from the occupied territories. There are many difficulties that stand in the way of reaching a serious reconciliation such as the Syrian regime is demanding Turkey to hand over leaders of the armed factions to Damascus, which is currently difficult for Turkey to implement. It also demands that it give up its areas of control and withdraw from the lands it occupied. In addition, the difficulty to ally together to fight the SDF, in light of the presence of the Global Coalition and the American bases in its region.

Syria and its prospects

The Syrian regime knows – by virtue of its historical experience with Turkey – that Ankara is in a hurry to complete many steps in record time for the upcoming presidential elections. It also knows that the conciliatory path will stop if the AKP wins the next electoral round. In this regard, two possibilities can be expected: the first is that the Syrian regime will not take any positive step in this regard until the elections are over and the winner is clear to it, knowing that it is implicitly aspiring for the victory of Erdogan’s opponents. The second is that it may speed up what will be agreed upon before the date of the Turkish elections, to confirm any victory on the ground, as it is greedy for some symbolic gains, such as restoring its control over some areas from which Turkey may withdraw, and raising the Syrian flag on some border points, and considers this a diplomatic victory for it. The Syrian regime is also looking forward to a military achievement at the expense of the armed factions that called themselves the opposition, after they became victims of this conciliatory coordination. Therefore, it is not unlikely that the coming months will witness more Turkish-Syrian coordination regarding deployment sites.

We can call the last meeting between the Turkish and Syrian regimes no more than initial security understandings, and we do not think that an agreement between them will take place with the ease and simplicity that some analysts and observers expect, as the points of contention are much more than the common denominators between them, and the outstanding and accumulated issues for more than a decade cannot be resolved by forming committees or holding separate meetings.

The serious desire to reach a real solution to the issues in Syria requires numerous and deliberate efforts on the political, economic and social levels, and not being limited to temporary security agreements.