The Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria and the Policy of Granting Citizenship to its Fighters
Raman Rashwani
After the fall of the Baath regime in December 8, 2024 the issue of foreign fighters in Syria has become a major concern for the local and international community, and poses a major challenge to the Damascus authorities, given the sectarian-motivated violations and the loss of trust between the new government and various components of the Syrian people, which these fighters bear a large portion of the responsibility. What is raising controversy and uncertainty in the context of the new phase in the country is the issue of integrating these fighters with the local community and granting them Syrian citizenship, where the matter reached the point of appointing some of them to governmental and military positions after granting some of them military ranks under the pretext of their participation in overthrowing the regime, such as fighters of the Turkestan Islamic Party, which was founded at the end of the twentieth century as an extremist jihadist organization that believes in violence as a means to achieve its goals, which are represented – according to the party’s literature and the statements of its leaders – in its quest to form an Islamic state in the Xinjiang region , northwest China , which enjoys autonomous rule and is inhabited by a majority of Muslim Uyghurs belonging to the Turkey ethnicity.
After the outbreak of the crisis in Syria in 2011, the party established a branch and began its operations and activities in the country, facilitated by some regional countries and groups linked to Al-Qaeda (such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham), which facilitated the party’s movements and provided it with logistical and military support. This contributed to its transformation and entrenchment in the military structure of the Islamic opposition, especially after the fall of the Assad regime and the party’s ally (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) assuming transitional authority in Damascus, opening the way for party leaders to assume leadership positions in the Ministry of Defense, allowing them to carry out their activities openly and in full view of everyone. This could bring with it tensions and negative repercussions for the country’s political and military future, as well as its international relations, if a solution is not found that satisfies the countries from which the fighters came, especially the Chinese government, which is working to link political, military, and economic understandings with the transitional authority to the extent of its ability to address this issue, which greatly concerns it. This is especially true since the party has gained widespread fame in the region and has acquired extensive experience in how to manage battles and terrorist operations that it may carry out against the Chinese government in the future.
The research topic suffers from a dearth of field studies and analyses that address the party’s organizational structure. This may be due to the local community’s lack of understanding of the party’s language, coupled with their reticence and avoidance of social interaction in order to preserve their structure and prevent intelligence breaches. Most references addressing the party appear biased, viewing and interpreting the issue from their own ideological perspective. This study will attempt to shed light on the emergence of this party and how it has remained resilient in light of international and regional consensus on the dissolution of most foreign factions. It will also address the future awaiting it in light of the chaos in Syria and the international pressures on the transitional authority to resolve this issue, which is troubling various countries, most notably China.
- Origins and ideological affiliations:
The Turkistan Islamic Party (in Uyghur: تۈركىستان ئىسلام پارتىيىسى, in Turkish: Türkistan İslam Partisi, in Chinese: 突厥斯坦伊斯兰党) is a Uyghur Salafi militant party seeking independence from China. It was founded by Hassan Mahsum in Pakistan between 1997 and 1998 , as part of Al-Qaeda, which played a major role in the emergence of many extremist Islamic organizations and parties, some of which are linked to conspiracies between states seeking to impose their hegemony over countries and global societies, by creating sources of threat and non- state actors in order to achieve their agendas and weaken the competing state, noting that there are organizations and parties that have emerged as a result of the accumulation of historical and political grievances against their nationality or sect. The party has long been active in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and has been able to recruit thousands of Chinese Uyghur Muslims to fight for the independence of East Turkestan (Xinjiang Province) from China. This has helped it establish close ties with Al Qaeda and the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (formerly known as the Taliban). The party’s slogans include anti-communist rhetoric and call for the unification of Turks in the countries where they are present. The organization’s central leadership and party headquarters are located in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it also has a presence in its home province of China, which has witnessed clashes that have resulted in the loss of hundreds of lives. More than 30 attacks occurred between 2001 and 2012, including factory bombings in Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Fuzhou, and attacks on police in Wuhan, Aksu, and Kashgar ([1]). Following these confrontations and clashes between the two sides, and the party’s emergence as an extremist organization calling for global jihad, both the United States and Russia began to classify it as a banned terrorist party in 2002 and 2006.
The party’s anti-American activities, such as the attack on its embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, contributed to an increase in attacks against it, and consequently, its leader, Hassan Mahsoom, was killed in the same year by Pakistani forces. Some sources confirm that the party leader was killed by a US drone. Regardless of who was directly responsible for his assassination, his death played a role in weakening the movement’s activity, which appears to have been… It has worked to develop its structure and jihadist ideology calling for fighting Western countries in order to create safe environments free from targeting that would affect its leadership. Therefore, in 2006, the party published a recorded tape calling for fighting only Chinese forces, which prompted Finally To pursue him and begin to eliminate him through arrests, assassinations, and cooperation with neighboring countries, in which the party has headquarters, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, noting that the current leader of the party after the killing of Mahsoom is Abdul Haq al-Turkistani ( [2] ).
After the Syrian crisis began in 2011 and the country became an arena for jihadist factions, the party moved its operations center to Syria and established a branch called the “Turkistan Islamic Party for the Support of the People of the Levant.” This was based on the principle of holy jihad and, according to its claim, to fight China’s ally (the Syrian regime). The party thus began a new phase in its military history by participating in the Syrian civil war as part of Al-Qaeda. The call of Sunni clerics in the Islamic world played a major role in inflaming sectarian sentiments and assisting jihadists there. The Turkistan Party eventually found its way to Syria, where it was embraced by Salafi jihadist groups, due to the party’s attractive and organized ideological power.
- Participation in the Syrian Civil War (battles, support, and factors contributing in its failure to disintegrate).
After the crisis began in Syria, former Uyghur fighters in Afghanistan began heading to the country. They played a major role in encouraging more of their compatriots to come to Syria, settling in Turkey. Language facilitated their transition to Syria, as they spoke Turkish. The party actively participated in the civil war in late 2013, facilitated by the Turkish state ( [3] ) and al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, formerly known as the Jabhat al-Nusra, which opened the door for it to carry out its activities and staffing young Uyghurs in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkey, which is home to approximately 50,000 of them ( [4] ). Associations and organizations operating under a humanitarian umbrella, such as the East Turkestan Solidarity and Education Association, also played a pivotal role in staffing fighters and preparing them to go to Syria, under the guise of providing humanitarian support to the Syrian people. Like other organizations and factions, the Turkistan Islamic Party worked to create a geography specific to itself and its families due to differences in language, customs, and traditions, and fear of intelligence breaches. Most of them spread out ” in areas extending from the city of Jisr al-Shughur and its western countryside to the Turkmen and Kurdish mountains in the northern Latakia countryside, in addition to the Ghab Plain, including border areas with the Iskenderun district, where Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra) was located ” ( [5] ). After their numbers increased, the party announced in 2014 a branch in Syria under the name “The Turkistan Islamic Party to Support the People of the Levant” and began participating in battles against the Ba’athist regime, the first of which was the battle of Jisr al-Shughur in April 2015, during which the party gained widespread fame, especially after its fighters contributed to controlling the city, which later became the party’s headquarters and raised their flag there.
Regarding the numbers of those who are under the party’s banner, there are no official statistics, but according to some open sources, including the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, which estimated their number in its latest statistics at 1,500 and 5,000 fighters ( [6] ), they are distinguished from other factions by following a military strategy that ranges between attacking the Baathist regime and its allies , especially in exhausting the Iranian militias , and remaining neutral in the face of internal fighting between the factions. This strategy enabled them at the beginning to win the people’s favor, but their strategy began to collapse after de-escalation zones were imposed by Turkey, Iran, and Russia, which linked the cessation of escalation between the Baathist regime and the factions to the liquidation of the extremist factions opposed to the new trends, and to stopping attacks against the regime. This led to confrontations and clashes between hardline factions and pragmatic factions, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Turkistan Movement, and others. Both groups maintained good relations and were capable of confronting the other factions, noting that their alliance continues even after the fall of the Ba’athist regime.
As for the party’s funding sources and how to support its activities, battles, and families, the latter relied on several mechanisms; the first is by taking advantage of the support provided by both Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the Turkish state, and this is confirmed by many sources: “ The party receives financial support from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and operates businesses in regional countries, including Turkey ” ( [7] ), while the second mechanism of support was through imposing royalties and confiscating public and private property like other armed factions stationed in Idlib. For example, it proceeded to dismantle the tower of the Zayzoun thermal power station in the northwestern Hama countryside in 2020 after support for them declined, as they dismantled the electrical transformers and sold them to Turkish merchants in order to cover their expenses ( [8] ); These economic mechanisms, military cooperation, and other factors have helped the party survive to date. Many foreign factions that arrived in Syria were liquidated or eliminated under deals between influential countries on the Syrian scene and the countries participating in the Astana talks, with the exception of this party and some other factions. It appears that several objective and subjective factors contributed to its continued disintegration. The objective factors include China’s lack of direct involvement in pursuing the party on Syrian soil, relying on intelligence coordination with the Ba’ath regime, and the West’s lack of interest in eliminating the party as long as it did not threaten its agenda. Indeed, the West turned it into a bargaining chip against China when the United States removed it from its list of terrorist organizations. The party subsequently resumed its activities publicly, holding its first official conference on Syrian soil after its removal from the list. In addition, it receives vital support from Turkey, in particular.
The internal factors are represented by both the party’s organizational structure and its ability to adapt to the new security environment imposed on it in Syria. It also established alliances with the strongest and largest factions, represented by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which previously shared its jihadist ideology. In addition, the party moved away from the language and tone of threats to the West, and it moved away from the terminology of global jihad and was satisfied with threatening the Chinese state and its allies only. In addition, the party included groups close to its culture. Because it is a nationalist party, it has its own culture and language, to prevent it from disintegrating like other factions that have followed a policy of gathering mercenaries to support their wars and agendas. In general, the Turkistan Islamic Party has made Syria a second base for its advanced operations after Afghanistan in recent years, and has made many changes to its structure and ideology to suit the complex security environment in Syria. It is worth noting that the current emir of the Turkistan Islamic Party to Support the People of the Levant is Abu Omar Kawthar, and that the general military commander and deputy emir is Abdul Aziz Abu Muhammad, who is also known by his nom de guerre Zahid Qari. What distinguished the party from others is that it did not enter into any internal conflicts and was not a party to confront any Syrian opposition faction. Furthermore, the behavior of its members Inside Syria, he was highly disciplined. The Uyghurs in Syria adhered to the policies of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, clearly aligned with them, and dealt with political and military transformations without objection or counter – movement.
- The relationship between the party and both Turkey and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
As for the party’s relations with the two aforementioned parties, some points were mentioned in the previous paragraph, but this relationship played a major role in preserving the party, not only from disintegration, but also in its emergence. Without that relationship, the party would not have been able to continue. It seems that the Turkistan Islamic Party’s alliance with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is a continuation of long-standing relations with al-Qaeda; and a result of the party’s pledge of allegiance to the late leader of the Taliban movement. The Afghan cleric Omar, to whom Al-Qaeda also pledged allegiance, the relationship between the two parties was very strong, so much so that some of them , despite the difference in the outward characteristics and forms between the two factions , went so far as to say that there was an internal similarity with “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (Al-Nusra ), and some sources confirm that the two parties participated in the security and legal institutions, including the Jisr al-Shughur court , and that the party was intervening in factional conflicts and wars to protect Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and sometimes it was showing itself as a mediator and neutral; For example, the party intervened in the fighting in Idlib province, which ended with the control of the organization over large parts of Idlib province in 2017 and 2018 ([9] ). The relationship between the two parties developed further following the party’s effective participation in the deterrence of aggression operation that ended with the fall of the Baath regime, which changed the political, military and political landscape in the country in favor of the groups and factions based in Idlib, including the aforementioned party, whose activity shifted from a strategy of isolation in a specific geography to assuming leadership positions and controlling a wide geography.
As for the party’s relationship with Turkey, which is home to thousands of Uyghur families who migrated from China, their relationship has been characterized by a degree of ambiguity and lack of clarity. Sometimes the support was public, and other times it was hidden and secret. This is due to the connection between the issue and the political and diplomatic relations between Turkey and China, which tried to pressure the former to stop its support for the party, especially in Syria, which has become a main headquarters for the party’s activity, which has greatly benefited from Turkey and its influence in several aspects. For example, Turkey opened its doors to Uyghur youth from all regions to come to the country and head to Syria in coordination with Turkish intelligence. It also allowed Uyghurs present in the country to staffing ” Uyghur mujahideen ” within Turkish territory by launching a “jihadist” website in the Turkish language to facilitate communication and to revive the spirit of vengeful jihad among those members. Consequently, heading to the battlefronts in Syria, it also provided them with vital military and logistical support, which contributed to their survival and prevented them from disintegrating like other factions. Even when the de-escalation zones were implemented (which appear to have been a military maneuver by the West and Turkey, which attempted to pressure the factions in Idlib), Turkey did not abandon the party. Rather, it entrusted it with the task of guarding logistical equipment arriving in Syrian areas and protecting military convoys. At the same time, it protected it from attacks and helped it establish itself in the region by securing its various needs. Currently, Turkey is exploiting it to further its agenda against the Kurds and North and East Syria. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Uyghur man belonging to a pro-Turkish faction beheaded a young Kurdish man in the occupied city of Afrin, indicating that Turkey is seeking to settle them in those areas to commit violations against the Kurds and continue its ethnic cleansing and demographic change.
In general, the nature of the relationship between the aforementioned parties can be understood as one of mutual and beneficial interests. For example, the relationship between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the party gave the former additional strength, given its good armament, disciplined military force, and strong ideology. According to numerous sources and information, the party was stationed in very hot spots on the battlefronts against the Syrian regime and the Iranian-backed militias. Its members formed the first line of defense on the Jisr al-Shughour fronts, and were known for their steadfastness in defense and fighting on the front lines. In addition, the party played a major role in deterring aggression. As for Turkey, it benefited from the party by using it as a political pressure card against China and even against Russia. Turkey is now trying to exploit the party’s influence and benefit from it in the Ministry of Defense formed by the Damascus authorities.
- The party’s role in HTS’s control of power in Damascus
The party, like other factions allied with the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham brigades, participated in the “Deterring of Aggression” operation under the name “Al-Fath Al-Mubin Operations Room,” which began on November 27, 2024, where members of the Turkistan Islamic Party attacked positions of the Ba’ath regime forces in the Tuffahiya and Al-Kabina axis in the northern Latakia countryside, using medium and light weapons ( [10] ). In addition, units of the party participated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other factions during the battles in both the cities of Hama and Damascus, according to the party’s official website, which published photos of its members from the battles in the aforementioned cities ( [11] ), during which the Ba’ath regime did not resist, as one city after another fell and ended with the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024, and the party’s ally, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, took power in Damascus. The party then entered a new phase, completely different from the previous phase, during which the party was unable to move from one region to another for fear of being targeted by the Baathist regime and its allies (Russia and Iran).
After the fall of the Baath regime, the party participated in what was called the “Victory Conference” in Damascus, and began to follow a new strategy based on spreading throughout various Syrian regions, including coastal areas such as Latakia and Tartous, where it has a large presence (especially in military bases and barracks, according to field sources from Latakia). This contributed to its emergence as a force to be reckoned with in terms of numbers, military discipline, and compliance with orders issued by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. As a reward for the efforts of the party members, Ahmed al-Sharaa integrated these foreign factions into the Ministry of Defense and promoted their members to high ranks and positions. Like other factions, the party played a role in committing massacres against the Alawites, according to reports issued by Reuters, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, and field sources, which confirm the party’s involvement in the mass killings committed against the Alawites in March, which, according to a Reuters report, claimed the lives of 1,500 people ( [12] ); These massacres confirm that the Damascus government is attempting to exploit the foreign fighters’ file in several ways: first, internally, by suggesting to the factions and the Sunni community that these fighters are fiercely loyal to them and their sectarian agendas and ideology, thus paving the way for their integration into the areas under Damascus’ control. Second, externally, by leveraging the foreign fighters’ file to strengthen its relations with Western countries, by sharing intelligence information related to the movements of the factions and individual’s hostile to them. At the same time, it is also deploying them in coastal areas under the pretext of confronting the remnants of the Baathist regime and Iranian militias, a move that has earned it Arab and international approval.
- Granting Syrian citizenship to members of the Turkistan Party: goals and obstacles
After the fall of the Baath regime, the Damascus government began a number of steps to convince the countries from which many of its fighters originate of the necessity of integrating these factions and parties into the Ministry of Defense; in order for them to abandon their jihadist ideology, change their behavior, and move from the concept of factionalism to the concept of the state, in order to be compatible with the new reality of the country. To achieve its goal, the Damascus government worked to communicate with the countries active in the Syrian crisis, led by America, to address this issue through adopting a diplomatic discourse. For example, Ahmed Al-Sharaa stated regarding the goals of the Turkistan Islamic Party, which are represented by fighting China and separating from it, saying: “I sympathize with them, but their struggle against China is not our struggle” ( [13] ). In addition to that; He worked to reassure other countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Russia, Iraq and others, that they would address this issue and not allow them to engage in any foreign and hostile activities. More importantly, they obtained the American green light, as stated by its special envoy, Tom Barrack, who said: “I would like to say that there is understanding and transparency.” He also said that it is better to keep the fighters, many of whom are “very loyal” to the new Syrian administration, within the state project Instead of excluding them ( [14] ). It seems that America’s approval to address this issue came after regional demands, led by Turkey. In addition, it seems that the former worked to link this issue to other files and demands that it imposed on the Damascus authority and its accession to the Western alliance and the Abraham Accords. Therefore, its acceptance of foreign fighters joining the Ministry of Defense, including fighters from the Turkistan Islamic Party, could be linked to America’s desire to create tension in the relationship between the new authority and the Chinese state, which is greatly concerned about this issue and is working through various means to ensure that they do not pose a threat to its security. For example, China may offer attractive economic investments in exchange for resolving this issue, or it may communicate with Turkey to pressure the Damascus government not to allow the party to carry out any foreign operations in exchange for economic investments. It may also, from an intelligence perspective, support some factions to assassinate influential and ideological leaders of the party, thus dispersing and weakening it.
In general, the decision to accept foreign fighters into the Ministry of Defense was not met with approval from various countries for several reasons, including the fact that the interim authority lacked the military and political capabilities to tame them and force them to abandon their extremist ideology, making it easier for them to organize themselves into groups and battalions and launch cross-border attacks. Furthermore, the decision taken by the interim authority was made with a US green light, which indicates the existence of a kind of geopolitical balance and trade-offs in the issue of naturalizing and accepting foreign fighters.
- Implications of integrating foreign fighters at the international and local levels
The integration of foreign fighters will certainly have repercussions on the local and international community, due to its political, social, economic, and even cultural impacts, as well as due to the differences in ideologies. Every faction and group have its own customs, traditions, and beliefs that it will attempt to impose on Syrians, whose country has become an arena for international and regional competition. Each party seeks to implement its own agendas and goals and works to impose its plans, including the issue of foreign fighters. Regarding the international dimension of the foreign fighter problem, preventing foreign fighters from assuming leadership positions and preventing any activity that threatens Western security is one of the US administration’s conditions for the Syrian authorities in exchange for partially lifting sanctions on Damascus. The Washington Post report quoted a senior US administration official as saying: “Washington remains skeptical about the new Syrian government, which lacks any significant minority representation, while including extremist foreign fighters in prominent positions …” US forces targeted a number of these fighters in northern Syria during the first three months of 2025. US demands also include the expulsion of Palestinian factions, taking concrete steps to prevent any activity by these Palestinian factions on Syrian territory, and deporting their members outside Syria. This measure aims to allay Israeli concerns about the presence of these factions near its borders. Meanwhile, many Western and Arab capitals, as well as China, are closely monitoring the file of these fighters and are seeking guarantees from Damascus to neutralize them. To mitigate Western concerns, the Damascus government announced that the foreign fighters in its ranks would not pose a threat to any friendly country, focusing on using them to fight remnants of the regime, its allies, and enemies of the Damascus government within the country’s borders. They will be integrated into the new Syrian army, isolated from independent factions, placed under a unified command, and prohibited from forming private organizations outside state control. They will also be prohibited from engaging in any activity that threatens the security of friendly countries.
As for the local dimension of the foreign fighter problem, their participation in massacres committed in the Syrian coastal areas has been documented. According to sources from within Latakia and Tartus, as well as testimonies from survivors of sectarian violence in western Syria, foreign fighters were observed at checkpoints at the entrances to Alawite towns, asking local residents about their religious and sectarian identities before the massacres. These fighters also participated extensively in the massacres that occurred on March 6, including 62 massacres ([15]). The extremist ideology of these fighters and their opposition to all forms of democracy and participatory politics will be among the most prominent obstacles that could fracture the structure of Syrian society, create a fragile environment, and deepen the crisis that has been ongoing in the country for 14 years. Therefore, the foreign fighter problem will create a national Syrian crisis as long as there is no national government or national constitution that enjoys the support of the majority of Syrians, guarantees their rights, and provides them with security and safety.
- The party’s future in Syria
The party’s future is tied to the country’s political and military landscape, whose direction is currently unknown. There are significant contradictions and gaps between local parties, and a lack of trust among them amid daily threats from the interim authority, its henchmen, and its media mouthpieces. These threats have been accompanied by systematic killings and genocide against both Alawites and Druze, and involvement, in one way or another, in bombings targeting Christian churches. This coincides with daily threats against components of northern and eastern Syria, especially the Kurds. The future of foreign fighters is largely tied to the fate of the current authority, affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which faces major challenges that may ultimately lead to its ouster. This could have an impact on the Turkistan Islamic Party. If groups affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham remain in power, the latter will seek to prepare the legal, social, and religious edict groundwork to integrate party members and their families into Syrian society and settle them in suitable geographic environments. This scenario could be applied to the party’s moderate elements. However, the hardline wing, which wishes to adhere to its jihadist ideology that rejects integration and political flexibility, will attempt to defect from the party and join hardline factions and parties opposed to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, such as ISIS, in order to pursue its goal of fighting China and establishing an Islamic state in Xinjiang.
However, if the transitional authority falls, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham loses power, and new groups assume power in Damascus, these groups may expel or eliminate foreign fighters, or allow them to leave the country for new locations such as Afghanistan or Pakistan, which is close to China and the stronghold of the Turkistan Islamic Party. The issue of foreign fighters is largely linked to the political and military situation that the country may witness, amidst significant tensions and a struggle for influence between regional states, most notably Turkey and Israel. Turkey, in particular, is working hard to prevent an agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the transitional authority, which is heading towards a dangerous slope that could turn the country into an open arena for all scenarios.
Results and conclusion:
- Foreign extremist groups view the modern political system as a challenge to their extremist ideology, and therefore will not submit to a transitional authority that demonstrates political flexibility to consolidate its rule and gain international, regional, and local legitimacy.
- Foreign fighters, led by the Turkistan Islamic Party, played a prominent role in the genocide targeting Alawites, and the interim government may use them in other genocides.
- No component of Syrian society is satisfied with the naturalization of foreign fighters, except for the jihadist community and those loyal to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This will have serious future consequences.
- Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is working to persuade Turkistan Party hardliners to embrace local jihadism while shunning the idea of fighting outside Syria’s borders. What happened in Sweida and the coast appears to be an example of this.
- Many political analysts believe that the integration of the Turkestan Party into the new Syrian army represents a shift from the eastern to the western camp. This is evidenced by North Korea’s closure of its embassy in Damascus, while South Korea simultaneously opened its embassy.
- China believes that the United States can use this file to pressure it, because this party has no real interest in global jihad, does not complain about the West, and focuses only on China. China also believes that the Syrian regime; by promoting party leaders in the Ministry of Defense as merely a signal of a threat to it.
[1] Mustafa Zahran, Asian and Chinese Studies Center, “The Turkistan Islamic Party: Birth and Development,” July 18, 2024, link https://cacsr.net/archives/415
[2] The Arab Center for Extremism Studies, The Network of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, publication date 12-5-2025, electronic link:
[3] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Turkistan Party, a friend of the Jabhat Al-Nusra… 7,000 fighters came to Syria with the facilitation of the Turkish authorities and became famous for their ferocity. They crowded the Syrians with their livelihoods and seized a lot of them. Published on October 7, 2018. Electronic link:
[4] Sky News Arabia, newspaper: Erdogan sold out Uyghur Muslims for a handful of investments, published on July 27, 2020, electronic link;
[5] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Turkistan Party, a friend of the Al-Nusra Front… 7,000 fighters came to Syria with the facilitation of the Turkish authorities and became famous for their ferocity. They crowded the Syrians with their livelihoods and seized a lot of them. Published on October 7, 2018. Electronic link:
[6] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Turkistani” Integration… Fears of Early Islamization of the New Syrian Army, published on June 1, 2025, electronic link;
[7] Arab Center for the Study of Extremism, Turkistan Islamic Party Leader Directs Syrian Fighters from Afghanistan, Publication Date Not Available, Electronic Link;
[8] Russia Today, Syria: Armed group destroys and dismantles the Zeizoun thermal power station tower in the Hama countryside, published on May 6, 2020, electronic link.
[9] Center for Asian and Chinese Studies, Dr. Haitham Muzahim, The Turkistan Islamic Party… From China to Syria, published on July 10, 2024, electronic link; https://cacsr.net/archives/325
[10] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Turkistan Islamic Party faction attacks regime forces’ positions in the Latakia countryside, and Russian airstrikes target the area, December 6, 2024 AD, electronic link; https://www.syriahr.com/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%85/739492/
[11] The official website of the Turkistan Islamic Party “Al-Muhsin”, the Mujahideen of the Turkistan Islamic Party affiliated with the Military Operations Department continue the battles within the Deterreing_of_Aggression operation, 11-30-2024, electronic link;
https://www.muhsinlar.net/kumandanlik-merkizi-2/
[12] Reuters- Reuters investigation found 40 distinct sites of killings, looting and arson during three days of sectarian massacres following an Assad loyalist insurgency- By Maggie Michael– June 30, 2025
[13] Hafriaat website, Maher Farghali, The Turkistan Islamic Party in the New Syrian Equation, publication date 03/15/2025, electronic link;؛ https://hafryat.com/ar/blog/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9
[14] REUTERS- By Timour Azhari and Suleiman Al-Khalidi- US gives nod to Syria to bring foreign jihadist ex-rebels into army- June 3, 2025
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-gives-nod-syria-bring-foreign-jihadist-ex-rebels-into-army-2025-06-02/
[15] Report of the Humanitarian and Human Rights Follow-up Committee, Sectarian Cleansing as a Governance Method for the Massacres on the Syrian Coast, 4/22/2025.
