Self-Protection and Its Importance for Local Communities in Syria

Introduction:
Over the past decade, regional security and stability have witnessed severe deterioration, while the regional geopolitical and geoeconomic environment has undergone structural transformations. These shifts accelerated following the outbreak of military operations in Gaza on October 7, 2023, which triggered the decline of certain regional powers and the rise of others. Climate change has further exacerbated local crises. On the domestic level, the steady erosion of the security environment has left local communities unsafe, vulnerable, and exposed to war and violent conflict. Security fears continue to dominate daily life in Syria despite developments in the trajectory of the Syrian crisis. New threats have emerged that had previously lain dormant, the most dangerous of which is sectarian violence, now a defining feature of the security landscape in western and southern Syria. These threats come in addition to long-standing challenges such as terrorism, occupation, displacement, human rights violations, poverty, drought, and the struggle to secure energy and food resources—all in the context of great powers reshaping the political and security order across the Eastern Mediterranean[1].
Local communities face relative difficulty in grasping the complex layers of political transformations and their accompanying threats, while also lacking the capacity and efficiency to respond to their consequences or manage the resulting crises. As is well known, community security depends on: a stable and prosperous economy, effective and resilient political institutions, cohesive and united societies, and an environment free of existential threats. These conditions, however, are absent in the lived reality of the region. This reinforces the conviction that the area is experiencing a profound decline in security across humanitarian, societal, and national dimensions—an outcome of the century-long failure to establish a state based on citizenship in Syria.
With the political deadlock in resolving national crises and ongoing attempts to recycle an authoritarian system, the issue of self-protection emerges as a community-level tactic for crisis management until sustainable solutions are found to achieve peace and stability—both essential preconditions for prosperity and strategic goals for any society. In practice, driven by instinct, communities have adopted various means of ensuring their own protection, depending on their surrounding security environment[2] and available resources. These methods have ranged from accommodation (submission), to resistance, and, in many cases, displacement and migration to avoid subjugation by dominant powers.
Self-protection holds great significance for human societies, serving as a mechanism of adaptation to their environment and as a means of confronting diverse threats. Its relevance has been especially evident in the Syrian crisis, where it took on a more organized form within the Kurdish community, shaping many of the political and security dynamics on the ground. With sectarian violence now widespread across several Syrian regions, the debate around self-protection has resurfaced as a societal necessity to confront attempts at extermination and assimilation. This makes the phenomenon worthy of study through an analysis of its underlying dynamics.
Accordingly, this research will seek to shed light on the nature of self-protection in its military-security dimension, and to describe its dynamics within local communities across Syrian territory. It will do so by analyzing security threats and patterns of response since 2011, using a descriptive methodology and observation as the primary research tool.
The Concept of Self-Protection and Its Dimensions
Every living being possesses a defensive system that ensures its survival and preserves its existence. According to natural law, a being sustains its life in part by threatening or destroying the life of another. Humans, in particular, have a range of means to establish a defensive system based on their own capacities. Some of these means are innate, while others—often more effective—are consciously developed through reasoning, enabling protection both during waking hours and sleep, regardless of the measures’ effectiveness or reliability.
Self-protection also has a societal dimension beyond its individual aspect. Its design is primarily shaped by the social environment in which an individual life; it cannot be constructed in a way that conflicts with the culture and ethical norms of the community. This brings into focus the concept of an “security doctrine,” which establishes the foundations of self-protection at both the individual and collective levels by defining the nature of threats, strategies for confronting them, and ways to mitigate their effects.
In general, avoiding death, disability, or enslavement forms the core principles of a human security doctrine, which in turn informs the security doctrine of the community. Death and disability caused by illness, injury, poverty, or ignorance have become more clearly understood within the framework of human security. Enslavement, however, remains an ongoing issue due to its multiple forms in the modern era. As Friedrich Nietzsche famously said: “He who does not possess two-thirds of his day for himself is a slave.”
Enslavement, in its many forms, has been a persistent threat to humans since the weakening of moral constraints that governed relationships before the formation of the city-state in mythological eras. Today, this phenomenon is more complex. Compulsion and persuasion are no longer the sole drivers of enslavement; some individuals willingly assume the role of the servant to gain personal benefits within the master-servant dynamic. Researcher Ahmed Barqawi explains this paradox[3] as follows: “The self that experiences the dialectic of sovereignty and servitude is a self that sacrifices its sovereignty for its own servitude, obtaining through it a limited form of control over others.”
The paradox lies in the individual’s willingness to accept severe compromises—such as diminished dignity or moral concessions—in pursuit of material gains or psychological comfort. Yet, the human existential drive and pursuit of self-actualization inevitably create both internal and external conflict with the imposed situation, leading to rebellion against oppressive forces.
This issue is a vital component of **human security**, which underpins social security and forms the foundation of national security in any state. The essence of the threat to this security arises when humans are exposed to the grips of enslavement. Poverty, fear, tyranny, racism, forced assimilation, genocide, terrorism, and similar pressures push individuals toward the brink of subjugation. The response involves adopting defensive measures and behaviors proportional to one’s energy and awareness.
Society channels collective awareness toward resistance through ideology, which reinforces the perceived justice of the cause for which people fight or struggle. The sense of justice motivates combatants to defend their land and sacred values against enemies and occupiers. Societies that are underdeveloped are more vulnerable to attacks and less organized and cohesive in responding to them.
In the context of human history, researcher Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi[4][5] emphasizes: “One of the main characteristics of every civilization is the way it understands and organizes aggression. This understanding is instilled in every member from an early age. Every upbringing that directs aggression teaches when and how it must be restrained, or conversely, when it may be expressed…” This process constitutes one of the key manifestations of self-protection, self-defense, or intrinsic protection.
Incapacity to confront violence represents one of the most significant risks that humans face. Enslavement is one manifestation of this incapacity, alongside poverty, ignorance, and physical or health weakness. It can be argued that responding to violence—both material and psychological—receives the highest priority within the defensive systems of both individuals and communities.
From a sociological perspective, violence[6] is defined as “a harmful behavior grounded in the denial of the other as a value equal to the ‘self’ or the ‘we,’ a value deserving of life and respect, whose exclusion from the struggle is achieved either by reducing them to subordination, expelling them from the field, or eliminating them physically and morally.” Conversely, violence is often employed as a response to violence[7], making it “a reciprocal behavior initiated by the actor and met by the recipient, whose confrontation requires resistance.”
War, similarly, is considered “an act of violence aimed at compelling the adversary to submit to our will,” according to General Carl von Clausewitz in his work on war. This underscores the role of the security environment in shaping self-protection systems. The battlefield represents the most acute expression of a severely deteriorated security environment, highlighting the critical importance of awareness: self-protection cannot be effectively managed without understanding the characteristics and conditions of the security environment in which threats emerge.
Accurate interpretations of war allow for more reliable predictions, which in turn guide appropriate self-protection measures. For example, socialist theory views the driving force behind modern[8] wars as “imperialism seeking markets for manufactured goods, control over raw material sources, and dominance over political and ideological spheres, with capital as the main engine of all regimes.” In contrast, the psychological theory of war attributes conflict to mental factors characterized by hostility, aggression, and negativity, asserting that “the feeling of hatred in people and its active influence on behavior drives them to enter conflicts with others. Such conflicts, which may take the form of wars, serve to satisfy instinctual needs, particularly the need for destruction and inflicting harm upon others[9].”
Hatred, along with unconscious tensions, grudges, and aggressive impulses, is thus a key explanation for the outbreak and recurrence of wars among nations and peoples. These impulses also prompt readiness and provoke fear of retaliatory attacks. The precision of this theory can be observed in Syria’s conflict since 2012 and the types of self-defense systems adopted by local communities[10] to protect themselves and respond to crises. This reinforces the understanding that awareness of the security environment is a primary factor in structuring and managing self-protection.
Self-protection can be understood as a response to various conflicts, whether social[11] (e.g., class-based) or political. The most dangerous conflicts arise from “accumulated aggression” directed at another community, posing a direct threat to the targeted society. According to a psychosocial study[12], aggression “threatens group cohesion and the possibility of continued membership.” In underdeveloped regions, the most common response is to direct aggression outward, often through ethnic or sectarian prejudice accompanied by authoritarian tendencies.
In this context, British philosopher Bertrand Russell[13] observes that some humans paradoxically “require a continual external enemy to ensure internal unity, because a common external adversary perpetually unites those opposing it. Group unity thus depends on the existence of a common enemy. The need for an enemy may disappear when humans recognize their shared traits and collective human identity.” Ideologies that glorify sacred violence—violence to satisfy a deity—serve as outlets for such aggression, as seen in religious wars historically and in sectarian violence following the fall of the Ba’athist regime in Iraq and later Syria.
In the master-slave dynamic, this conflict manifests in individuals who are either oppressed or resisting oppression, and in those attempting to impose dominance on others. Pragmatism often shapes distrust in political and economic relationships, with all parties invoking the protection of interests to justify violence or political actions that may lead to violence. Consequently, self-protection emerges as a means of responding to violence, regardless of underlying motives. Psychologists explain that the oppressed often resort to armed resistance as a last measure against annihilation and violence, when faced with a choice between destruction and confrontation. Social psychologist Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi notes that through the use of arms[14], “a radical reversal of roles occurs, transforming weakness into strength. Weapons take on an almost magical significance: they are both shield and protection, and a symbol of a new existence.”
In both social and political conflicts, violence functions as a final recourse for humans to escape predicaments and avert internal annihilation.
Based on the foregoing, the following can be identified as key dimensions for constructing a general understanding of a community’s self-protection system:
- The security environment surrounding the individual and the immediate and potential threats they face.
- The reliability of the security doctrine which defines the manner of response to those threats.
- Available security measures and their effectiveness.
- The community’s readiness to organize and make necessary sacrifices.
In this context, a self-protection system can be defined as a set of procedures and measures that require the adoption of specific behaviors and the use of tools and mechanisms to respond to various threats in the surrounding environment—before, during, or after their occurrence—while addressing their effects and preparing to confront them more effectively if they recur. The effectiveness of this system depends on the level of awareness possessed by those managing it.
The ultimate objective of self-protection is to counter annihilation, enslavement, and incapacity in all their forms. Accordingly, terms such as self-defense, personal defense, defensive strategy, resistance, and similar expressions are all manifestations of a self-protection system.
Self-Protection as a Social Phenomenon
At times, aggression and self-protection are conflated, following the principle of a “preemptive strike to prevent imminent aggression.” In a similar context, Freud[15] wrote to Einstein[16] that “when one reads about the atrocities of history, it sometimes seems as if idealistic motives were merely a pretext for destructive desires.” However, self-protection cannot be considered aggression; at its core, it is a defensive process aimed at confronting danger, responding to violence with proportional measures, and preparing proactively for imminent threats.
An individual may be able to confront simple threats alone, yet complex dangers—such as floods, famine, terrorism, occupation, drought, epidemics, crime, and corruption—cannot be managed single-handedly. Such threats require social solidarity, whereby an individual’s self-protection system is shared with peers within the surrounding community to build a comprehensive communal self-protection system. This is a fundamental human trait: a person cannot feel secure without it, even to a limited extent. For instance, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell[17] regarded “war and combat” as “an instinct deeply rooted in human life, whereby humans instinctively divide humanity into friends and enemies, aligning themselves with friends and engaging in continuous struggle with enemies.” This dynamic can be observed in tribes, rural communities, political organizations, and religious sects.
Kurdish thinker Abdullah Ocalan, in his analysis of the self-defense system[18], emphasizes that “defense in humankind is as social as it is biological,” distinguishing it from aggression by defining “existential protection” as the primary goal of defense. He stresses that it “is free from colonialism and the imposition of dominance over members of the same species or other beings.” Freud offers a similar perspective in his letter to Einstein[19]: “There is a path that leads from violence to right or law. What is this path? I believe there is one, based on the principle that the combined force of several weak individuals can confront the superior force of one. Union is strength; union can overcome violence.”
Ocalan also highlights the social dimension of self-protection by attributing meaning and value to high birth rates as a means of communal self-defense among populations in distant colonies unable to develop individually or collectively in intellectual or political power. He asserts that[20] “responding to imposed annihilation by increasing population is a form of resistance and self-preservation. However, this is a form of self-protection specific to communities with limited opportunities for free life.”
In this context, A. Hussein Abdulrahman[21] (lecturer at the Community Protection Forces Foundation) argues that self-protection relies primarily on **social solidarity**, based on the experience of self-protection in northern and eastern Syrian communities throughout the Syrian crisis. He emphasizes that “sectarianism, regionalism, nationalism, and authoritarian tendencies pose a significant threat to self-protection, which is fundamentally based on equality and the acceptance of coexistence with others—essential conditions for self-protection to achieve its objectives.”
Abdulrahman further highlights that the most significant threat to self-protection comes from the “fifth column” within the community, where groups or individuals act on behalf of adversarial forces to undermine the established resistance. This underscores the critical social dimension of the self-protection system.
On the other hand, the social dimension of self-protection can be understood through the measures and procedures adopted to confront crime in its various forms within human society. Sociologically, crime[22] is defined as “a deviation from societal rules and a violation of social norms; these are acts that pose a threat to the community and make coexistence among its members impossible.” Crime, along with dangers arising from political motives, represents a manifestation of violence used to compel others to submit to the will of the aggressor, sometimes for plunder and theft, and at other times for extermination. Self-defense against such threats cannot be achieved without social solidarity, which underscores self-protection as a social phenomenon also influenced by political systems.
Politically, the need for self-protection arises from the breakdown of ethical interactions among people. If values such as tolerance, justice, honesty, cooperation, solidarity, peace, and security were prevalent, there would be little need for such protection. However, pragmatism, when adopted as a political way of life, has relegated these values to secondary importance—a reality evident in the genocides suffered by many peoples around the world. In exceptional cases, local communities may seek to protect their members through negotiations with armed groups, reaching security agreements in exchange for harsh concessions. Communities that choose resistance often rely on collective action to secure means of combat, water sources, food storage, and medical care, while some prepare for mass displacement as a protective strategy.
Self-protection is not limited to confronting external enemies; it also addresses internal threats, particularly in countries with diverse sects, ethnicities, or religions. The danger lies in the efforts of political ideologies to construct authoritarian systems by fostering conflict among these groups, exploiting historical grievances, doctrinal animosities arising from past violence, and the lack of trust among the components of a single society. Such conflicts may be “overt and explosive, or latent, simmering beneath the surface and eroding the social fabric while threatening unity—but always present.” These conflicts may also be manipulated to accommodate external interventions by powers seeking to dominate the community, inflaming divisions to keep countries at constant risk of civil, ethnic, or sectarian wars characterized by widespread massacres. The situation is worsened when local leaders collude with external forces to protect their own interests. The crisis of the Syrian state since its founding provides a clear example of this phenomenon.
Regarding the foundations of the self-protection system, they begin with community members imitating one another in protective measures. This includes mimicking social interaction patterns, construction styles, methods of arming, storing water and food, analyzing threats, dealing with outsiders, gathering news, and more.
For example, in some villages in the eastern countryside of Qamishli, villagers’ homes were built adjacent to one another, with small openings in the dividing walls between houses. This functioned as an early warning system, alerting residents to dangers such as thief or wolf attacks, or other emergencies. In response, all members would arm themselves with available tools to confront the threat.
Another example is among Kurdish communities, who traditionally pitched their tents on hilltops while avoiding valleys. This practice, inherited from their ancestors, aimed to protect against sudden floods and to enhance surveillance of the surrounding environment. They understood that elevated locations offered defensive advantages and opportunities to transition to offense if necessary.
In contrast, some Arab Bedouins set up their tents in valleys, assigning young men to reconnaissance and monitoring tasks in the surrounding area. This choice reflected the understanding that lower areas were safer due to fewer sudden floods, the difficulty of hiding or taking cover on relatively flat land, and the cooler temperatures of the lowlands. According to a Kurdish elder, it was even possible for an observer from a distance to identify tribal affiliation based on the location of their encampment.
The Importance of Self-Protection:
The importance of self-protection emerges in the context of national crises, when official institutions are absent, or under authoritarian regimes. Its effectiveness depends on the efficiency of its organization. The wars waged by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes over the past decade have demonstrated the importance of self-protection for societies and the efficiency of the self-protection system available within them.
A self-protection system ensures a society’s ability to respond to various risks by avoiding them, reducing the incidence of damage and casualties, or repelling them. The loss of the ability to manage self-protection can cause a major catastrophe for society, such as the catastrophe suffered by the Yazidi, Alawite, and Druze communities, as well as some Arab tribes, at the hands of extremist Islamic organizations. Self-protection also constitutes an emergency plan in the event of the collapse of the country’s defense system, exposure to foreign occupation, and in the event of natural disasters and the spread of epidemics. Switzerland, both as a country and a people, represents an exemplary model for building a self-protection system in the event of a nuclear war or bloody conflict in Europe. In 1950, the Swiss government issued a special program for “People’s Defense” based on the idea of ”civil protection.” On May 24, 1959 ( 19), Swiss citizens voted by a decisive majority of 62.3% in favor of including a civil protection clause in the Federal Constitution. This established a clear clause: protecting the population and their way of life from any threat, whether a natural disaster or an armed conflict) (20This resulted in a project to dig shelters in the Alps against nuclear war, and to build individual food stores and underground hospitals. The goal was to enable the Swiss people to move within a few hours in the event of a nuclear attack to fully equipped underground shelters, prepared for long-term refuge. In the context of the Syrian crisis, the self-defense system, adopted by the majority of the Kurdish population in Rojava, helped reduce the number of casualties, the extent of destruction, and the rate of losses in their areas. After the collapse of the Ba’athist regime, the effectiveness of this system in protecting areas of northeastern Syria from terrorist attacks became clear, despite ongoing Turkish attempts to undermine it through ongoing aerial bombardment, siege, and special warfare. Thus, self-defense is no longer limited to confronting a predator, a criminal, or a natural phenomenon; it has become a system for confronting genocide, occupation, and complex threats. Thanks to this system, human security is ensured and transformed into a fundamental pillar of national security. Any political system that neglects to support the self-defense of its communities will be more vulnerable to defeat, as evidenced by the resounding fall of authoritarian regimes in Syria and Iraq and the ongoing crises in other countries. In some relatively stable countries, the issue of self-protection within the community has been reconsidered to achieve internal security. For this purpose, “community policing” ( 21) has been created, which allows the police, as an official institution, to work with the community to solve problems of crime, disorder, and other security issues, in order to improve the quality of life for all members of society, as the community participates in the process of establishing security.
o Self-protection dynamics in the context of the Syrian crisis
For decades, Syria has witnessed a steady deterioration in the pillars of peace: the equitable distribution of resources, clear acceptance of the rights of communities, and good relations with neighbors. This was due to the rise of nationalist and religious extremism, which sometimes clashed bloodily. This ultimately led to the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, which the Ba’athist regime worked hard to keep dormant by tightening its security grip. Each local force active in the conflict now possesses its own approach to security issues, based on building authority or refusing to submit to the authority of others. However, the continued deterioration in security—despite the fall of the Ba’athist regime—is clear evidence that current security approaches are ineffective in achieving and consolidating peace. Due to the failure to adopt humanitarian security approaches that place the concerns of local communities at the core of their concerns, and the continued adoption of security approaches based on an authoritarian ideology that conflicts with the self-protection system of most communities, and ultimately leads to increased insecurity and instability at the local level, each community or group of “partner communities” finds itself forced to adopt its own security approaches based on social solidarity, based on confronting threats emanating from its surroundings. This is confirmed by the crimes and violations occurring in Sweida, the Homs countryside, the Syrian coast, Deir ez-Zor, and Daraa.
At the beginning of the Syrian crisis, local communities adopted various forms of self-protection to confront systematic violence and security threats. Their political orientation played a role in shaping their self-protection system, which developed further as ISIS attacks escalated in the region. Despite this, many communities suffered heavy casualties and significant material losses, and millions were forced to flee to relatively safer areas. With the fall of the Ba’athist regime, many communities still find it difficult to manage their own self-protection in the face of the repressive policies of the new sectarian regime. This is particularly true for urban communities, Shiite communities, and Christians, who had grown accustomed to secular life and adapted to the repressive policies of the Ba’athist regime.
In general, based on the security approach adopted by local communities, four main types of self-protection systems can be identified in the context of the Syrian crisis: the first type was initially adopted by Kurdish communities based on the principle of “self-defense,” and was later adopted by Christian and Arab communities that allied with the Kurds. The second type was adopted by Sunni communities based on the principle of “jihad.” The third type was adopted by communities that were not convinced by the authority of the governments to which they were subject and relied on a policy of appeasement. The fourth type was adopted by communities that supported the Ba’athist regime based on their adoption of the regime’s security approach.
- The Communities that have adopted self-defense:
It is certain that the Kurds of Rojava are among those who have preferred not to emigrate, and are among those who have developed the most self-defense systems compared to the surrounding communities. They have transcended the traditional system of self-defense and transformed it into an integral part of their social lives since 2011, based on the experience of the “Self-Defense Units” (SDU), which were secretly formed to confront the widespread attacks by Ba’athist regime elements against the Kurds since the Qamishli uprising in 2004. They have been able to maintain their self-administration despite the occupation of a number of their historical regions by Turkish forces and their mercenaries. They have also been able to respond effectively to the genocidal operations targeting them throughout the Syrian crisis through their willingness to make sacrifices. The “Community Protection Foundation’’in North and East Syria has played a major role in this, developing ideas for community protection at the political, economic, security, and military levels, and calling it “confronting the special war” (*). This relative success may be due to the security environment surrounding them and their awareness of the risks at the strategic level. The Rojava regions are poor in mountains and forests and do not have a military infrastructure that would enable them to confront various attacks. Most of the existing infrastructure, the size of the military forces, and the international partnership were achieved thanks to their own efforts and their benefit from the military and security experience of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, as dozens of people returned from the mountains of Kurdistan to defend their community.
The Kurdish community in Rojava relied on the principle of legitimate defense in the democratic nation approach proposed by Kurdish thinker Abdullah Ocalan (**) to build their own self-defense system. Ocalan, in the context of cultural genocide (22), emphasized that “the existence and freedom of Kurdistan and the Kurds are impossible without self-defense.” This awareness was translated into this system in the form of:
- Military organization: with the formation of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).
- Social organization: with the formation of communes and community defense forces.
- Political organization: by forming the Democratic Society Movement.
This system enabled the Kurds to defend themselves, protect their communities and infrastructure in their areas to a relative extent from the repercussions of the war in Syria, reveal sleeper cells, and protect the rear lines of advancing forces in various battles fought by the People’s and Women’s Protection Units (YPG) and later the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in various regions of northeastern Syria. It also enabled them to rescue Yazidis from ISIS attacks and support the security forces (Asayish) as volunteer groups. They transferred this experience to their Arab and Christian neighbors, who in turn formed political and military organizations based on the principle of self-defense. Together with the Kurds, they established the Autonomous Administration and organized military formations that were able to repel most attacks by Al-Qaeda, the Al-Nusra Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, the Syrian regime, and organized crime networks. This close alliance culminated in the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which now constitute the most disciplined and well-armed military force in Syria and enjoys the support of the international coalition to fight ISIS.
Self-defense is part of the Kurdish people’s combat doctrine. Kurdish thinker Abdullah Ocalan, in his analysis of the nature of Kurdish social life, says:( (23“Self-defense has always been of great importance to the Kurds throughout history, given the concrete circumstances they have experienced. They have been subjected to continuous attacks…” Ocalan explained that “the systems for protecting existence and the mechanisms of self-defense that they [the Kurds] developed in the form of clan and tribal units based on the mountainous regions they have inhabited since the early ages were not sufficient in the face of the means of attack based on the capitalist system. For the first time, the danger of losing their existence entered the agenda…” He pointed out that the “self-defense movement,” which the Kurds initially practiced on the ideological and political levels, had moved within a short period to a phase of self-defense based on mutual violence against the nation-state system, emphasizing that they had achieved success in record time, represented by the recognition of identity and respect for semi-independent life. In his book “Manifesto of Democratic Civilization/Volume V,” Ocalan called on the Kurds to persevere in their self-defense, emphasizing that “the minimum condition for coexistence with nation-states is to include Kurdish identity and free life in a constitution.” He emphasized the necessity for Kurdish society to manage its own security affairs (24). He believes that “ensuring internal security in the best possible way and meeting its requirements in the most appropriate manner is not possible unless society undertakes it itself…” Many Arab and Christian military formations in northern and eastern Syria have adopted this approach to defend their communities. Currently, there is a “Self-Defense Authority” as an official institution within the Autonomous Administration, and those assigned are subjected to military courses within the framework of self-defense tactics.
- b) Societies that have adopted the principle of jihad:
Sunni political Islam movements and religious orders have had a strong presence in rural areas and major Syrian cities, such as Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, and Daraa, for decades. This is due to several factors, most notably:
▪ The conservative religious nature of these societies and their rapid emotional susceptibility to religious propaganda.
▪ A cultural heritage based on sectarian tensions in the context of both
jurisprudential and political disputes between Sunnis and Shiites, and the Crusades in the region, which are passed down from generation to generation.
▪ The tyranny practiced by the Ba’ath regime over Syrian societies, which Islamists interpreted in their political propaganda as injustice perpetrated by the Alawite sect, to which the regime’s leaders belong.
▪ The weakness of political and cognitive awareness resulting from the framing of the humanities within Arab and Islamist nationalist thought, the blaming of the West for the failure of Arab-Islamic civilization, and the marginalization of positive sciences (experimental and applied) in educational life.
Almost all religious Sunnis in Syria are convinced that jihad, “holy violence,” is the only way to liberate themselves from oppression and rebuild their civilization. The oppressed in these societies are the groups most likely to choose armed violence and brutality as the sole means of self-expression and the right to exist, which submission to the regime’s authority has denied them. Within this framework, several different Islamic organizations have emerged, proposing political projects that transcend national borders. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood supported the Turkish state’s policy of rebuilding the regional order based on the approach of the Ottoman Empire, while the Salafists called for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate based on the “prophet’s approach.” ISIS built an authoritarian structure called the “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” and appointed its leader as caliph over Muslims. Meanwhile, Jabhat al-Nusra (later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) worked to establish a Sunni emirate in the Levant.
Thousands of young Sunnis Muslims joined these organizations, hoping to escape the oppression and misery in which they were and continue to live. They were armed with the clerics’ interpretation of the term “one of the two good things” (25 ) in the Holy Quran, meaning “victory or martyrdom.” Victory brings them spoils of war and freedom from the oppression of the infidels, while martyrdom takes them to paradise. Although this approach enabled them to break the barrier of fear of the Ba’athist regime, their total reliance on it and the regime’s insistence on military confrontation led to the savagery of the conflict, with both sides committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, massive destruction of infrastructure, and a major demographic shift. Although the Islamists benefited from geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, developments in the international conflict, and the impasse in resolving the Syrian crisis, which led to the collapse of the Ba’athist regime, their seizure of power in Damascus, and the establishment of a sectarian regime behind a secular ” ties “. They then launched bloody military campaigns against their opponents; However, they have so far been unable to establish a system of government that enjoys the support of the local community and the international community. Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi offers a vision that can be measured to clarify this problem. In his book, “Social Backwardness,” Al-Hijazi says that one of the dangers that spread in the context of the conflict between the oppressed society and the oppressor is (26) “the practice of armed action through the hierarchy of oppression and submission. What is meant by this is the issue of identifying with the oppressor in the use of violence and weapons.” He explains that “the oppressed person who has taken up arms without a sufficient political culture to guide his new situation may reverse roles in his dealings with the public or with those under his command, acting with the mentality of the old oppressor… and exploiting his new power for domination, material exploitation, and control of others…”
Although the essence of jihad is “self-defense,” (*) Syrian Islamist organizations have offered many interpretations of jihad, and factions affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda have exploited it to justify their attacks against each other and to occupy the Kurdish areas of Afrin, Gire Spi (Tal Abyad), and Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), which are inhabited by a Sunni Muslim Kurdish majority. Many young Muslims who resisted the attacks of these factions relied on the principle of jihad to repel injustice and aggression from their communities.
C)Societies that adopted an approach of appeasement: The approach of containing threats is an ancient socio-political phenomenon, adopted by many societies as a type of appeasement with the forces that dominate them, and which they lack the energy to repel. This is achieved by conceding certain rights in order to preserve their existence and cultural identity, or as a result of their need for these forces to repel aggressors, but within the context of a close alliance, such as the Kurdish-Turkish alliance in the Battle of Malazgird in 1072, for example. History abounds with many examples of this approach, such as: Mesopotamian societies’ containment of the tyranny of the Assyrian kings, Iranian societies’ containment of the Arab-Islamic occupation, and Arab societies’ containment of the Ottoman occupation and, later, Western colonialism. The thinker Ocalan also presents “Sufi orders in Kurdish society” as a type of self-defense organization, explaining that (27) “It is possible to define orders in their purest form as a form of self-defense against the religious hierarchy that has transformed into authority.” And a state…”, where he indicates that Islam (28) “is a form of societal culture that played a role in Kurdistan as much as ethnic tribal culture at least.”
Many Syrian communities that found themselves, de facto, under the control of one of the forces involved in the conflict attempted to appease these forces and accommodate the conditions imposed on them, with the aim of preserving property and preventing harm. The communities that most succumbed to this practice were those that lacked political and military organization, such as the Syrian urban communities that remained under the control of the Ba’athist regime and attempted to adapt to its security, economic, and political policies without pledging allegiance to it. They also included communities that suddenly found themselves under the control of one of the political Islamist organizations, such as ISIS in central Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra in Idlib Governorate, and the Muslim Brotherhood in northern Syria. There were also communities that did not want to engage in the ongoing conflict, considering it not their battle, such as the Christian, Druze, Yazidi, and Kurdish communities in the Levant. There were also communities that found their new circumstances better than before, despite the ideological disapproval of some of their elites, such as the conservative and tribally fanatical communities in the autonomous areas.
- d) Societies that have adopted the regime’s security approach:
Some may find it strange that societies have adopted the regime’s security approach despite its apparent tyranny. Perhaps the explanation for this lies in an idea similar to Freud’s belief that (29)”society is held together by two members: the brute force of violence and the emotional bonds between its members (identities being the code name). If one of these two members is absent, perhaps the other can keep society together.” In the north and east, dozens of areas previously called security squares in the Qamishli and Hasakah countrysides have joined military formations bearing the names: National Defense, Baath Brigades, Ansar al-Amn al-Amn al-Askari, Ansar al-Amn al-Dawla, and Hezbollah. Inside Syria, there were other militias in addition to these militias, such as the “Army of Tribes” faction and others. The regime’s goal with these militias was to force the communities under its control to participate in its war against the opposition, exploiting the preference of the elites of these communities (clan and family leaders, clerics, and even ordinary people) for their own interests or their adherence to ideologically tinged hate speech. It also exploited the loyalty of members of these communities to the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. In the advanced stages of the Syrian crisis, Iranian militias spread among these communities, promoting the so-called Islamic resistance and imbuing it with a “leftist revolutionary” character. They coined the term “Axis of Resistance” to liberate Jerusalem, confront imperialism, and rescue the oppressed (according to their political propaganda). Despite the misery they experienced under the regime, it seems that these societies were forced to follow the adoption of the regime’s security approach by their elites, and to keep pace with the involvement of their sons in the ranks of its militias and security forces. In this context, Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi believes that one of the models of defenses and solutions with which the oppressed backward person confronts his dilemma is to proceed on the axis of “approaching the oppressor and identifying with him on the one hand, and distancing himself from him and dissolving into the group on the other hand. To the extent that the oppressed person approaches the oppressor, he denies his original group. Conversely, to the extent that he denies the oppressor and distances himself from him, he integrates into his original group, which shares his fate and situation to the point of dissolving into belonging to it…” (30 ); Therefore, this position on the ground can be interpreted as a mixed approach of self-defense, compliance, and the adoption of a different interpretation of the concept of jihad based on Baathist or Khomeinist ideology, different from that adopted by jihadist groups. The primary factor appears to be the emotional and moral bond with its members who are embedded within the ranks of the regime. Tribal tendencies play a crucial role in this regard. An example of this is ‘’the Hashemite Tribes Regiment’’ militia, led by ‘’Nawaf Ragheb al-Bashir’’, sheikh of the al-Bakara tribe in the Deir ez-Zor region. Although dozens of members of the tribe were in the ranks of other armed groups, the majority were in these militias based on their tribal commitment. The same applies to the Tribal Forces militia, led by Ibrahim al-Hafl, which mostly included members of the al-Aqeidat tribe, despite the presence of hundreds of members of the tribe in the ranks of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The situation was repeated under the name of “National Defense” and other names in the remaining areas under the control of the Ba’ath regime, and the same thing was repeated in the Alawite and Shiite communities, and in a section of the Druze and Christian communities.
o Self-Protection Requirements After the Fall of the Ba’athist Regime:
The new security environment in the post-Ba’athist era, characterized by the control of various Islamic factions over northern, western, and southern Syria, makes local communities in dire need of a self-protection system. This system should enable them to confront the new threats in this stage, now under the control of the opposition, which adopts the principle of “jihad” from a sectarian standpoint in areas formerly controlled by the Ba’athist regime. Communities that adopted both the approach of appeasement and the security approach of the regime are most in need of reviewing their self-protection system. Since the fall of the Ba’athist regime, these communities, according to reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and other human rights organizations, have been subjected to killings and systematic violations of human rights for sectarian, political, and retaliatory motives, amid a clear military and political inability to achieve self-protection. Many individuals responded to this inability by declaring allegiance to the new regime in a phenomenon called “Al-Takwee’,” while others, especially officials of the Ba’athist regime, were forced to flee abroad or go into hiding. The majority remained to face their fate, which appears to have been bloody, with dozens of massacres, arbitrary arrests, torture, and sectarian insults committed by extremist Sunni militants (*) since the fall of the regime at the end of 2024.
Fundamentally, these communities did not develop their self-protection system based on social organization and the development of community diplomacy with all Syrian communities. They also did not rely on their own capabilities for military organization. It seems that they relied entirely on the Ba’athist regime, and religious leaders and social elites bear the main responsibility for this strategic mistake, despite their political history being full of massacres and violations, such as the Alawites, Druze, and other sects. They did not even learn from the genocide suffered by the Yazidis at the hands of ISIS in Sinjar in 2014, despite the presence of the Iraqi army and state security forces, and they were unable to change the mentality of “seeking external protection.” An exception can be made for some of the Druze, given their historical experience in organizing themselves militarily to defend their regions and internal conflicts among their princes. On the other hand, communities that have adopted the principle of self-defense need to develop their self-security system in line with the evolving threats and the unclear plans of the enemies after the ceasefire agreement at Tishreen Dam in March 2025, and the failure of the Damascus authorities to take a clear stance on the armed militias affiliated with the Ba’athist regime that were carrying out sabotage operations in northern and eastern Syria, in addition to ISIS making adjustments to its tactics in the new security environment that was available to it after the fall of the regime.
Despite the fall of the Ba’athist regime and the relatively positive rhetoric circulated by officials of the new regime in Damascus, and despite the international community’s calls for a ceasefire throughout Syria and the start of reconstruction after achieving specific conditions, most notably: resolving the problem of foreign fighters, fighting ISIS, achieving transitional justice, involving all Syrian components in the political process, normalizing relations with Israel, and disengaging with Iran, etc.; however, field data indicate the reality of the sharp security deterioration in many internal regions of Syria, and also indicate the inability of local authorities to control them. The “new-old” threats are: the combat and advocacy activity of extremist groups, most notably the new organization “Saraya Ansar al-Sunna” and ISIS, which was clearly manifested in the suicide bombing that targeted “Mar Elias Church” in Damascus, and there are also organized crime networks, most notably drug dealers and kidnapping gangs, the difficulty of securing energy carriers such as fuel, cooking gas, and electricity, and the repercussions of climate change, most notably drought and the deterioration of agricultural seasons, and retaliatory operations and human rights violations in conjunction with the return of hundreds of mercenaries, who were involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity in northern Syria, to their original areas, most of whom only know how to carry weapons and fight as a profession and a means of earning money; the most prominent indicators of this are the increase in assassinations and acts of killing motivated by revenge or theft, and the seizure of property, especially the property of those who preferred to flee their areas because of their direct relationship with the Ba’athist regime or because of their relationship with parties that are not considered friendly to the new regime in Damascus. These threats require local communities to develop a security and diplomatic strategy capable of responding to unequal security threats, reducing human and material losses, weakening the impact of hate speech, and educating the local community on how to respond to them; this is done through social organization by building a social solidarity system similar to the commune system in northern and eastern Syria, as well as through political organization by electing a political body with legal personality and capable of managing diplomatic work.
Self-protection is considered a necessity to preserve life, property, cultural identity, and to keep the impact of threats at their lowest levels, until better political and security conditions are available. In general, upon investigating the response of most Alawite villagers to the attacks they are subjected to, a lack of resourcefulness, a lack of organization and cohesion, and the multiplicity of community leaders could be observed. The data indicating this belief are numerous, including: young men fleeing to the mountains and hiding among the thickets, abandoning residence in their homes and residing in other villages, resorting to acquaintances from the Sunni sect, or resorting to acquaintances in Lebanon and the Russian Hmeimim base. Some preferred to surrender themselves to the security forces of the Damascus authority, taking advantage of the “security settlement” decision. Some have taken the path of working for the new authorities in the context of aligning with the dominant power and avoiding its repression, even if their numbers are relatively small. In major urban societies, efforts have been made to conceal sectarian identity and adopt “taqiyya”(*) in sectarian identity. Of course, there are those who chose armed resistance and inflicted heavy losses on the forces of the new authority, but they in turn suffer from logistical problems and a lack of political and social organization to secure a funding network, sources of information, and staffing operations.
Regarding the north and east Syria region, information warfare is considered the most prominent threat facing the Autonomous Administration, along with drought. The continuation of disinformation campaigns, false news, and conspiracy theories is expected to hinder the democratic transition process in all social and political institutions and the governance system, weaken trust, and incite discontent towards the Autonomous Administration. The bet will be on increasing the power of populist and nationalist movements, which will be based primarily on the extent to which the Autonomous Administration can effectively respond to a set of challenges, most notably: increasing population growth and increasing needs, demographic overlap between different cultures, especially societies not open to democratic values due to their conservative nature, which can be easily influenced by exploiting religion as a means of political action, in addition to a lack of economic opportunities, deterioration of the elements of human security, and increased nepotism due to climate change and decreased efficiency in governance. A study published by the Belgian “Royal Higher Institute for Defence”,31 confirms that “the human brain is the battlefield of the 21st century: relying on human cognitive flaws, such as confirmation bias or our innate intellectual laziness (which leads to a lack of critical thinking), the manipulation of information, through the information environment, will remain the preferred means of weakening democracies. These conflicts between narratives, storytelling and communication will be an integral part of the operational strategy in future conflicts…”. It can be asserted that the information war waged on the region in general focuses on holding specific parties responsible for the deterioration of food security and promoting extremist ideas and propaganda that portrays jihadist groups or regional state regimes as a “savior” from crises. Corruption and weak efficiency in governance will strengthen the position of the parties waging this war, ultimately undermining the existing governance system and escalating crises in various sectors. No local communities will be excluded from this war; therefore, local communities must develop their self-protection system to ensure an appropriate response to every threat or emergency crisis.
o Means of responding to threats and security crises in the context of the Syrian crisis
Establishing a protection system is one of the best means to enable individuals and society to respond effectively to threats and crises. It has become self-evident that an unprotected thing can be destroyed faster than anything else, even if we do not protect that other thing. In light of technological developments, the deterioration of human security, and the multiplicity of risks, it has become possible to choose better means and analyze and prioritize threats better than before. In general, there are key means that must be provided and secured, and that form the basis of this system in the context of its existence as a social phenomenon and the factor that coordinates the integration between human security and national security, namely: awareness of security risks, social organization, resources, and good governance of resources, relationships, and organization. Success depends largely on the transformation of society into a democratic society that accepts coexistence with the different and peaceful other. It may be difficult to secure these things together, especially in culturally heterogeneous, poor, or weak societies, but it is wise to dedicate efforts to secure them in alliance with societies that possess them relatively better. The experience of the alliance of Christian and Yazidi communities with the Kurdish community in the face of ISIS attacks on the Jazira canton is an example that can be relied upon, especially since these communities have lost many of their self-protection factors as a result of the massacres and violations they have been subjected to throughout history. Moreover, the approach of appeasing the autocrat or adopting his security approach does not constitute a long-term guarantee to face threats. A good example of this is the almost daily attacks to which such communities have been subjected since the fall of the Ba’athist regime. On the other hand, social elites must develop long-term strategies for future generations, enabling them to secure self-protection for themselves. Most cultures used to settle in geographical locations that allowed them to defend themselves and assigned a group of their members to carry out combat tasks, and they framed for them the doctrine of fighting in the context of folk tales and epics, glorifying the importance of revenge and self-sacrifice, and constantly reminding them of the tragedies that their ancestors had suffered in order to maintain their fighting spirit. This seems insufficient in our current era based on the idea that “the human brain is the battlefield of the twenty-first century,” noting that some creative minds have played a major role in achieving self-protection for their societies. We mention, for example, the Greek mathematician Archimedes (c. 287 BC – c. 212 BC), who resisted with his inventions the Roman attacks on his homeland in Sicily, and the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu (551 BC – 496 BC), who resisted with his military philosophy the attacks of enemies on his society. His book “The Art of War” is a major reference for military leaders to this day, and Marzi bin Ali al-Tarsusi, the military advisor to Saladin al-Ayyubi, who contributed to strengthening his army by developing his military engineering. His book “” تبصرة أرباب الألباب في كيفية النجاة في الحروب من الأسواء” is a reference in military engineering. In the modern era, there are dozens of minds working in scientific and military research centers to defend their societies. This leads us again to the issue of awareness that links knowledge with thinking and science, and is the decisive means in dealing with various threats through its response to social organization, and good governance of: resources, relationships, organization, and strategic planning.
In areas suffering from security deterioration, there must be a level of preparedness among communities commensurate with the multiple threats they face or are likely to emerge in this environment. Operationally, the existence of organized defense and political and strategic awareness remains the ultimate guarantor of the security of societies. In addition, environmental trends, climate change, demographics, migration, stability, economic prosperity, resources, and energy will form the basis of the security environment for decades to come; that is, security requires more resources, energy, and awareness, to ensure defense that needs to adapt and prepare for low- and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, the paradigm (*), the conceptual framework that affects awareness, is a crucial factor in engineering a self-protection system. In the context of the Syrian crisis, three paradigms played a major role in framing the military doctrine of Syrian societies by adopting a security approach that determines how to analyze threats and how to respond to them, and on the basis of which security risks, social organization, resource management, policies, and strategic planning were defined. These paradigms are:
- The Secular Paradigm:
The secular paradigm with a Marxist-socialist character played a significant role in the victory of the revolution of many peoples in Cuba, Vietnam, and China, as well as in the defeat of the Nazis on the Eastern Front of World War II, and so on. In the Syrian crisis, the approach of the “Democratic Nation” formulated by the Kurdish thinker Abdullah Ocalan was adopted among the Kurdish community in Rojava initially, and later adopted by the Kurds’ allies of Christians, Arabs, and Turkmen, through the Syrian Democratic Forces, at a time when secular leftist organizations failed to achieve self-defense for local communities against tyranny and the effects of conflict based on their previous experiences. The paradox lies in the fact that the democratic nation does not abolish religion as a moral value for humans and respects it by considering it the “cultural memory of peoples.” When analyzing the self-defense system in the democratic nation paradigm, it can be observed that it is based on “positive neutrality” (*) as a strategy, through the “Third Line” policy adopted by the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and non-interference in the ongoing power struggle between the Ba’athist regime and the opposition, using violence only to deter aggression, and relying on community diplomacy to build trust between the various components of the northern and eastern Syria region; one of the most prominent results of which was the “Social Contract of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of the Northern and Eastern Syria Region,” which played a major role in reducing the rate of massacres, destruction, and hatred in the region compared to the rest of the Syrian regions.
The basic idea upon which the democratic nation relied in formulating a secular self-defense approach without excluding religion as a moral value in society is based on addressing the Kurdish phobia created by state systems and extremist national and religious ideologies that have dominated the peoples neighboring the Kurdish people; this is done by portraying the Kurds as a people who have suffered from genocide and cultural extermination and who have an existential cause and demand legitimate rights that do not pose an existential threat to anyone. This approach was supported by some Christian and Arab political and military organizations who refused to pose an existential threat to any other people and who have rights they defend. This approach intersects in many aspects with Freud’s32 vision that it is impossible to eliminate aggressive motives in humans, but it is enough to keep these motives at a level where there is no need to translate them into war. Freud emphasizes from a psychoanalytic standpoint that in every identity there is a sleeping and lurking monster, ready to turn the peaceful identity – outwardly – into a deadly and savage identity, and he confirms that “there is no way to extract aggression from identity except by dissolving the distance that makes the difference vast between us and others, and dissolving the distance may eliminate the monster lurking in every identity”.33 He considers the process of objectifying or animalizing a human being as a first step towards committing the most heinous crimes against him; therefore, he emphasizes that the best plan is for one to dedicate oneself to confronting the danger by any means available in each case, and the need to rid the identity of its combat and aggressive tendencies by moving beyond the isolationist and deterministic approach that reduces diversity to a single and inevitable affiliation.
Based on the foregoing, the secular security doctrine adopted by the Autonomous Administration seems to have succeeded in confronting many threats, and its current strong position, despite the strength of its enemies and the continued internal cohesion after the fall of the Ba’athist regime, expresses this fact.
- The Religious Paradigm:
This paradigm played a significant role in the resistance of the oppressed against the tyrants who were called “the infidels of Quraish” through jihad. However, the submission of the religious establishment to the powerful, and the division of conservative Muslims into dozens of sects, has led to multiple purposes of jihad and transformed it from a paradigm for self-defense and repelling enemies into a means of dominating peoples, plundering their wealth, and violating their dignity under the guise of spoils and fighting infidels. The exploitation of jihad (**) by ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood in inciting armed attacks on areas in northern, northeastern, and eastern Syria are prominent examples in this context, as they have caused the loss of thousands of lives, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and harm and injustice to millions, the majority of whom are Muslims. In general, most Sunni Arab societies have armed themselves with this paradigm to confront their enemies, whether it was the Ba’athist regime or other extremist organizations. Hundreds of military factions emerged throughout the Syrian crisis, which fiercely fought among themselves. Currently, there is much talk about a new organization called “Saraya Ansar al-Sunna,” which is currently active in the Homs governorate and on the Syrian coast, and has negative attitudes towards all components and different organizations in Syria. Currently, the new authority in Damascus is working to link the security of the new state to the security of its Islamist supporters, and has developed a constitution based on the religious paradigm, which stipulates that the religion of the president of the republic is Islam, and Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of legislation. What supports this belief is the volunteering of thousands of Sunnis from different regions to support the forces of the Damascus authority in their suppression of the Alawite uprising that broke out in March 2025. This brings to mind the adoption of the regime’s security approach as a means of self-protection, knowing that all Syrian political Islamist organizations have not yet agreed on a mechanism of governance and the selection of “Ahmed al-Sharaa” as the legitimate president of the new state, and most of their friendly positions seem to be just “throwing dust in the eyes” in preparation for a new conflict over power, based on experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the ideological conflict between Al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizb Al-Tahrir. Here, one cannot deny the morale that the religious paradigm has provided in confronting tyranny, as dozens of citizens have armed themselves with it to defend their societies and confront the tyranny practiced against them. However, the exploitation of these sacrifices by leaders to build a new authoritarian regime constitutes a great disregard for those sacrifices, and it is expected that this paradigm will continue even in the face of attempts to build authoritarian Islamic regimes.
- The National Paradigm:
In the twentieth century, the national paradigm played a role in political and military organization in confronting the Ottoman occupation and later the French and British colonialism. It put forward projects that transcended the national borders of countries, such as the term “Arab homeland” and the unification of Arab countries. On this basis, a group of extremist national parties were formed, most notably the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement. In the context of the Syrian crisis, the Ba’athist regime armed itself with this paradigm to confront the Islamic opposition and reject democratic reforms, exploiting the national ideology in neutralizing societies supporting national thought in its war against the opposition and the Autonomous Administration, and exploiting it in recruitment operations under the slogan “Defending Arab Nationalism,” and justified the destruction it caused by the country being subjected to a major conspiracy (34). The security approach, which relied on this paradigm, has caused serious repercussions on the security of Arab societies, especially in Syria, by causing major political, economic, and social crises. Currently, this paradigm, in its secular form, has become almost frozen after the declaration of the collapse of the Ba’athist regime and the announcement by the Ba’ath Party that it was dissolving itself and suspending all its activities.
By comparing the results of adopting the three paradigms, it can be observed that the secular paradigm manifested in the democratic nation better preserves the Syrian national identity and supports the moral bond between the Syrian components with their different beliefs and cultures, compared to the religious and national paradigms. By virtue of its relatively successful experience, it is useful for societies that feel existential threats to adopt it, especially the Alawites, Druze, and religiously moderate Arab societies. What indicates the usefulness of this is that the military organization announced by a group of Alawite military personnel to confront the violations committed by the Damascus authority and the extremist groups loyal to it, has failed to achieve self-protection for the Alawite community, and the Druze communities seem more flexible in this matter, by adopting tactics and policies similar to those followed in the context of the self-protection system in northern and eastern Syria, but they must take strategic steps such as agreeing on a unified leadership.
In general, in order for local communities to establish their own self-protection system, they must implement several priorities: social organization through the commune institution, which manages protection, relations, justice, services, women, culture, and awareness (intellectual training) committees; responding to threats, whether actual or potential, according to circumstances and available capabilities; intensifying community diplomacy efforts to reduce rates of hate speech directed against the community and originating from it, since violence is often ineffective; and preserving the community’s culture and developing its members’ awareness, which is a necessary condition for saving the community and reaching better conditions through which the ceiling of resistance to tyranny can be raised within the framework of self-protection. Developing awareness is manifested in maintaining public opinion’s focus on issues and policies that affect its security, preventing entertainment and amusement from becoming a social issue by focusing on reviving popular heritage, folklore, and art, involving the community in managing its affairs through the commune and social solidarity, continuously emphasizing transparency and increasing communication between the community and its leaders, preventing the fabrication of crises and problems, resolving them in a timely manner, preventing their spread, providing radical solutions and committing to their implementation as a community culture, addressing the mind instead of emotion, strengthening the power of criticism by immersing the public in knowledge and information, and encouraging it to appreciate quality and modernity while preserving the moral specificities that affect its existential identity. The Jewish community, which has been subjected to campaigns of extermination and denial throughout its history, provides inspiring models in this context.
o Conclusion
Most communities in various parts of Syria live in deteriorating security environments due to drought, poverty, crime, terrorist operations, extremist ideology, or human rights violations. The Damascus authority shows no steps to gain the trust of local communities, and most of its internal policies fall within the context of what is called “strategic patience,” which ensures avoiding direct battles, seizing opportunities, and taking steps forward to enable gradual control, and holding what it calls “uncontrolled groups” in its forces responsible for violations against Syrian citizens. The Autonomous Administration has also not yet developed a clear strategy to confront drought and needs to update its strategy in the face of the activities of extremist organizations and ISIS cells in light of developments in the Syrian security landscape.
All these data indicate that the Syrian crisis will continue at an unstable pace until 2030, and the next five years are sufficient to clarify the features of the Syrian state and stabilize the political situation it will be in, especially since Turkey’s relative openness to the Kurdish peace initiative, the Damascus authority’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with Israel, and Israel’s declaration of war on Iran indicate the region’s direction towards major political transformations that may rebuild the regional order. The continuation of the region’s crises will have significant effects on the human security of communities, which will have dire consequences for social and economic development operations and will be exacerbated by the emergence of future conflicts. This may also lead to waves of migration and internal displacement, and the exacerbation of the phenomenon of kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking, which already seems to exist. Climate change further exacerbates the general situation. In light of these transformations, the self-protection system must be developed as part of the national security system of countries, and human security must be the focus of national security strategies of countries, unlike the security approach of the Ba’athist regime, which focused on “state security,” as it had allocated the largest percentage of the state budget to armaments under the pretext of liberating Palestine and thwarting cosmic conspiracies.
The relative success of the self-protection experience in northern and eastern Syria does not mean that replicating it in other communities will achieve the same results due to the different sources of threat in the security environment and the different culture that frames the fighting doctrine of these communities. For example, the Druze or Alawite sects tend to rely on the religious paradigm as a basis for self-protection to a greater extent than the secular or nationalist paradigm. Adopting the same security approach to build the self-protection system is required because the democratic nation paradigm grants a broader horizon to the concept of self-protection and includes a defensive approach that is based in some aspects on jihad by oneself in its essential sense by sacrificing oneself to defend the community, and also urges the members of different nationalities to defend their cultural existence and confront operations of extermination and assimilation (*), but achieving this requires accepting the idea of transforming into a democratic society. Failure to build citizenship states is expected to lead to a dead end in the political solution to national crises. Amid efforts to recycle the totalitarian regime, the issue of self-protection emerges as a tactic for managing crises at the community level until solutions are found that lead to peace and stability.
[1]Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey
[2] The security environment refers to the geopolitical, political, diplomatic, military, media, and other spheres in which favorable conditions, critical phenomena, or potential and actual threats emerge, exist, accumulate, or manifest in pursuit of national interests. It is within this environment that the state implements its national security policy and interacts with international security structures, strategic partners, allies, and military, political, and other institutions and organizations to ensure its sustainable development over a given period. Security is understood as a state or set of conditions in which threats, risks, or other destabilizing factors are absent. In reality, however, threats always exist for both the individual and any social-economic system.
For further reading, see: Vasyl Franchuk and others; SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES; FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITY: PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE- Volume 3 (50), 2023.
[3] أحمد برقاوي؛ جدل السيد والعبد: وعي السيادة ووعي العبودية؛ الناشر: موقع الجديد؛ تاريخ النشر: 2018.09.01؛ الرابط:
https://www.aljadeedmagazine.com/جدل-السيد-والعبد
[4] Mustafa Hijazi (1936 – October 14, 2024) was a Lebanese psychologist, university professor, and thinker…
[5] مصطفى الحجازي؛ التخلف الاجتماعي: مدخل إلى سيكولوجية الإنسان المقهور؛ الطبعة التاسعة 2005؛ الناشر: المركز الثقافي العربي- الدار البيضاء/المغرب؛ ص182.
[6] د. خليل أحمد خليل؛ المفاهيم الأساسية في علم الاجتماع؛ الطبعة الأولى 1984؛ الناشر: دار الحداثة للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع؛ بيروت – لبنان؛ ص138.
[7] see ibid
[8] د. إحسان محمد الحسن؛ علم الاجتماع العسكري؛ الطبعة الثانية/2016؛ الناشر: دار وائل للنشر- عمان الأردن؛ ص172.
[9] Same previous reference; p. 173
[10] Local Community refers, in general, to a group of people residing within a specific geographical area who participate together in political, economic, and social activities, forming a socially cohesive unit with a degree of self-governance, guided by shared values to which they feel a sense of belonging. Examples of local communities include cities, towns, and villages.
[11] The Concept of Social Conflict:
“It refers to the social process that arises between two parties when there is a conflict of interests and objectives. Each party seeks to achieve its own interests and goals using all available means and methods, whether legitimate or illegitimate, and whether recognized by one party or not. Social conflict often manifests in the form of crises, tensions, and hostile struggles. Its ultimate aim is to control decision-making authority and governance.”
Ziyat Faisal – Mekhtar Didouche Mohamed; “The Theory of Social Conflict from Marx’s Logic to Dahrendorf’s Logic,” Journal of Human and Social Sciences Studies, University of Jijel, Vol. 02, No. 01, March 2019, p. 384.
[12] د. مصطفى الحجازي؛ التخلف الاجتماعي: مدخل إلى سيكولوجية الإنسان المقهور؛ الطبعة التاسعة 2005؛ الناشر: المركز الثقافي العربي- الدار البيضاء/المغرب؛ ص55.
[13] د. نادر كاظم؛ سيغموند فرويد- ألبرت أنشتاين: لماذا الحرب؟؛ ترجمة: جهاد الشبيني؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2018؛ الناشر: منشورات تكوين- الكويت؛ ص27.
[14] د. مصطفى الحجازي؛ التخلف الاجتماعي: مدخل إلى سيكولوجية الإنسان المقهور؛ الطبعة التاسعة 2005؛ الناشر: المركز الثقافي العربي- الدار البيضاء/المغرب؛ ص55.
[15] Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) was an Austrian physician of Jewish origin, who specialized in the study of nervous system medicine and a free thinker considered the founder of psychoanalysis…
[16] د. نادر كاظم؛ سيغموند فرويد- ألبرت أنشتاين: لماذا الحرب؟؛ ترجمة: جهاد الشبيني؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2018؛ الناشر: منشورات تكوين- الكويت؛ ص52.
[17] Same previous reference; p. 27
[18] عبد الله أوجالان؛ مانيفستو الحضارة الديمقراطية/ المجلد الخامس/ القضية الكردية وحل الأمة الديمقراطية؛ ترجمة: زاخو شيار؛ الطبعة الثانية- 2014؛ بلا ناشر؛ ص538.
[19] د. نادر كاظم؛ سيغموند فرويد- ألبرت أنشتاين: لماذا الحرب؟؛ ترجمة: جهاد الشبيني؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2018؛ الناشر: منشورات تكوين- الكويت؛ ص43.
[20] عبد الله أوجالان؛ مانيفستو الحضارة الديمقراطية/ المجلد الخامس/ القضية الكردية وحل الأمة الديمقراطية؛ ترجمة: زاخو شيار؛ الطبعة الثانية- 2014؛ بلا ناشر؛ ص66.
[21] The interview was conducted with a number of lecturers at the Community Protection Forces Foundation in Qamishlo on 06/28/2025
[22] بسام محمد أبو عليان؛ الانحراف الاجتماعي والجريمة (علم اجتماع الجريمة)؛ الطبعة الثالثة 2016م؛ بلا ناشر؛ ص14.
19 Dimitri Burkhard; Switzerland Fallout Shelters: Ultimate Guide to the Swiss Underground Network; Newly Swissed; 8 March 2025; Link:
https://www-newlyswissed-com.translate.goog/switzerland-fallout
-shelters/?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=ar&_x_tr_hl=ar&_x_tr_pto=rq
20 Kessava Bakeri; Switzerland is the “gold standard” for building shelters to protect against the effects of nuclear attacks; Publisher: SWI swissinfo.ch; Publication date: 2023.06.14; Link: https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/business
/سويسرا-المعيار-الذهبي-في-انشاء-الملاجئ-المضادة-للأسلحة-النووية/48578800
21 للمزيد انظر: غراهام ماتياس وآخرون؛ فلسفة ومبادئ الشرطة المجتمعية؛ الناشر: مركز شرق وجنوب شرق أوروبا لتبادل المعلومات للسيطرة على الأسلحة الصغيرة والخفيفة (SEESAC)/2006/ بيلغراد- صربيا.
* Special warfare has no specific definition in military dictionaries. It is a key term in the PKK’s security doctrine, and a “revolutionary people’s war” is employed to confront it. It forms the backbone of the self-defense system. In contemporary military terminology, special warfare corresponds to the concepts of hybrid warfare, fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation warfare, and conspiratorial operations.
** Abdullah Ocalan (1949) is the leader of the Kurdistan freedom Movement and the founder of dozens of Kurdish political, military and cultural organizations. He considered the first leader in kurdish history to write books in which be presented an in-depth and comprehensive sociological analysis of kurdish society and the Kurdish personality, based on the political geography, economic geography, and cultural geography of Kurdistan from Neolithic society to the present time…..
22 Abdullah Ocalan; Manifesto of Democratic Civilization / Volume Five / The Kurdish Question and the Solution of the Democratic Nation; Translated by: Zakho Shiar; Second Edition – 2014; No Publisher; p. 540.
23 Same previous reference; pp. 538-539.
24 Same previous reference; p. 540.
25 Say, ‘Do you expect for us except one of the two best things while we expect for you that Allah will punish you with punishment from Himself or at our hands? So wait; indeed, we, along with you, are waiting.'”
26 Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi; Social Backwardness: An Introduction to the Psychology of the Oppressed Human; Ninth Edition 2005; Publisher: Arab Cultural Center – Casablanca/Morocco; p. 57
* There are many verses in the Qur’an that emphasize that military jihad is considered self-defense. For example, in Surah Al-Baqarah: “And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors” (2:190). Also, in Surah Al-Mumtahanah: “Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes – from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly” (60:8).
Most of the verses that urge fighting against “polytheists” and “disbelievers” come in the context of direct threats against Muslims.
27 Abdullah Ocalan; Manifesto of Democratic Civilization / Volume Five / The Kurdish Question and the Solution of the Democratic Nation; Translated by: Zakho Shiar; Second Edition – 2014; No Publisher; p. 237
28 The previous reference; p. 109.
29 نادر كاظم؛ سيغموند فرويد- ألبرت أنشتاين: لماذا الحرب؟؛ ترجمة: جهاد الشبيني؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2018؛ الناشر: منشورات تكوين- الكويت؛ ص48.
30 Dr. Mustafa Al-Hijazi; Social Backwardness: An Introduction to the Psychology of the Oppressed Human; Ninth Edition 2005; Publisher: Arab Cultural Center – Casablanca/Morocco; p. 98.
* Video footage and documented reports of a sample of these violations can be found on the “Violation Documentation Center in Northern Syria” channel on Telegram, link: https://t.me/vdcnsy
* One of the meanings of Al-Taqiyya (dissimulation): Making a show of agreement with people and pretending to be other than what one believes for fear of oppression…
31 David Criekemans and others; Security environment 2021-2030; Royal Higher Institute for Defence; June 2021; page:8.
* The word paradigm is Greek (paradigm) and means example, model, and pattern. Therefore, it is an old concept, not a new one. It also applies to perceived meanings. The American philosopher, Thomas Kuhn, generally defined the paradigm as the guiding model that expresses all the beliefs, accepted values, and shared technologies among members of the same society. These shared values are represented in the principles, assumptions, and laws to which members of the scientific community adhere. The model is an effective means of building scientific knowledge, as it precisely defines a set of problems and seeks to solve them… See: محمود زعيم عباس يوسف؛ فلسفة العلم عند توماس كون؛ الناشر: مجلة كلية الآداب بقنا – العدد 52 (الجزء الثاني) لسنة 2021؛ ص362.
* Positive neutrality: A positive political doctrine based on non-alignment with any of the internationally conflicting blocs… (تعريف ومعنى الحياد الإيجابي في معجم المعاني الجامع – معجم عربي عربي)
32د. نادر كاظم؛ سيغموند فرويد- ألبرت أنشتاين: لماذا الحرب؟؛ ترجمة: جهاد الشبيني؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2018؛ الناشر: منشورات تكوين- الكويت.
33 Same Reference p.24
** Among these fatwas is the fatwa of the Syrian Islamic Council, which legitimized fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces through Fatwa No. 11, which was issued on February 26, 2018, during the occupation of Afrin and the commission of genocide against its people. To read the fatwa, see: The Syrian Islamic Council; The Ruling on Fighting the QSD / Syrian Democratic Forces; Publication Date: February 26, 2018; Link: https://sy-sic.com/?p=6465
34 France 24; Al-Assad promises to thwart a “conspiracy” to which the country is exposed and reaffirms previously announced reforms; Publication date: 2011.03.30; Link: https://www.france24.com/ar/20110330-syria-president-bechar-assad-political-cahnge-speech-parliament-clashes-popular-deraa-arabic-demonstrations
* For more, see the five volumes of “Manifesto of Democratic Civilization” by Kurdish thinker Abdullah Ocalan…