Security and defense issues in the North and East Syria Region

Note: This study was written in 11/2024

Introduction:

The term “political anarchy”[1] refers to the absence of a global government above nation-states with the power to enforce international order. This absence leaves states in a state of ambiguity and uncertainty, leading them to assume the worst about their rivals’ intentions. Consequently, they feel compelled to take measures to enhance their security, such as increasing armament, military spending, and launching external wars. This leads to a security dilemma (*) because of the opposing states’ reactions to protect their security, which respond with similar steps, thus heading towards inevitable conflict, according to the realist school of thought[2] (a school of international relations theory). Although this does not necessarily mean the outbreak of a traditional war, this security dilemma negatively affects the people of countries ruled by autocratic regimes in the form of economic, political, and social crises, where justice, freedom, and citizenship are re-institutionalized according to the standards of these regimes, similar to the ministries of state in the fictional Oceania (**).

This disarray can be observed in the recent crises in the Middle East, and the inability of the Western axis, which is supposed to be represented by the global government after the collapse of the Soviet Union, to impose its solutions – which were not solutions after they became apparent later – on the region, as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the twenty-first century. What indicates this is the continuation of the Syrian crisis and the Gaza war, and the efforts of Iran and Russia, the West’s rivals, to consolidate their hegemony in the region, militarily or ideologically. Even the Turkish regime is trying to find a place for itself as a regional power, reduce its dependence on its Western allies, and achieve its ambition to become an international power. The United Nations remains unable or unwilling to protect its charters that are being violated in the region, where massacres are committed, genocides are carried out, demographic changes and the displacement of millions of people occur, and it seems that condemnation and denunciation are the only things that UN officials can do, while some reports deviate from objectivity in showing the reality of things; such as the report issued by Amnesty International3, which held the Autonomous Administration responsible for violations in Al-Hol camp and inside the detention centers without relying on evidence or assessing the facts on the ground, as the Autonomous Administration clarified in a statement that the Amnesty International team4 “did not visit the two detention centers in the Chinese camp in Al-Shaddadi and Al-Panorama in Al-Hasakah, which are run by the Syrian Democratic Forces, and it seems that they relied primarily on interviews and testimonies of people who may belong to ISIS or its sleeper cells, whom the Amnesty International team may have met outside the detention centers…”.

The failure of states to resolve their crises and their inability to achieve security and justice has led to the emergence of political and administrative entities, such as parties, associations, and civil institutions, that have gained the support of a section of local communities to manage their various affairs. Countries in the Middle East are witnessing this phenomenon, such as Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and others. Western politicians, biased towards the idea of the state, have tried to interpret this phenomenon according to their ideologies and have come up with the term “violent non-state actors,”5 which seems unclear as a concept to them. They have presented inaccurate explanations of their nature and reasons for their emergence, describing them as groups operating in isolation from state law, i.e., “outlaws,” and adopting an unconstructive stance towards them, even though these organizations have emerged as a result of the crises caused by the West’s policy of fabricating nation-states, and the role of these organizations in achieving stability, reducing violence, and limiting chaos, especially since the scope of contemporary international relations – under the pressure of globalization – is moving in the direction of the development and spread of these actors. According to some Western researchers,6 “the interactions of the international system harmonize within a symbiotic duality between two worlds: the ‘world of the state’ and the ‘multi-polar’ world consisting of a group of participants who have the ability to act internationally, which creates a very complex form of affiliations. While the first world is based on the uniqueness of citizenship affiliations, we find the second world under the attractions of an uncontrolled network of affiliations whose nature, dynamics, and space are based on the free will of the players in it, in a context of transnational flows, which in turn allows the emergence of multiple models, some of which result from non-governmental organizations, and others arise from the influence of the formation of multiple individual actions…”

The security and defense issues of most countries, governments, and political entities in the region are intertwined, and interference in the internal affairs of others has become part of the political, military, and economic doctrine of most countries. They will support it if it agrees with their strategy and fight it if it conflicts with it, and they will take a neutral stance if it does not benefit them but contradicts the strategy of their opponents. This can be clearly seen in the Turkish, Iranian, Russian, American, and other positions on security and defense issues in the north and east of Syria, which have become the focus of great attention for the strategic planners of those regimes. There are those who are trying to eliminate it, and there are those who are trying to subdue it or influence it.

Analyzing security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region, based on naming the political, military, and conspiratorial operations with their most expressive designations, and analyzing the reports issued by the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration in the political, economic, environmental, and security fields since the beginning of 2024, as well as other reports specific to the region, will better clarify the problematic security landscape of North and East Syria and its vital surroundings, and provide a basis for anticipating security challenges in the near future, and consequently; suggesting some solutions based on them. Therefore, this research comes as an attempt to shed light on this problematic, to clarify it by narrating, discussing, and analyzing the facts.

• Importance of the Research:

Many researches have focused on the concepts of security and defense and their definition within the framework of the state as a primary reference, which most researchers attribute to the results of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. However, this research will focus on the concept of the Autonomous Administration of security and defense at the level of society and the military, security, political, and economic institutions it represents, away from the authority of the state, which allows for the creation of an approach towards the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces to analyze security and defense issues in North and East Syria.

• Objective of the Research:

To shed light on the most prominent security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region and the method of responding to them, and to attempt to build a vision for anticipating the security landscape during the year 2025; with the aim of contributing to focusing the attention of those in charge of the institutions of the Autonomous Administration and public opinion on these issues.

• Problem of the Research:

The problem of the research lies in the question: How does the aggressive policy of regional regimes affect security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region? And how does the Autonomous Administration respond to various security and environmental challenges? An attempt will be made to answer through the sub-questions: What is the relationship between the concepts of security and defense? What are the most prominent security challenges facing the region? What is the framework in which these challenges interact? And what are the suggestions for facing these challenges?

• Time and Spatial Boundaries:

Regarding the temporal framework, the focus will be on security and defense issues in the region since the beginning of 2024, which witnessed dramatic developments in regional and international positions towards the Syrian crisis, and its reflection on the security of the region in the form of a wave of operations in which new tactics were followed to undermine the Autonomous Administration, with occasional reference to a relatively earlier period to take into account the relationship between developments and their initial causes. As for the spatial framework, the focus will be on the North and East Syria region, which is managed by the Autonomous Administration.

• Research Methodology:

Descriptive analytical method, using the comparative method.

• Terminology:

The term “Autonomous Administration” has been adopted in the research as a broad concept referring to the administrative, military, security, political, economic, social, and cultural system in the North and East Syria region, as an unprecedented political situation in the region and distinct from the political conditions in the rest of the Syrian geography, and includes the Democratic Autonomous Administration of the North and East Syria region, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Syrian Democratic Council, tribal councils, dignitaries, communes, and others. As for the rest of the terms, a brief explanation will be provided as needed in the footnotes.

• Titles:

2. The relationship between the concepts of security and defense.
3. Security challenges in the North and East Syria region, and the method of response.

First – The effects of the aggressive policy of regional regimes:

• The Autonomous Administration’s approach towards the aggressive policy of regional regimes.

Second – The extremist activities of ISIS:

• The Autonomous Administration’s approach towards the extremist activities of ISIS.

Third – Actions falling within the framework of organized crime:

• The Autonomous Administration’s approach towards actions falling within the framework of organized crime.

Fourth – Regarding environmental degradation:

• The Autonomous Administration’s approach towards environmental degradation.

4. Fourth and fifth generation warfare as a means to undermine the Autonomous Administration
5. The impact of the challenges on the security environment of the region until the end of 2025

• Regarding the agendas of regional regimes.
• Regarding the activities of ISIS.
• Regarding organized crime activities.
• Regarding environmental degradation.

6. Means of responding to security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region.
8. Sources and references.

• The relationship between the concepts of security and defense:

Security and defense are intertwined concepts, and one cannot be achieved without the other. They are always used as key terms in developing strategies, managing crises, confronting threats, and analyzing various challenges, whether military, economic, political, environmental, or otherwise. As for security, it is difficult to give a precise definition due to the multiplicity of its issues. However, most definitions of “security”7 revolve around freedom from threat, danger, or fear, and the reduction thereof. It has an objective dimension, i.e., the extent to which protection is available in the reality in which a person lives, and a subjective one, i.e., the extent to which a person feels safe and free. Security is relative; a person may feel threatened even if there is nothing threatening them, or there may be a possibility of danger occurring in the future. This reinforces the belief that security is not limited to freedom from danger and fear of something certain to happen, but also includes things that may occur that require taking proactive measures. This has become a hallmark of the modern concept of security, which has been designated as a term attached to the securitization8 of issues of a strategic dimension to which a security character is attached, such as human security, national security, international security, environmental security, food security, etc. Thus, security issues can be described as any situation, threat, action, or condition that poses a danger leading to a security incident. Security issues differ from one country to another, or the security issues are the same for everyone, but there is a difference in their order in terms of priority. For example, trafficking in human beings, drugs, and firearms, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber piracy are among the most prominent security issues affecting the security of the United States, while drought, sectarian strife, and Turkish and Iranian interference in internal affairs are among the most prominent security issues affecting the security of Iraq. The main goal of achieving security is to ensure the safety of people, physically and morally, in times of peace and war.

Security is achieved by various means, the nature of which depends on the type and size of the danger or threat and the circumstances of the surrounding environment. An ordinary house, a shelter, and a Panic Room can be presented as examples of means to achieve security in different circumstances in the environment in which a person lives, and each means has its own safety rules. Therefore, providing security for the city, society, economy, country, etc., has its own means that suit it. This is an indirect expression of the concept of protection, which in turn constitutes one of the means of defense. Protection is the link between the concepts of security and defense. Based on this, efforts to protect against various military attacks, negatively directed media, and the repercussions of political and economic crises and natural disasters can be considered as an expression of managing security and defense issues. For example, confronting attacks by ISIS, Turkish forces, or the conspiratorial operations of the Syrian regime and its allies, and participating with the international coalition forces in the fight against ISIS constitute security issues facing the North and East Syria region, while core protection or social protection, consolidating democracy, protecting the environment, and social diplomacy in order to confront these dangers and threats fall within the scope of defense issues. For example, the mobilization of the “Community Protection Forces” (*) (Hêzên Parastina Civakê / HPC) to confront ISIS attacks is one of the manifestations of responding to security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region.

Human defense is a communal defense, where all members of the group jointly protect themselves. Defense is a fundamental function of humans, alongside eating and procreation. Survival is impossible without it. Each culture has its own perspective on concepts related to defense. For example, in Kurdish military doctrine, defense is “protecting of existence.”9 According to the Cambridge Dictionary, defense10 is “the ability to protect from attack or harm, or something used to protect from attack or harm.” According to the Arabic dictionary “Al-Ma’ani,” defense11 is “repelling and preventing… methods taken in wars to repel enemy attacks…” The relative difference in the concept of defense among the three cultures reflects the security concerns of each. The Kurds have been subjected to mass extermination campaigns, European societies have suffered greatly from religious and then national wars, and exposure to invasion is a prominent feature of Arab tribal society. Therefore, security and defense issues are not exactly the same for every nation, in every place and time.

Managing security and defense issues is done through many means, such as armament, building alliances, sustainable development, establishing a knowledge society, consolidating ethics, reviving culture, self-protection, confronting ideas that incite hatred and extremism, and addressing the repercussions of economic and political crises and natural disasters such as climate change, environmental degradation, earthquakes, and so on.

Security Challenges in the North and East Syria Region and the Method of Response:

The challenges of survival are almost a constant feature of any entity, regardless of its nature. These challenges may be the reason for the survival of certain species and a factor in the destruction of others. They may be governed by the laws of nature or shaped by the laws and behaviors of humans. No matter how strong an entity is, it cannot be without challenges that it faces or may arise later. One may find an explanation for this in the arguments of dialectical theory.

The challenges with political, economic, and environmental dimensions that face societies, governing systems, and administrations, which require a pragmatic response, have turned into contemporary security issues. For example, socialist forces found themselves forced to engage in utilitarian relations with some liberal regimes to confront a common danger represented by ISIS. State systems that are ideologically opposed are now forced to engage in joint commercial projects to confront their economic crises, and strict environmental protection has become a factor disrupting the provision of increasing needs for energy sources and financial resources. Responding (out of necessity) to these challenges has become a defensive issue, making it difficult to balance ideal principles and ideas with the reality of lived experience. This means that security and defense issues have become a matter of existence in our contemporary history, and every entity, whether it is a state, a local government, an organization, or even a family, has its own approach in dealing with these issues.

The issues of security and defense that the North and East Syria region has been witnessing since its beginnings are fundamentally existential. There are security challenges represented by: the aggressive policies of regional regimes, the extremist activities of ISIS, actions falling within the framework of organized crime, and environmental degradation. All of these are sources of most of the social, economic, health, and political problems in the region, foremost among them being migration, the issue of displaced persons, and the high cost of living. In contrast, there is a struggle by the various institutions of the Autonomous Administration to confront these challenges in order to protect their existence. During the first half of 2024, the momentum of these challenges increased due to subjective and objective factors, to which the Autonomous Administration responded by adopting a specific approach to each. To clarify the reality of these matters, most of the reports and data issued by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the institutions of the Autonomous Administration, the Internal Security Forces, and some other reports were studied and analyzed, and compared with what could be observed of the facts on the ground, to formulate a general perspective on security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region during the first half of 2024, as follows:

Firstly – The effects of the aggressive policies of regional regimes:

There are four regional regimes (Turkish, Syrian, Iranian, and Russian) seeking to undermine the Autonomous Administration, foremost among them being the Turkish regime, which has explicitly declared its hostility to the North and East Syria region and sought to eliminate the Autonomous Administration through a series of invasions and attacks since 2012 until now, directly, or indirectly through its mercenary groups. It can be asserted that the aggressive policy of the Turkish regime is the source of most of the problems suffered by the region, including political, security, economic, environmental, and social ones.

At the end of December 2023, this aggressive stance escalated in an unprecedented manner; as Turkish forces launched a series of destructive raids12 on oil and energy facilities, factories, service facilities, and civilian objects, including a medical facility, an olive factory, a tailoring workshop, feed facilities, a concrete plant, a wedding hall, the only oxygen cylinder manufacturing plant in Al-Jazira, the (Semav) printing press, and other civilian objects,13 in addition to a number of civilians losing their lives and others being injured, causing a state of panic in the region, and depriving millions of water, electricity and fuel. A report by the Civil Society Organizations Alliance14 indicated that “Between January 13 and 16, 2024, 40 Turkish strikes were documented throughout northeastern Syria…while at least 26 vital infrastructure sites were either severely damaged or out of service.” The report also confirmed that the air strikes also caused damage to six power generation stations and the destruction of the Sweidiya station, which serves about one million people, in addition to putting four electricity transmission substations in Al-Hasakah and its countryside completely out of service, disrupting dozens of wells that deliver water to more than 815,076 thousand people in northern and eastern Syria, in addition to disrupting more than 38 bakeries and a number of silos and mills, and depriving more than one million people in eleven major cities and towns of electricity, in addition to restricting the movement of relief organizations in northern and eastern Syria. The aggressive operations of the Turkish regime have caused far-reaching effects on the infrastructure and the service sector.

On the environmental front, the Turkish regime has been a source of unprecedented pollution waves. The bombing of oil installations in Rmelan at the end of 2023 caused oil spills into the Jaghjagh River, reaching the Khabur River and the Southern Dam Lake in Hasakah. This prompted the Autonomous Administration to form emergency committees in late January 2024 to contain the pollution by creating floating barriers and manually removing oil materials. According to a report by the Environment Authority in Al-Jazira Canton,15 this oil spill led to significant pollution of surface and groundwater, as well as soil contamination in agricultural lands along the polluted stream, as the oil contains accompanying gases that spread into the air. It should be noted that the Jaghjagh River suffers from continuous pollution due to the Turkish authorities pouring sewage into its course before it enters the city of Qamishli, and what exacerbates its pollution is the municipality’s postponement of the necessary works to clean it, which may be due to a deficit in its financial resources.

At the beginning of March, many cases of skin diseases spread in the Euphrates Canton16 as a result of the leakage of toxic cyanide after the explosion of a gold mine located near the course of the Euphrates River on the other side of the border with Turkey, which prompted the Environment Authority in the region to call on the residents of the area to use water wells for two months until the chemical effect on the river ends.

The Turkish regime’s exploitation of water in politics has caused the majority of the region’s cantons to suffer from difficulties in securing water, especially the city of Hasakah, which the Autonomous Administration declared a “disaster area” since July 2023. For political motives, the Turkish authorities cut off the water of the Khabur River, which is considered the water artery in Al-Jazira Canton and one of the tributaries of the Euphrates River. This caused difficulties in securing water for more than two million citizens from its waters and cut off irrigation water to about 150,000 hectares17 of agricultural land, which led to a decrease in agricultural production and damage to livestock and fish. The Turkish regime’s occupation of the Alouk water station in the countryside of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) exacerbated the water crisis for about one million citizens in the region extending from the town of Zarkan to the city of Hasakah. An official in the Hasakah Water Directorate18 accused the Turkish, Russian, and Syrian regimes of being behind the water crisis in Hasakah and its countryside for political purposes. The frequent reduction of the water levels of the Euphrates River by the Turkish regime also poses a real threat to natural habitats along the river, reaching the Iraqi side. An official in the Civil Administration of Raqqa19 warned that in 2024, it will only be possible to secure 50% or less of the water allocated to agricultural projects in 2023 if the Turkish state continues to cut off the water of the Euphrates River, and this is what actually happened through the decline of the agricultural season this year and the exacerbation of the water crisis in the region.

With the beginning of the harvest season in the summer of 2024, unofficial statistics indicated20 that fires broke out in 2,443 hectares of agricultural areas and 19,000 olive and pistachio trees due to Turkish bombing and mercenary factions, with the Manbij region alone witnessing 300 fires.

The impact of Turkish airstrikes on production and service facilities extended to the general budget for the fiscal year 2024, as confirmed by the co-chair of the General Finance Authority in the Autonomous Administration, Dr. Ahmed Youssef,21 where a budget deficit of $389 million was recorded.22 This deficit seems to have affected many sectors, most notably the wheat pricing ($0.31 USD per kilogram), which many farmers considered unfair. The Agriculture and Irrigation Authority in the Autonomous Administration issued a statement saying23 that it was unable to “give a large profit margin to the brother farmers” and acknowledged that “the Agriculture and Irrigation Authority set a price that may not be suitable for cost and profit standards,” in addition to the effects of the financial deficit on the municipal services sector.

As for the Syrian regime, it still insists on regaining control over northern and eastern Syria exactly as it was before 2010, and through the restoration of its relationship with some Arab countries and attempts at normalization with Turkey, it is trying to mislead public opinion into believing in its victory in its war against various Syrian political currents, despite the facts on the ground indicating otherwise. The Syrian regime sought during the first half of this year to raise the level of its aggressive operations towards northern and eastern Syria, and it seems that it tried to take advantage of its media campaign directed against the northern and eastern Syria region since the failure of the sabotage operations it managed in the summer of last year against the Deir Ezzor Canton, which focused on misleading public opinion with misinformation to divide it between the “state camp” led by the regime and placing the Autonomous Administration in the position of the “separatist camp,” and tried to repeat the attempt in August 2024, relying on its conviction of the success of its psychological warfare in creating a fragile security environment in the Deir Ezzor Canton. Therefore, it initiated an attack on the towns located on the eastern side of the Euphrates River under the cover of mercenaries from the “Tribal Forces” and “National Defense,” groups of whom crossed the river and carried out sabotage in civilian properties in the area in parallel with a focused media campaign and with the support of Russian, Iranian, and Turkish media, betting on inciting tribal and extreme nationalistic tendencies in Hasakah and Qamishli and carrying out attacks on military and civilian properties and managing the conspiratorial operation from inside the security squares in the two cities; however, the operation failed due to its mismanagement, which may be due to an error in the calculations and analyses of the planners of the conspiratorial operation and that they built their plan on political and security fallacies; their bet on inciting ethnic strife between Arabs and Kurds failed, and their attacks did not receive support from the local Arab communities, which took a more supportive stance towards the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the disruption of attacks on the service sector revealed some of the advantages of the Autonomous Administration in the region, and caused the citizens of the region to develop a belief that “the Autonomous Administration builds and the Syrian regime destroys,” especially after a video scene was circulated showing one of the regime’s mercenaries firing a missile at a civilian facility, and what proves this is that their indiscriminate firing of shells caused a massacre in the villages of “Al-Dahla” and “Jadida Bakara,” which led to the fall of more than 16 victims, including children and women,24 which prompted the Internal Security Forces to impose a siege on the security squares and military regiments of the regime in Hasakah and Qamishli and prepare to storm them in conjunction with carrying out a retaliatory operation against three points of the regime forces25 on the western bank of the river, in parallel with the increasing anger of the local communities with their various components, which prompted the Russian forces to mediate, which was considered an announcement of the failure of the operation, despite the regime forces pretending otherwise by firing shells from time to time on the countryside of the Deir Ezzor Canton.

For the Russian and Iranian regimes, they are not directly involved in aggressive operations against the region, but they participate in managing these operations and providing intelligence, political, and logistical support to the regime’s forces to carry out their conspiratorial operations. The Syrian regime’s recent attack on the Deir Ezzor Canton would not have occurred without Iranian and Russian support. From another angle, they are exploiting Turkey’s aggressive policy towards the region as a political pressure card on both the Turkish regime and the Autonomous Administration.

The four regional regimes are still seeking to reach agreements among themselves. The opening of the Abu al-Zandin crossing, discussions on opening the international roads M-4 and M-5, and the attempt to hold a meeting between Bashar al-Assad and Erdogan under Russian auspices fall within the context of these endeavors. Undermining the Autonomous Administration is a shared goal for them, considering that Russian foreign policy is driven by short-term utilitarianism (pragmatism) and each party follows the path dictated by its own strategy for the region, through direct attacks, inciting racial tendencies, media disinformation, economic pressure, and carrying out sabotage operations. In conclusion, it can be asserted that these regimes have failed to become factors of stability for the region, and their policies have increased the discontent of local communities towards them, while affecting the ability of the Autonomous Administration to respond to security problems and challenges.

• The Autonomous Administration’s Approach to the Aggressive Policy of Regional Regimes:

Since its inception, the Autonomous Administration appears to be good at managing the balance of power in the region of northern and eastern Syria according to the principle of “political neutrality” (*) and the diplomacy of fighting ISIS and not engaging in the conflict for power raging between the regime and the opposition. It has presented many dialogue initiatives with both parties on more than one occasion, the latest of which was the announcement by the General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces of his readiness “for dialogue with all parties and all forces, including Turkey”26 on the 20th of last July. Therefore, undermining the Autonomous Administration by one of the regional regimes in the presence of a competitor lying in wait for it requires caution. This is a factor in the loss of confidence and the failure to unify the fronts through which attacks are launched on the region, despite the convergence of their goals. There is the northern front managed by the forces of the Turkish regime, the western front managed by the forces of the Syrian regime and its allies, and the internal front managed by ISIS.

The Autonomous Administration has adopted an approach that suits its capabilities in confronting the aggressive policy of regional regimes, which can be defined by what resulted from the tripartite meeting27 in last June, which brought together the General Command of the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration, and the Co-Presidency of the Syrian Democratic Council. It was agreed to work “to strengthen the political strength of the Autonomous Administration and expand Arab, regional and international relations, especially with regard to combating the terrorist organization ISIS, and cooperation with those parties in economic, health, educational and other important files.” Therefore, this approach can be described as a means of “strategic hedging”28 through following a policy in the form of a mixture of cooperation and conflict. In general, the most prominent elements of political strength on which the Autonomous Administration relies in determining its approach to confronting various challenges can be summarized as follows:

1- The partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Internal Security Forces with the international coalition to fight ISIS; where most American officials in most of their media meetings confirmed the continued support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, and on 2024.09.03, the US Central Command announced in a post on the “X” platform:29 “…US Central Command remains committed to supporting our partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS and promote regional stability,” after providing support to the Syrian Democratic Forces to arrest a number of ISIS elements fleeing a prison in Raqqa; senior leaders of the international coalition also stated earlier that they are conducting daily contacts and coordination30 with the Syrian Democratic Forces, and continuing to build the infrastructure and military capabilities necessary to ensure that the organization cannot re-emerge.

2- Maintaining the stability of Al-Hol camp, which includes more than 10,000 foreign extremists from about sixty countries that refuse to take them back, and at the same time these countries fear their escape from the camp and return to carry out combat operations in them, and since the stability of Al-Hol camp comes from the stability of the north and east Syria region, it seems that not allowing the deterioration of the stability of the region is in the interest of these countries.

3- The secular administration with a democratic character of the region, which is suitable for regional and international security, even if it does not pose an imminent threat to the countries neighboring the region that warrants declaring war on it.

4- Maintaining communication channels with Damascus, and signing memorandums of understanding with the Russian forces regarding the deployment of Russian and Syrian army forces in areas along the Syrian-Turkish border within the framework of the ceasefire between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Turkish regime forces after their occupation of both Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) and Gire Spî (Tel Abyad), on the other hand, Russia has an interest in the continued victory of the Autonomous Administration over ISIS, and according to experts,31 “Russia has a long-term security concern in the region, which is the spread of international terrorism to Russia and neighboring countries… [there are] 3,200 Russians who traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2014 to fight in the ranks of Islamists.”

5- The reliance of a section of the areas in the Syrian geography in securing fuel on the oil of northern and eastern Syria, where the region includes at least 75% of the oil reserves in Syria.32

6- The absence of plurality in the military, political, and administrative leadership of the region, unlike the divisions of loyalties among Syrian regime officials towards Russia, Iran, and the Arab countries, or the gang mentality followed by the factions in managing the areas occupied by Turkey, in addition to the local communities’ boredom with the ideological wars that they have witnessed since ten years of the Syrian crisis, and what enhances it further is the community diplomacy that is managed relatively well.

• Secondly – ISIS’s Extremist Activities:

The current form of military and propaganda operations pursued by ISIS in the northeast of Syria, Daraa, the Syrian desert, and central Iraq, along with its attempts to boost its recent operations in Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, and its increasing activity in Africa,33 indicate structural shifts in its tactics. These shifts suggest changes in its strategy, potentially meaning that the term “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” no longer suits the organization’s attempts to spread, especially as it has become a “rogue” organization for local communities. This is evidenced by the arrest or killing of dozens of its members and leaders by law enforcement forces in northeast Syria and Iraq, with support from the international coalition, during the first half of 2024, despite its exaggerations in describing its operations in those regions. According to reports published by the official website of the Internal Security Forces of northeast Syria, the number of ISIS members and leaders announced to have been arrested during the first half of 2024 reached 77, most notably: the financial services emir of the organization in Deir Ezzor,34 Khaled Hassan al-Saloum, nicknamed “Abu Fatima al-Shaiti,” who was arrested in the town of Ghranij in the Deir Ezzor countryside. Meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced the arrest of 233 ISIS members during the first half of 2024.35 The strongest blow the organization suffered was the elimination of six first-tier leaders in a coalition operation in the Anbar desert called “Lion’s Leap.”36

Upon investigating the organization’s activities in northeast Syria, it is observed that it is trying to maintain its presence in the region and announce it through operations that specifically target relatively easy targets from civilian and military figures, through individual operations that rely on the so-called “hit and run” tactic by targeting civilians who refuse to pay them protection money (*) or firing at checkpoints and military vehicles in relatively remote areas, and targeting members of law enforcement agencies unexpectedly in the markets.

The organization derives part of its ability to continue its activities in northeast Syria from several sources, most notably:

1- The ease of its activities in the areas occupied by Turkish forces in northern Syria,37 and its reliance on the “principle of dissimulation” after settlements or reconciliation with the Syrian regime. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria38 confirmed, through the results of the investigation into a massacre committed on April 7 in Daraa, that “ten civilians, including two children, were brutally executed by pro-government militias largely composed of former rebels who had ‘completed reconciliation procedures’ and were chanting ISIS slogans. Most of the victims were executed using knives or gunshots at close range in acts that may amount to war crimes of murder and outrage upon personal dignity…”

2- The inability of the Syrian regime and its allies to eliminate the organization in the desert, in addition to the regime’s aggressive policy towards northeast Syria, as it has an interest in the organization continuing to destabilize the region.

3- The continuation of the problem of al-Hol camp, which is one of the most dangerous camps in the world. According to officials in the Autonomous Administration, the camp is still the main target of the organization and an approved incitement propaganda material in all its publications and promotional identifiers. ISIS women are working to train children on extremist ideology, in addition to carrying out killings and torture. During the first half of this year, the organization planned to carry out dangerous operations inside the camp in coordination with ISIS cells from outside the camp, which prompted the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Internal Security Forces to carry out operations inside the camp. In February, the security and military forces completed the third phase of the “Humanity and Security Operation” inside al-Hol camp,39 which resulted in the killing of the emir responsible for the cells within and around the camp, named “Abu Sufian al-Luhaibi,” and the arrest of the so-called first Sharia official and the person responsible for spreading Takfiri ideology and issuing fatwas of killing and threats against the camp’s residents, named “Abu Abdul Hamid,” in addition to the arrest of 85 members of ISIS cells and the seizure of a quantity of weapons. In April, the Internal Security Forces, in a security operation inside the camp, managed to arrest 25 members of the most dangerous cells within the camp, who were monitoring and tracking security patrols, carrying out killings and torturing women and men who rejected the organization’s ideology, and spreading extremist ideology among the camp’s residents. These cells were also preparing and planning to carry out joint operations to target military and security points, according to a statement by the Internal Security Forces.40 At the beginning of August, a cell consisting of 7 members who were planning to carry out terrorist acts within the camp was arrested, which means that the organization relies on its members in the camp to start any new launch.

4- Media disinformation and the aggressive actions of regional regimes towards the North and East Syria region, where the organization works to create harmony between its propaganda and that media disinformation by exploiting the suffering of the region’s residents due to: the repercussions of Turkish airstrikes on the service sector, international sanctions on the Syrian regime, the effects of the crisis that has been ongoing for more than ten years, the drought striking the region, in addition to the problem of functional neglect in some institutions, and promoting these as grievances against local communities and holding the Autonomous Administration responsible; which may create a fragile security environment through which recruitment, sabotage, and targeting of military personnel and civilians can be facilitated. This has been observed in the areas where it is active in the countryside of Al-Hasakah, Deir Ezzor, and Raqqa.

The organization also benefited from the aggressive operations of regional regimes that are fully aware of this fact. For example, the Turkish regime deliberately bombed the vicinity of the al-Sina’a prison and detention centers housing hundreds of the organization’s members and dangerous leaders, coinciding with its destructive bombing campaign at the beginning of this year. This prompted the Office of Justice and Reform Affairs in the North and East Syria region41 of the Autonomous Administration to appeal to the international community and the international coalition to intervene, in addition to bombing checkpoints belonging to the Internal Security Forces, which was considered a facilitation of the organization’s movements.

5- Exploiting the issue of detaining hundreds of the organization’s leaders and members in northern and eastern Syria as a moral energy to incite the remaining members to continue carrying out the organization’s combat, advocacy, sabotage, and recruitment activities. In this context, General Michael Erik Kurilla, commander of the US Central Command, said that “there are still more than 9,000 ISIS detainees in more than 20 detention facilities of the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, which is literally an army of ISIS under detention. If a large number of ISIS fighters escape, this will pose an imminent threat to the region and beyond…”42.

• The Autonomous Administration’s Approach to Addressing ISIS Extremist Activities:

The Autonomous Administration continues to rely on social diplomacy to enhance stability and security in the North and East Syria region. This diplomacy forms the foundation of its existence and the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) among the military components in the region in 2015, based on the principle of “collective security” to confront both shared threats and ISIS attacks, alongside the International Coalition. The Administration has worked to develop this diplomacy through the new formulation of the Social Contract, which has met with a clear aggressive stance from regional regimes and ISIS. Therefore, confronting ISIS’s extremist activities relies on community participation in the confrontation process. Evidence of this is the unprecedented number of ISIS members arrested during the first half of 2024 and the increase in ISIS targeting of civilian figures. It appears that involving the community in the process of enhancing security and stability has turned into an effective defense policy. This policy has given great flexibility to law enforcement institutions in managing the security file better and provided local communities with the opportunity to contribute to achieving self-protection. Some examples of cooperation between the community and law enforcement institutions include: the “Second National Unity Forum for Syrian Clans and Components,” organized by the Autonomous Democratic Administration of the North and East Syria region and the Syrian Democratic Council in the city of Al-Hasakah in May. About 5,000 community and religious (Islamic, Christian, and Yazidi) figures, sheikhs and dignitaries of clans in the North and East Syria region, and officials from the Autonomous Democratic Administration participated. The Autonomous Administration considered it an extension of the “Conference on Strengthening Security and Stability” held in Deir Ezzor in mid-October 2023, after the failure of sabotage operations that targeted the Deir Ezzor Canton by regional regimes. Its final statement43 became like a document for joint action between the community and the administration, as most of the amnesty decisions and administrative decisions related to the Cantons and addressing what is called social grievances, which are promoted by the media opposed to the political situation in the region, and the implementation of demands were based on it later. Among the items implemented from that statement was responding to the demands of the people for tolerance with their relatives in the Al-Hol camp and allowing them to return to their areas.44 The Social Affairs and Labor Authority in the Autonomous Administration opened the “Social Welfare Center” in Raqqa and Tabqa, which is the first of its kind in the Middle East,45 to follow up on the conditions of families returning from the Al-Hol camp to empower them and integrate them into society, in addition to carrying out awareness campaigns in the camps in cooperation with the concerned bodies. Dozens of families from Deir Ezzor were secured to leave the Al-Hol camp during the first half of this year with the sponsorship of tribal sheikhs,46 69 families in May and 88 families in July, and the Executive Council in the Deir Ezzor Canton undertook to shelter them, return them to their homes, follow up on their affairs, issue personal documents, and provide the necessary support to be able to reintegrate into society.

On the other hand, in April, the Autonomous Administration announced the receipt of a Tajik delegation47 of 50 of its citizens in the Al-Hol camp, and the receipt of a British delegation of 5 of its citizens under an official receipt document, in addition to dozens of Iraqi and Kyrgyz families. The departure of families from the camp constituted an important step in removing them from extremist ideology and the dangers that ISIS poses to them, and reintegrating them into society, which is considered an exhaustion of one of the resources that ISIS relies on.

At the beginning of the year, social elites in the Raqqa Canton authorized the Internal Security Forces to intervene in resolving tribal disputes. One of the most prominent and serious security incidents that was resolved was the extensive security campaign in the town of “Al-Hamrat,” east of Raqqa, on January 29th, following disputes and infighting between the “Al-Mudlej/Al-Balasem” clan and the “Al-Jamassa” clan. This was in response to demands from dignitaries, tribal elders, and residents of the area, which resulted in the arrest of approximately 82 people involved in the fighting and the seizure of a large quantity of weapons,48 including mine detectors and a reconnaissance drone. At the beginning of August, the Internal Security Forces and the Council of Notables in Raqqa held a coordination meeting in which it was agreed upon:49 “The intervention of the Internal Security Forces in resolving tribal disputes, opening roads that were closed for security reasons by the Internal Security Forces, responding to the demands of the people to address the scourge of drugs, and holding similar meetings in accordance with the wishes of the people and notables of the Raqqa Canton and civil society activists.”

During the first half of 2024, the Autonomous Administration issued two amnesty decrees. The first was on April 6th for some committed crimes,50 and the second came in response to the final statement of the Tribal Forum. The Democratic Peoples’ Council in the Autonomous Administration issued Amnesty Decree No. (10) in mid-July to release detainees whose hands were not stained with the blood of innocents. According to the Democratic Peoples’ Council,51 the goal is to “promote civil peace and give an opportunity for integration into society for Syrians who were misled and whose hands were not stained with the blood of Syrians, and to enable coexistence between the components of the northern and eastern Syria region.”

Based on this, the involvement of local communities in confronting the activities of ISIS is part of the security and defense issues in the northern and eastern Syria region, regardless of whether this stems from the Autonomous Administration’s commitment to the principles of democracy or as a result of its compulsion to adopt this in its security doctrine to defend its existence. In either case, it is considered something positive and beneficial to both parties.

Thirdly – Activities falling within the framework of organized crime:

The Middle East region is witnessing significant activity by drug trafficking networks. According to American reports, the Syrian areas under the control of the Syrian regime have become one of the global centers for this trade, and the report described Damascus as the “Captagon capital.”52 Amidst this activity, drug dealers cannot ignore the region of northeastern Syria to spread the scourge of drugs for material gain. ISIS is also transforming this activity into a source of funding for its activities after losing most of its financial resources. Moreover, it can be asserted that it is considered part of the aggressive operations of regional intelligence agencies on the region, based on two indicators: first, most international reports accuse the Syrian regime of involvement in this trade and its spread; and second, the direct bombing by Turkish warplanes of the Anti-Drug Academy in the village of “Hamza Bey” in the countryside of the town of Derik on October 8, 2023, resulted in the loss of 29 students from the academy. As a result, the Internal Security Forces launched a retaliatory campaign against drug sales and promotion networks that is still ongoing. In June of this year, the General Command of the Internal Security Forces confirmed in a public statement the involvement of forces hostile to the Autonomous Administration in introducing large quantities of drugs into the region of northeastern Syria, and announced53 that it was working on 2387 files and arresting 3485 drug dealers, promoters, and users, and seizing a large quantity of narcotic substances. In a related context, local media published54 confessions of a network of agents of Turkish intelligence, who confirmed that part of their tasks was to spread drugs among the people of northeastern Syria.

On the other hand, migrant smuggling operations are still ongoing along the border with the Turkish state. Seri Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), Keri Sapi (Tel Abyad), and the countryside of Afrin, which are under Turkish occupation, are among the most areas witnessing crossing operations, where mercenary factions control smuggling crossings,55 and immigration to a lesser degree in other border areas within the region; where many are subjected to torture or injuries, and some have lost their lives56 at the hands of the Turkish gendarmerie.

Regarding armed robbery operations, operations were recorded in the southern Hasakah countryside. In June, the Internal Security Forces were able to arrest a gang involved in robberies and armed robberies57 and seized a quantity of weapons in the area between the city of Hasakah and al-Hol. No rates of kidnapping crimes were recorded compared to the rest of the Syrian regions, and most of the crimes that occurred were for individual motives. On the other hand, it is difficult to track the threats that citizens in the Deir Ezzor Canton receive, especially oil investors, to pay royalties by ISIS cells. The Internal Security Forces were able to arrest58 one of these cells in September.

Regarding corruption files, Ahmed Sheikho (Co-Chair of the General Oversight Authority in the Autonomous Administration) stated59 that “the Authority, during the first half of 2024, has resolved 169 files, and there are 32 files under review, in addition to 257 complaints from residents, most of which have been resolved, and work is underway on the rest.” He pointed out that there are difficulties facing the work of the General Oversight Authority, including the lack of specialized staff in the field of oversight and the small budget allocated to the Oversight Authority, and he indicated that they are working to address them. According to what is being observed on the ground, operations are underway to follow up on corruption files in various sectors away from the media, based on reports and decisions received by the Democratic Peoples’ Council in the Jazira region, which is attended by a member of the NRLS.

The danger of activities falling within the framework of organized crime lies in their susceptibility to exploitation60 by regional regimes and ISIS. Therefore, it can be assumed that they have an interest in disrupting efforts to combat these activities in any way. For example, the Turkish regime threatened to launch a military operation if municipal elections were held in the northern and eastern Syria region, which the Autonomous Administration was forced to postpone (*) at the invitation of political parties in the region and some partner countries in the fight against ISIS, knowing that these elections are an effective means of making administrative reforms in all municipalities. The distraction of the security and military apparatus in the region in confronting the conspiratorial operations of regional regimes and ISIS has led to difficulties in confronting activities that fall within the framework of organized crime. Also, the lack of a clear strategy in the local media to cover activities falling within the framework of organized crime, follow up on citizens’ complaints and criticism, and open files for accountability, contributes in some ways to exploiting these activities as a political smear campaign against the institutions of the Autonomous Administration, and at the same time, does not help to enhance social control and support the efforts of law enforcement institutions towards many criminal cases.

On the other hand, the security apparatus in the northern and eastern Syria region still lacks a financial intelligence unit specialized in combating the financing of terrorism, organized crime, and financial corruption as an official institution, and most of the work to combat these activities is distributed among various departments of the Internal Security Forces of the northern and eastern Syria region, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and the General Oversight Authority. Also, the hostile position of regional regimes does not allow the establishment of formal relations in the field of combating transnational organized crime with regional governments or with Interpol.

• The Autonomous Administration’s Approach to Organized Crime:

The Autonomous Administration’s approach in this context is based on the same approach it takes in confronting extremist activities of ISIS, that is, relying on social diplomacy to involve the community in the confrontation process. It considers drug, corruption, and smuggling cases as issues that are difficult to respond to without social support. This may be one of the reasons why there is no fragile security environment through which kidnapping gangs, drug trafficking, extortion, or transnational organized crime networks can be formed. What supports this belief is the conservative social nature of local communities, as well as the tribal customs among Kurds, Arabs, and Syriacs do not protect those who practice these activities.

According to reports from the Internal Security Forces, most arrests of drug dealers are based on citizens’ reports. This is due to society’s awareness of the danger of these substances and the great sympathy of society with the victims of the Turkish bombing of the “Anti-Narcotics Academy,” as most of those who lost their lives came from different regions of the region. For example, a relative of one of those arrested in a drug promotion case told an NRLS research team that they are “satisfied with his imprisonment to receive his punishment,” as he was arrested based on a report submitted by a friend after he offered him drugs. In addition, the efforts made by the Internal Security Forces to develop their expertise and increase their resources can be noted.

Regarding corruption files, the Autonomous Administration is working to increase the number of specialized personnel in the field of oversight and subject them to specialized training courses in the work of the oversight body, while noting indications of attempts to carry out administrative reforms, which means that the relative state of weakness will continue until those goals are achieved.

Fourth – Regarding environmental degradation:

Climate change has affected the economic situation in the region, in parallel with the repercussions of the aggressive operations by regional regimes and ISIS on service facilities, infrastructure, and the investment environment (*) in the region, which have escalated since the beginning of this year (**). At the same time, it has led to an increase in environmental degradation rates (***), which has exacerbated some internal crises such as the water and energy supply crisis, the high cost of living, and civil services, making them more difficult to manage. Since the beginning of 2024 until the eighth month (August), the impact of climate change on northern and eastern Syria has increased significantly, and the extreme weather conditions (****) continued to dominate the region’s climate. The World Meteorological Organization61 confirmed that last July recorded the highest temperature globally in modern history, which had repercussions on: economic security, through the loss of income sources for many and the decrease in financial income from agricultural sector activities, as local communities still rely on the agricultural sector as a source of income from labor, trade, and agriculture. Due to the difficulty of importing materials for this sector, the impact of these repercussions has also been reflected on medium and small enterprises that rely on agricultural products such as bakeries, bulgur factories, dairy farms, and oil production.

Environmental degradation has relatively affected the decline in resources for achieving human security in the northern and eastern Syria region, through the indicators of weakness that have emerged in each of the following:

• Food security: Difficulties have emerged in securing bread and locally produced vegetables, and difficulty in obtaining animal feed.
• Water security: The city of Al-Hasakah, its countryside, and the Deir Ezzor province suffered from a major water crisis as a result of irregular rainfall, high temperatures, low levels of the Euphrates River and groundwater, and the Turkish occupying forces cutting off water from the Allouk station.
• Health security: This was clearly observed through the increase in the number of people with poisoning62 and inflammatory diseases, especially in the months of June and July, in addition to a relative increase in pollution rates, some of which were mentioned in the previous paragraphs.
• Social security: This was manifested in the continuous phenomenon of migration, whether from the countryside to the city or abroad, and a relative weakness in social communication. This was clearly observed in the city of Qamishlo due to the hot weather and the preference of many to stay at home. Its impact was also noted in the occurrence of some individual incidents and altercations due to the influence of the hot weather on aggressive tendencies63.

In general, the agricultural sector was the most affected by the repercussions of climate change. In April, the Al-Jazeera province was exposed to a low-pressure system characterized by heavy rainfall and rainstorms accompanied by hail, which damaged more than 4,500 dunums64 of cultivated areas with various crops, including grains, vegetables, and some aromatic plants (coriander and fenugreek) in the countryside of the city of Amuda alone. On the other hand, irregular rainfall and heat waves led to a relative deterioration in the agricultural season. For example, the irrigated areas did not exceed 6 million dunums65, and the quantities of wheat received from farmers in the northern and eastern Syria region, according to officials of the Agriculture and Irrigation Authority to “NRLS”, amounted to 771,000 tons, while the Authority received “1 million and 150 thousand tons of wheat” in 2023.

Environmental pollution posed a major threat to health security. The delay in removing accumulated garbage from cities to its designated places had a serious environmental impact. The act of rummaging through garbage increased and turned into a phenomenon of child exploitation by some individuals to achieve material benefits, leaving a negative impact on cities. The People’s Council in Raqqa province was forced to issue a decision66 in order to reduce it, stipulating legal accountability for the phenomenon of rummaging through garbage in containers and scattering it in public streets and gardens in the city of Raqqa. In June, the municipality of Amuda apologized to the residents67 after the accumulation of waste in the city, as a result of the disruption of garbage transportation vehicles, and carried out a cleaning campaign inside the city. Several neighborhoods in the cities of Qamishli and Al-Hasakah also witnessed an accumulation of garbage. When a number of municipality workers were asked about the reason, they explained that the problem lies in the difficulty of securing fuel and spare parts for garbage transportation vehicles. What contributes to the exacerbation of this phenomenon is the small number of waste recycling projects in the cities of the region.

In May, the number of leishmaniasis cases increased in the Manbij region, with the Health Authority in the region recording approximately 9,000 cases since the beginning of 2024, a 50% increase compared to last year.68 This prompted the Directorate of Environment, the Municipalities Committee, and the Health Authority in the region to launch awareness and control campaigns targeting the fly that transmits the disease in the city and its countryside to limit its spread.

On another front, air pollution persists in the region’s major cities due to the large number of vehicles of all types and the continued reliance of citizens on internal combustion engines to secure electricity, in addition to dust and pollutants carried by the winds towards residential areas.

• The Autonomous Administration’s Approach to Environmental Degradation:

The institutions of the Autonomous Administration have tried to respond to the repercussions of environmental degradation in a manner that balances available resources, with the greatest focus on addressing the water crisis in the region by implementing a series of projects and relief campaigns. For example, in the past month of May, the Local Administration Authority in Al-Jazeera Canton completed the preparation of 5 wells out of 20 within a project to draw drinking water from the city of Amuda to the stricken city of Hasaka,69 which had been halted after attacks by the Turkish regime on the infrastructure of the northern regions of the region. Drilling operations are still ongoing to complete the project, amid a continued water crisis inside and outside the city. In the past month of June, the Local Administration Authority in Deir Ezzor Canton launched a campaign to deliver drinking water to the residents of Al-Sour70 town via 11 tankers after several appeals from the residents due to the scarcity of drinking water and high temperatures. At the beginning of July, water flowed into the Al-Khabur irrigation canal project,71 which is 50 km long, after the canal was rehabilitated and maintained as part of the plan prepared by the Autonomous Administration in Deir Ezzor Canton. This secured water for irrigating agricultural areas estimated at 220,000 dunams and providing drinking water for 270,000 people through 5 main drinking water stations: Harizeh water station, Al-Harijia water station, and the two water stations: Khamiyah Al-Suwar and Markada, with the continuation of work to complete the second phase of the project to deliver water to the city of Hasaka.

As for the most prominent environmental development projects announced by the institutions of the Autonomous Administration during this year, they are:

1- Opening a soil and water analysis laboratory at the Scientific Agricultural Research Center for Innovation and Excellence to receive soil and water samples in order to diagnose the problems of the main resources of agricultural systems, such as soil, water, and plants, and treat them with the aim of “increasing the production of agricultural crops to achieve self-sufficiency for the population.”72

2- Planting 15,000 diverse trees,73 which were distributed to the institutions of the Autonomous Administration, reserves, and existing forests.

3- The Environment Authority74 in the Autonomous Administration announced its plans at the beginning of 2024, which include a project to analyze water throughout northern and eastern Syria, create new forests, and launch afforestation and awareness campaigns to preserve the environment, and prepare statistics on air pollution in Al-Jazeera Canton.

4- Activating a laboratory specialized in drug analysis75 and establishing a laboratory for qualitative analysis in Qamishli, and completing the construction of public hospitals in Kobani and the maternity hospital in Qamishli.

5- To contain the fires that broke out in agricultural crops, an emergency committee was formed to protect agricultural crops in the region’s districts, in coordination with community protection forces and farmers. Rapid response units equipped with firefighting equipment were deployed on the roads, and most of the fires were contained.

On the other hand, environmental degradation and the destruction of the Suwaydiya power plant led to increased demand from citizens for installing solar panels, water filters, and greenhouse farming. However, these efforts were insufficient to meet the growing demand for energy, curb rising agricultural product prices, and reduce reliance on internal combustion engines for energy. Furthermore, cities are overcrowded with various types of vehicles running on diesel and gasoline.

o Fourth and fifth generation wars as a means to undermine Autonomous-administration:

The state has monopolized power and becomes the sole entity waging or confronting wars, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648(76), which ended the religious wars in Europe between Catholics and Protestants. This became a common practice in the nation-states that later formed in Asia, Africa, and America. However, with the technological development witnessed in the military and intelligence fields, the impact of security challenges that cross political borders between states on societies and the environment has increased and has become a factor in conflict. According to military experts77, the battlefield where two armies clash is no longer common due to the change in contemporary battlefield conditions and the inability of inherited beliefs in warfare to respond to new circumstances. What explains this belief is the exacerbation of threats posed by organized crime networks and extremist organizations, and the repercussions of the pragmatism of nation-states and sectarianism in implementing their agendas, in addition to the effects of climate change and the spread of epidemics, all of which have produced new types of warfare, such as fourth-generation (*) and fifth-generation (**) warfare. State systems have transformed these sources of threat into an integrated unit to strike opponents as a strategic principle that provides the most prominent determinants in formulating security doctrine related to security and defense issues. That is, it defines the concepts, principles, and foundations upon which security policies and strategies are based to confront various threats and challenges in an organized manner across all institutions and within society. ‘’General Robert Smith’’, in his book “The Usefulness of Power,” sees that “the pursuit of defense and security is a conflictual pursuit stemming from overt and covert confrontations. Confrontations between people with different interests and priorities are an endemic disease in all societies…”78

Using various sources of threat as an integrated unit to strike opponents is a complex form of warfare, or can be described as “complex warfare” or a war on multiple fronts, based on General ‘’Carl von Clausewitz’s’’ definition of war, which he considered that it is79 “an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will… and imposing our will on the enemy is the goal of war.” The term “fourth generation warfare” expresses this type of warfare.

Considering that environmental degradation is largely caused by global warming, a global problem, the harmony between the aggressive policies of regional regimes, ISIS activities, and actions that fall within the framework of organized crime can be considered a war waged against the region of North and East Syria. Since the defense strategy of the Autonomous Administration is based on the support of local communities, the success of these groups’ operations against the region lies in stripping it of this support, since “the purpose of war is to disarm the enemy in order to force him to submit,” according to Clausewitz80. This what can be notes through the propaganda directed against the Autonomous Administration and the obstruction of services by bombing infrastructure and service facilities, cutting off water, and exploiting international relations to impose the widest possible degree of political isolation on it. The closure of international crossings with North and East Syria, the prevention of the Autonomous Administration’s participation in regional relations, ISIS’s continuation of its ideological campaign via social media or through local followers, and the exploitation of difficult economic and psychological conditions by some practitioners of activities classified as organized crime, are all examples of this. All of these may lead to, or aim to create a rift between local communities and the autonomous administration, which in turn adopts the concept of self-protection and flexibility in managing internal and external relations as the basis of its defense strategy, especially since the security doctrine of the autonomous administration recognizes more advanced forms of these wars, which it calls “special warfare”81, which is: “a war that aims to achieve its goals by using all material and moral means to kill the will of the society or the targeted party with the aim of its surrender, creating despair, pessimism, and lack of confidence in souls, in addition to confusion and creating ambiguity in opinions, ideas, and positions, deepening secondary and artificial contradictions, marginalizing the main contradiction, creating internal conflict, and marginalizing the community…” It seems that this approach was correct, as evidenced by the autonomous administration’s ability to preserve its entity and ensure stability in an area surrounded by forces trying to undermine it. Defense, as Clausewitz says82, is simply “the strongest form of war, which makes the defeat of the enemy more strongly certain…” On the other hand; The Autonomous Administration’s approach to confronting threats can be framed within the framework of Sun Tzu’s principle of “undermining the enemy’s strategy,” meaning maintaining strong ties between the Autonomous Administration and local communities. This is evidenced by the failure of the operation launched by Syrian regime forces against Deir Ezzor province in early August, the failure of the Turkish regime’s bet on widespread protests against the Autonomous Administration due to poor services and high living costs, the destruction of infrastructure and vital facilities in the northern regions of the region, the continued closure of international crossings, ISIS’s failure to build a popular base, and the failure of ideologically-driven media outlets run by regional regimes and ISIS to spread hatred among local communities and create ethnic, sectarian, or regional strife. What has been mentioned in the context of this paragraph more accurately illustrates the region’s exposure to fourth- and fifth-generation warfare83, which in many respects resembles the concept of “special warfare” circulated by military and security personnel in the region. This type of warfare is based on a strategy of “destruction from within” through Exploiting gaps in the social fabric, which no society is free of, no matter how advanced, creates societal tensions—whether ethnic, religious, sectarian, or political—and widens existing disputes, fueling discontent with the status quo to the point where things spiral out of control. This is a proxy war waged behind the scenes with the goal of overthrowing the adversary without the need for direct foreign military intervention. This is achieved through the collapse of vital institutions and the dismantling of the nation’s unity, paving the way for the construction of a new system of government that safeguards the interests of the party waging this war. What distinguishes this type of warfare for states is its low cost, while avoiding the problems that typically arise after conventional wars. It also provides flexibility to the force administering it, potentially enabling it to gain the sympathy of local communities and appear as a savior, after the country has reached a state of chaos or internal collapse and is on the verge of disintegration and division. This explains why this type of warfare relies more on psychological warfare than military means. Therefore, the media is considered the most important weapon of fourth and fifth generation warfare.

The regional ruling regimes and ISIS are waging this war on the north and east of Syria for reasons related to expanding their vital geopolitical scope. They are not acting on a defensive principle, but rather their motivation is based on an extremist exclusionary ideology. The Turkish regime, with Qatari support, is managing plans to establish economic cartels in countries dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, similar to the Ottoman Empire’s provinces in the Levant and North Africa. The Brotherhood’s seizure of power in Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Libya and Gaza was exploited, and working to control power in Syria falls within this context. They have openly declared jihad against the communities of north and east Syria at least twice. The first was during the invasion of Afrin84 in the winter of 2018, and the second was during the invasion of Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain)85 and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) in the summer of 2019. The Iranian regime has a similar project, but with a Shiite undertone. Although there are no indications of Iranian interest in North and East Syria, based on ideological principles, control over the region is strategically important for strengthening the confrontation front with regional and international adversaries. The policy of “exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution” excludes no area from its deployment. This aligns with Russia’s own strategy toward the region in confronting its international adversaries. According to a study by the Rand Center86, Russia seeks to “transform Syria into a center for its leadership in the Middle East and Africa, similar to the US command center in the Gulf.” The Syrian regime’s goal is clear: to regain full control of the region. ISIS, meanwhile, has an “Islamic State” project, and the atrocities it has committed in the name of religion clearly illustrate the current war it is waging87. The aim of presenting these matters is to clarify the objectives behind this war and the identity of the parties that are waging it, since wars, as General Robert Smith88 sees it, “are waged on four levels: political, strategic, field, and tactical.” each of which is situated within the context of the others in descending order, starting with the political level, which provides the context for all the activities of the other levels that aim to achieve the same goals and ensures the interconnection between them, and is the source of authority and decision-making…” This leads us to the existence of four fourth-generation wars that are being waged independently against the region of North and East Syria, even though undermining the autonomous administration is considered a common goal for them, based on the characteristics identified by ‘’Colonel William S. Lind’’, the author of the “Four Generations of Warfare” theory, which are the commission of acts of physical and mental violence through assassinations, the dissemination of hate speech through those described as politicians, intellectuals, and researchers, the attack on military targets, and the adoption of terrorist tactics89 that are based on a “non-national” basis. Here, the name of ISIS and the mercenary factions stands out. They are managed in a decentralized manner and launch a direct attack on the culture and ideology of the supposed enemy, and they also carry out acts of genocide. Collective attacks against civilians. This is being done through water terrorism, the destruction of infrastructure and vital facilities essential to the lives of the population, the displacement of residents, and the violation of their rights in the occupied territories. This demonstrates the extent of the pressure exerted on the autonomous administration and the credibility of its approach to confronting these challenges.

o the impact of challenges on the region’s security environment until the end of 2025

Northeastern Syria is essentially part of a broader region that was under the Ottoman occupation when the victorious powers of I World War divided it into a group of nation-states in a series of agreements that began with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. These agreements caused intractable security problems that were compounded by the problems caused by the Ottoman occupation within these countries. These agreements resulted from their failure, or impossibility, to fuse the various national identities into the Turkish or Arab nationalism, which in turn failed to establish a national identity within their respective countries. Because of the authoritarian regimes that ruled them, it seems impossible to separate the security and defense issues of a particular country from their counterparts in other countries. For example, the Kurdish issue continues to plague these regimes, and the conflicting, cross-border ideologies that drive these regimes keep them in a state of constant conflict. The ideology of establishing the state of the jurist guardianship, the ideology of reviving the Ottoman Empire, and the ideology of reviving the Sunni Arab Islamic state, in addition to the ideologies of Turkish nationalism and Arab nationalism, stand out in particular. On the other hand, there is the paradigm of the democratic nation, which contradicts all of these ideologies, and most of the communities in the region of North and East Syria, which are repelled by these ideologies, have opened up to it. What is striking is the presence of all the forces driven by these ideologies in the Syrian geography, and they have become the main factor in transforming the Syrian crisis into a regional crisis. This clearly expresses the overlap of security and defense issues between the countries of the region. However, instead of constructive cooperation, as seen in the flattering political statements of these countries’ politicians, there are hidden wars being waged by proxies.

The autonomous administration cannot isolate itself from these conflicts. Despite the relative success of the principle of neutrality, or what it calls the “third line,” in the context of the Syrian crisis, in reducing its involvement in this war, it has not been able to distance itself from the conflict. It appears that it is still attempting to maintain this principle of neutrality by maintaining channels of communication with Western countries, Russia, and even the Syrian regime. These are supposed to act as a restraining force against Turkish and Iranian expansion in northeastern Syria, given the alliances between them. This policy appears to have granted the autonomous administration a margin of uneasy stability and provided emergency solutions to address the repercussions of the security challenges it faces. If we accept that conflicting ideologies cannot live in lasting peace, pragmatism can play a role in forging a truce between them, based on the principle of postponing the plan until conditions permit its success.

Three factors determine the nature of the security challenges facing the region until 2025: First, the autonomous administration’s lack of appropriate deterrents to confront Turkish attacks. Its participation in the international coalition fighting ISIS has not deterred these attacks compared to its deterrence of the Syrian regime’s attacks. The coalition countries cannot be trusted, as they are driven by pragmatism. Second, the continued hostility of regional regimes toward the region. Third, the ongoing repercussions of climate change. Based on these factors, the shifts that may occur in the trajectory of security challenges since the beginning of 2024 can be predicted as follows:

– Regarding the agendas of the regional ruling regimes:

The Turkish regime shows no signs of reconsidering its aggressive policy toward the region. Even the shifts in its policy toward the Syrian crisis have focused on normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, based on the principles underlying the 1998 Adana Agreement, and undermining the autonomous administration. It continues to issue threats against the region, carrying out airstrikes and political assassinations targeting the region’s social, political, military, and cultural elites. The media campaign against the autonomous administration continues. Furthermore, it is impossible to rely on a change in the ruling regime in Turkey; most Turkish parties show no signs to stop the conflict with the North and East Syria region. On the other hand, The United States has not taken any action to removing the tension between Turkey and the region, and its strategy appears unclear. It appears to be following the principle of “constructive ambiguity” (*) and the policy of “the brink of war” (**) in its own approach to the region. What is clear from them is only an initial commitment to maintaining the stability of the current fronts, but it is not possible to be certain of the extent of this policy’s continuity. Based on these matters, the Turkish regime will continue to launch aggressive operations against the region, politically through understandings that may be reached with the Syrian regime and under Russian sponsorship; militarily by continuing to launch air and ground bombardment operations and even occupying new areas if the opportunity arises; intelligence-wise through assassinations, psychological warfare, and media; and economically by continuing the economic blockade, and matters may develop to the closure of the Semalka crossing. Similar to the Iraqi authorities’ attempts to close the Sinjar crossing, through which tens of thousands of Yazidis were rescued from ISIS’s brutality by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) between 2014 and 2015, This was after the Iraqi army forces and their auxiliary forces fled.

As for the possible shifts in this path, there are several considerations that can be described as strategic and could emerge. These include: Turkey has no interest in restoring full control over northern and eastern Syria to the Syrian regime and its allies. Turkey’s efforts to undermine the Autonomous Administration are aimed at establishing an authority similar to the “Interim Government” and the “Salvation Government” loyal to it in northern and northwestern Syria, not handing it over to the Syrian regime. This is especially true given the region’s wealth, and what it could coordinate with the Syrian regime on is the continued exhaustion of the Autonomous Administration with various conspiratorial operations. In other words, it is impossible to rely on a final agreement between the two regimes to invade the region and hand it over to the Syrian regime “on a golden platter,” as the saying goes. However, what could cause a decline in Turkish interest in northern and eastern Syria is the escalation of internal Turkish tensions. The Turkish regime’s policies have caused an identity crisis within Turkish society, particularly Between Kurds and Turks on the one hand, and between Turkish Islamists and Turkish nationalists on the other. The racist attacks by Turks on Syrian refugees in Turkish-majority cities, as well as the Islamists’ loss of the municipal elections in Istanbul and Ankara, refers to the reality of this crisis. It is worth noting that Turkish Islamists have abandoned their sympathy for Syrian Islamists in favor of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. After the leader of the new Al-Rafah Party, Fatih Erbakan (one of the leaders of Islamists in Turkey), asked the Turkish parliament to send Turkish forces to Gaza to support the Palestinians,90 he called for coordination with the Syrian regime to return Syrian refugees, saying:91 “This must be implemented by communicating with the Syrian state if necessary, because the war there has largely ended, and Assad has regained control over 70% or 80% of the territory.” The Turkish regime92 has always justified its reform of relations with the Syrian regime and the Egyptian authorities under the pretext of supporting the Palestinian cause in the context of media consumption to cover up the shifts in the Turkish regime’s position on regional issues, which was the cause of the region’s crises, not to mention the escalation of the Turkish economic crisis and the Turkish government’s inability to confront the disaster of a larger earthquake that might strike Türkiye, according to Turkish geologists.93 Therefore, it is possible to rely on the internal situation in Turkey exploding, or the Turkish planners realizing this reality and shifting their attention more towards the Turkish interior, to lead to a decline in the wave of Turkish violence against the region. However, the shift in the Turkish position towards the Syrian regime carries within it some of these speculations, namely the neutralization of the Syrian regime from any future conflict within Turkey, especially with the repetition of Erdogan’s disturbing statements about the growing activity of those he described94 as “fascists and racists” and the renewal of his fears of a new military coup95 after the position shown by the Ataturk-fanatic officers at the military academy graduation ceremony. As for Turkey’s reform of its relations with the autonomous administration, it is primarily related to the Western strategy towards the region. It is either accepting the autonomous administration as a political and administrative entity based on the regime’s loss of legitimacy to govern the country in accordance with international resolutions, i.e., the current entities continue to administer their regions, or withdrawing from the region, which is unlikely after Syria has become a potential transit zone for global trade routes. There are expectations that the price of normalization between Damascus and Ankara will be the opening of the international road linking Gaziantep to Aleppo, Damascus, Amman, and the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as access to the India-Europe route via the Arabian Peninsula. This road (Gaziantep-Aqaba) intersects with the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut Road, and there is speculation about the Basra-Erbil-Qamishli-Aleppo-Latakia Road, which also intersects with this road. These roads are vital and are part of the global economic competition in the Middle East, not to mention the attempts of Russia and Iran, the West’s adversaries, to strengthen their influence in Syria at the expense of Turkish influence. On the other hand, the Syrian regime’s strategy may change by mending its relations with the Autonomous Administration. This is vital for the regime because of the role that North and East Syria could play in Syria’s reconstruction and the potential use of military capabilities to consolidate security in the country. The aforementioned matters seem far-fetched in the remaining half of 2024, but in 2025, the reality of the situation will become clearer.

In general, the situation over the coming months can be summarized as follows: The Turkish regime’s aggressive operations against the region will continue at an irregular pace, meaning that tensions will escalate intermittently in the context of the Turkish and Syrian regimes’ attempts to build trust between them and their agreement to exhaust the autonomous administration through the fourth and fifth generation of warfare. In parallel, US forces will continue to reinforce their bases in northern and eastern Syria following the initial agreement between US and Iraqi forces to withdraw from central Iraq and deploy at the Harir base in the Kurdistan Region. This is in addition to the growing capabilities of ISIS in the Syrian Badia. The failure of its attempts to regroup in the Anbar Desert – following the killing of its senior leaders – may lead to the transformation of the Syrian Badia into a major operational arena for its activities. This means that the reason that led US forces to enter northeastern and southern Syria will continue to exist. In the context of these developments, the image of the Autonomous Administration as a “non-state governmental entity” will become more entrenched, and the region may witness a new wave of refugees from those who refuse to submit to security settlements with the Syrian regime in Idlib and its countryside and the Aleppo countryside, in the context of normalization between the Syrian and Turkish regimes, if it is implemented. The Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces hinted during a meeting96 that northern and eastern Syria is ready to receive displaced persons from Idlib and areas of northwestern Syria.

As for the Syrian regime, it shows no signs of coexisting with the autonomous administration and accepting it as a state of policy. It will work to create the conditions that enable it to regain control over the region, through the fourth generation of warfare or special warfare, and in coordination with its Turkish counterpart and its Russian and Iranian allies. It will work on its propaganda war, represented by spreading despair and doubts, and trying to shape public opinion around allegations of “temporary gains,” and other methods.97 It may work again to stir up unrest in Deir Ezzor province in the coming months and activate Baath Party cells to create a state of racist nationalist tension within Arab societies. What indicates this is the organization of a gathering of tribal figures affiliated with the Syrian regime under the name “The Arab Tribal Forum”98 in the city of Homs in mid-September, which came out with a set of racist positions and denial of the suffering of millions of Syrians from the authoritarian policy practiced by the regime. He may also seek to include Manbij and Raqqa in his potential subversive operations. He may also possibly repeat his experience of supporting extremist Islamist groups that fought US forces in Iraq in the first decade of the current century, and redirect those cells to strike US forces in northeastern Syria. This could be achieved through ISIS groups that have undergone security settlements with the Syrian regime, Baathist cells, and pro-Iranian factions, in addition to al-Qaeda member in the Idlib region following the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. He may then provide information about them to the US leadership to demonstrate goodwill and break the ice with the Americans, while simultaneously eliminating extremists who disagree with him ideologically.

In general, the regime will continue to be unable to launch direct military operations against the region. As for Damascus’s openness to finding a formula for agreement with the Autonomous Administration, it is not unlikely. The Autonomous Administration has never declared its independence from Damascus nor taken a hostile stance toward it. It has repeatedly declared its readiness for dialogue and a resolution of the existing problems between the two parties. Just as Damascus needs the North and East Syria region for reconstruction, economic recovery, and reform of the country’s military system, the Autonomous Administration also needs to neutralize Damascus’s position to lift the siege on the region and halt the aggressive operations launched against it. This is especially true since the Autonomous Administration’s social contract considers Damascus the capital of Syria. Therefore, Damascus’s interest lies in building relations with the Autonomous Administration, not in increasing hostility. For the remainder of 2024, the Syrian regime’s hostile stance toward the region will continue, in the context of rapprochement with the Turkish regime which is expected to continue until next year. At the same time, the regime will continue to exploit its lack of involvement in the Iranian-Israeli conflict to mitigate the hostile Western and Arab stance towards it. This will be relatively hampered by the Syrian regime’s continued reliance on drug trafficking to confront its economic crisis. In general, the Syrian regime’s economic relations with the Autonomous Administration may improve through proxy traders, but it will escalate its aggressive policy, particularly towards the education sector, the Syrian Democratic Forces, and civil peace, taking advantage of the Turkish regime’s hostile stance towards the region. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Syrian regime will completely change its strategy towards the region during the coming year. In parallel, the regime’s internal crisis will continue, and the conflict may develop between the poles of power within the regime, whose loyalties are divided between Russia and Iran.99 A current may emerge, strengthened by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, on the other hand.

For Russia and Iran, their interests intersect with those of the Syrian regime. At the same time, they are concerned with harming US forces in northern and eastern Syria. It is unlikely that they will decide to develop their relationship with the Autonomous Administration. Russian pragmatism has caused significant damage to the region of northern and eastern Syria since its complicity in the occupation of Afrin. Currently, Russia is working to repair relations between the Turkish and Syrian regimes on the basis of opposing the Autonomous Administration. Winning the favor of the Turkish regime in the midst of its conflict with the West remains a strategic matter in its political and military doctrine. This explains its efforts to drag Turkey into reconciliation with the Syrian regime and exploit the historical ideological contradiction between the countries (Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) to create reasons through which Russia can ensure its hegemony over the Syrian regime and reassert its control over the rest of the Syrian geography under the shadow of Russian warplanes and through the whirlwinds of its intelligence operations. This is an option to preserve the agreements it concluded with the Syrian regime regarding its military bases on the coast and the economic sectors dominated by its companies. Therefore, there will be no change in Russia’s position toward the region, and it will continue to exploit Turkey’s hostile stance to maintain a military presence there under the pretext of serving as a “ceasefire guarantor.” The Iranian regime considers the areas under Syrian regime control more vital to it than the regions of northern and eastern Syria. However, this does not mean that this region should be excluded from Iran’s military doctrine, which views the Syrian regime’s control over the resource-rich region as a guarantee for protecting its political and economic projects in Syria. The strategy of exporting the “Islamic Revolution,” as outlined in Khomeini’s ideological literature, is one of the national security principles the Iranian regime has set for itself. This puts it in a position to control Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Gulf. Generally speaking, the Russian and Iranian regimes do not enjoy a good reputation among most Syrians, and therefore, their reliance is focused on protecting the Syrian regime from collapse.

– Regarding ISIS activities:

absence of regional cooperation to confront ISIS gives it the opportunity to organize its ideological activities, staffing, and carry out operations. The Turkish regime has established a kind of bank for Islamist fighters in the Turkish-occupied areas of Rojava/northern Syria, and they have been loaned to entities to fight in Azerbaijan, southern Kurdistan, Libya, Niger, and the Qandil Mountains, amid expectations that they will fight in Ukraine. The most prominent extremists remain active in these areas, especially in northwestern Syria, as evidenced by the assassination of dozens of them by international coalition forces. The most prominent of these this year was the so-called “Abu Abdul Rahman al-Makki”,100 a prominent leader in the “Guardians of Religion” organization loyal to al-Qaeda. There is no doubt that the organization benefits from this environment. As for the Syrian regime, despite the fact that many of the organization’s members have undergone security settlements in the areas under its control, it remains unable to eliminate it or mitigate the escalation of its attacks. The organization benefits from the sprawling Badia, which facilitates its hiding and launching swift attacks on Syrian regime forces and their allies. Based on the organization’s reported operations in the Badia and Daraa, the organization appears to be working to reassert its control over these areas, repeating its experience between 2011 and 2014 and seizing control of cities when circumstances permit. The most likely cities for the organization’s control are Palmyra, Daraa, and Deir Ezzor, based on the grievances facing local communities and the ideological refusal to accept the presence of Iranian factions or Russian forces in these areas.

By monitoring various news sites covering ISIS operations, it was observed that it avoids direct military engagement with the SDF, focusing its attacks on easy targets, and carrying out assassinations in areas where cells affiliated with the Syrian and Turkish regimes are active. It was also noted that most of its tactics appear similar to those of cells affiliated with the Syrian regime; the attackers lack the audacity presumably derived from the “energy of ideological faith.” They fire barrages at checkpoints and vehicles, then flee, followed by exaggerated media coverage. ISIS has been unable to launch operations against the region, as it does in the Badia. On the other hand, ISIS cells exploit the Autonomous Administration’s flexible approach to areas liberated from its control, which are supposedly requiring greater security. The administration appears unwilling to disturb organizations described as defenders of human rights.

In general, the organization follows what it calls a strategy of “empowerment and exhaustion of the enemy” by re-establishing its ideology in the region and launching attacks that are not operationally useful but are necessary for the propaganda that serves this consolidation. In this context, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense ‘’Dana Stroul’’101 confirmed in a previous meeting that ISIS still “has the ideology necessary to inspire and staffing individuals into its ranks and has the intention to reconstitute itself despite not having any territory at the moment. This is what makes us committed to strategic patience and supporting our partners to ensure that this terrorist army is unable to reconstitute itself and terrorize the people and populations in Iraq, Syria, and the rest of the Middle East…” Thus, the organization will continue to pursue its established tactics, exploiting security gaps in the region caused by regional governments opposed to self-administration and the repercussions of environment change. It will attempt to carry out operations inside al-Hol camp and free its detained members. This was confirmed by General Michael Kurilla, commander of the US Central Command, who said:102 “ISIS’s primary objective remains the liberation of its currently detained fighters to sustain the organization’s activities…” On the other hand, the organization’s subversive activities in northeastern Syria serve the policies of regional governments, which will not refrain from carrying out operations against the region even if they serve the organization’s activities, if they are not involved in understandings with the organization.

-Regarding organized crime:

Community security will remain intact as long as cooperation between the community and the autonomous administration continues to combat these activities. Security pressure on the drug trade is expected to increase as Syria’s crises escalate. Drug traffickers will exploit security gaps to infiltrate the region, while local traffickers will attempt to develop their own networks Their methods of promoting their wares and increasing the number of users, especially among the newly wealthy (*) or those suffering from psychological and financial problems. As for corruption files, the autonomous administration will find itself forced to increase the pace of work of the oversight bodies and support them, because corruption undermines the basic idea upon which the autonomous administration was founded, and there is an inverse relationship between them. The more corruption increases, the more the essence of the autonomous administration diminishes, and vice versa. This is something that the regional ruling regimes and ISIS are well aware of, and the autonomous administration must realize more seriously.

– Regarding environmental degradation:

Despite predictions that the coming winter will be relatively good, it cannot be confirmed that this will happen, especially since most research that has shed light on the phenomenon of global warming and climate change has indicated that weather conditions cannot be accurately predicted. In general, the drought in the region will continue, and the Autonomous Administration must develop strategic plans to prevent its spread, drawing on global experiences. Regarding the water crisis in the region, it will persist as long as the Turkish regime’s aggressive stance toward the region persists. To date, no strategic plan has been observed by the Autonomous Administration to respond to the water crisis, and the emergency projects that have been approved are still being implemented at a slow pace. Regarding pollution, there are ambitious projects by the Environment Authority in the region through afforestation campaigns and pollution rate calculations. As for the problem of garbage accumulation in some areas, it is expected that the community will pressure the municipal authority to find a solution. Air, noise, and visual pollution will continue. Due to the heavy reliance on internal combustion engines for electricity generation, the large number of vehicles of various types on the region’s roads, the continued operation of traditional oil refineries (burners), and the reluctance of many companies to invest in the energy sector due to Turkish threats to the region, the autonomous administration is expected to exert efforts to prevent the increasing rate of environmental degradation, despite its weak ability to reduce this rate.

In conclusion, the North and East Syria region faces a network of hostile alliances and the repercussions of climate change, which will continue to be a source of concern for local communities and the Autonomous Administration alike. Most of the financial capabilities and resources will be focused on responding to these issues. Some responses will manifest in negative forms, such as migration, reluctance to invest capital, and increased military spending. School dropout rates may increase due to the high cost of living, among other factors. In parallel, the overwhelming anxiety will persist about the country being lost due to the international community’s inaction on the Syrian crisis, the regime’s continued authoritarian mentality, its alliance with Turkey, the reassertion of Iranian or Russian control over the country, or the country being subjected to division or a renewed Turkish occupation. However, in principle, it still insists on a military and security solution to the country’s crisis and adopts it as a strategic principle. The Autonomous Administration will continue its defensive approaches to these security challenges and will be forced to develop its approach according to the scale and nature of the threats it faces, based on this matter. The uneasy balance the region is experiencing will continue into 2025, unless there are sudden shifts in the strategies of the powers involved in the Syrian file, or even shifts in the strategy of the autonomous administration.

o Means of responding to security and defense issues in the North and East Syria region:

No matter how powerful the security threats are and how difficult responding to them is, there are always means that can be relied upon to confront them. Strategic leadership lies in aligning these means with available resources and capabilities. This is relatively evident in the Autonomous Administration’s approach to the challenges it has faced for more than a decade, even though it still suffers from the burden of these challenges and has not been able to neutralize them in a way that eliminates their impact. Therefore, the Autonomous-administration should adopt an approach that addresses the weaknesses that the sources of these challenges benefit from. Some things can be suggested that can help in building a broader vision for this approach, based on the challenges mentioned and the management’s response to them, and the general evaluations made by those interested in this matter, as follows:

1. a) Promoting Good Governance:

There is no specific definition of good governance; however, most researchers have emphasized it as a fundamental condition for achieving as a prerequisite for achieving development and human security. For example, the Arab Human Development Report defined it as follows:103 “Good governance is governance that promotes, supports, and safeguards human well-being and is based on expanding people’s capabilities, choices, aspirations, and economic, social, and political freedoms. It seeks to fully represent all segments of the population and ensure accountability to them to ensure the interests of all people.” The social contract of the North and East Syria region includes the foundations and principles of good governance,104 such as participation, responsibility, oversight, social justice, transparency, the law, institutional building, and strategic vision. Fourth- and fifth-generation warfare, or “special warfare,” is based on undermining the ability of the autonomous administration to practice good governance. This is clearly evident in the aggressive policies pursued by regional regimes and ISIS against them, some of the manifestations of which were mentioned in the previous paragraphs. The more the autonomous administration relies on a policy of good governance, the more successful its approach will be in confronting various security challenges. Therefore, the autonomous administration must adopt good governance as a primary security and defense issue, as it is the most effective means of increasing the region’s citizens’ confidence in their administration and targeting the social incubators that ISIS cells are working to create. Only good governments are capable of confronting them in this manner.

1. b) Developing monitoring and surveillance operations and confronting information and cyber warfare:

Spending on these operations must be increased, and the necessary technology must be secured. Most research indicates that ISIS relies heavily on social media and websites to spread its propaganda and rumors, staffing members, and issue instructions for carrying out its operations. Regional governments have also formed armies of “electronic flies” means (virtual accounts) (*) in their psychological war against the region, attempting to confuse the autonomous administration between criticism based on freedom of expression and propaganda directed against it, dragging it into a situation where it is accused of suppressing freedom of expression. On the other hand, tactics related to confronting sleeper cells (**) must be developed, especially since each regime with its own agenda in northern and eastern Syria forms its own sleeper cells.

A number of German and Italian municipalities, among others, need to be developed and relations established with other municipalities. It is important to focus on the environment in diplomatic relations, especially since it is a fundamental pillar of self-government. Environmental activity is taking place in many countries, and the environment has become an issue that affects human security around the world. Therefore, it is necessary to establish diplomatic relations with all environmental movements and activists and conclude agreements with them, given that our environment is poor and in need of development. The work being done in this context is still below the required level and is limited to theoretical lectures.

1. d) Raising awareness and combating hate speech:

 The media plays a prominent role in this, in addition to ongoing communication between officials in the autonomous administration and social, cultural, political, and economic elites. This includes informing public opinion of the reality of the crises facing the region and providing objective self-criticism. The people should also contribute to decision-making through their elected councils and various opinion polls conducted by the media and research and study centers. This should also include developing mechanisms for engagement and cooperation between the communes and institutions, and paying attention to studying complaints submitted by the communes and proposals presented by the “Community Protection Forces,” particularly in rural areas, as they are the first line of defense against fourth- and fifth-generation warfare. Furthermore, the autonomous administration must take a firm stance against (***) hate speech and issue specific laws.

In this context, experts in the field of defense management in a democratic society105 believe that the most serious threat facing any country is “the disruption and deterioration of the collective consciousness of its people, regardless of their orientations. This, as a result of distancing themselves from the paths of true knowledge, learning, and thought, leads to the collapse of the capacity for innovation and creativity on the one hand, and to an increase in hollow debate, disagreement, and societal division on the other. Among the most important ways in which collective consciousness collapses are the mobilization of media platforms of unwise governments, corrupt media, and tools for voicing opinions, such as social media, to mobilize public opinion toward disagreement, hatred, and conflict, toward singling out certain institutions and belittling others, toward glorifying certain individuals, and even personalizing all matters with a complete disregard for scientific positions, facts, and approaches…”.

1. e) Resolving Crises Technocratically:

It is useful to assign those with expertise and experience to address various crises, such as pollution, water, fuel, and energy scarcity, high cost of living, and others. According to available capabilities and resources, through committees, research centers, or workshops, and studying the temporary leasing of some service facilities to the private sector, such as the sanitation and water sectors.

1. f) Tightening anti-monopoly and price control laws, and the need for coordination between relevant bodies and the community through communes and the media.
2. g) Equating the threat of drug trafficking with the threat of ISIS, linking the counterterrorism and drug issues together; that is, viewing the drug phenomenon as organized activities for political purposes, not as a transient illegal trade, and informing public opinion of the reality of the situation.
3. h) North and East Syria can be a safe zone for all Syrians, and the Autonomous Administration constitutes a barrier against extremist groups. The more it is supported, the more it ensures that they (those groups) do not control the region. This is a reason to accept the political situation in North and East Syria, and the Autonomous Administration must make changes that are appropriate for a solution to the Syria crisis.

Syrian; for example, the Turkish regime is ready to make concessions to the Syrian regime to prevent a solution between the administration and Damascus, and Turkey is considered a barrier to any communication process between the opposition in northwestern Syria and the Autonomous Administration. The experience of the Autonomous Administration confirms that the social diplomacy of North and East Syria is capable of removing the barriers imposed by extremist ideologies between Syrian communities across the Syrian geography and the communities of North and East Syria, for example, allowing a specific group to study in universities in North and East Syria, and a certain percentage to receive treatment in Autonomous Administration hospitals, and sending relief aid or medical volunteer teams, water, fuel, prosthetic limbs, or other things to some of the affected areas, etc. These are achievable matters; as the head of the Department of Foreign Relations in the Autonomous Administration, Ms. ‘’Ilham Ahmed’’, confirmed that the doors of the region are open to all Syrians in coordination with the bodies concerned with these issues. In the same context; The Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, affirmed their “readiness to provide all forms of support and assistance, and to welcome those displaced from Idlib and the northwestern regions of Syria…”106 and their openness to dialogue with “all national parties in Idlib and all Syrian national forces, keen on the unity of Syrian territory…”.

1. i) Resolving the Education files:

There is a division in society between the Syrian regime’s curriculum, based on its continued recognition by international organizations, and the autonomous administration’s curriculum, which is based on the principle of “democracy in education,” but does not enjoy such widespread recognition, despite the fact that the Syrian regime’s curriculum ranks near the bottom in global evaluations of educational curricula. To resolve this problem, it would be beneficial for the autonomous administration to develop its education strategy based on the concept of “democracy in education,” which appears to be gaining popularity in scientifically advanced societies,107 as a means of gaining acceptance for the region’s educational curricula within the global education system, in a manner that does not conflict with the autonomous administration’s social contract. In addition, greater efforts must be made to confront the psychological war waged against the education sector by regional regimes and ISIS, and to make applied sciences a fundamental principle in the university education strategy. The seriousness of the security challenges lies in the interaction between sleeper cells, social grievances, and low cognitive awareness. As long as there is no international or regional will to authorize a direct invasion of the region, this interaction will be exploited through the fourth and fifth modes of warfare or private warfare to undermine the autonomous administration. Therefore, the easiest way to address this is to break this pattern, and the proposals mentioned above can achieve this. Good governance can solve the social problems stemming from the absence of justice, racial discrimination, oppression, and poverty—problems that provide an attractive environment for extremist propaganda. In addition, it can raise awareness of demagogic and populist rhetoric that exploits religion or ethnicity in politics. All of these factors can weaken the impact of these challenges. The point of this narrative is that good governance can ensure the other means mentioned, such as strengthening monitoring and surveillance operations, developing diplomacy, raising awareness and countering hate speech, addressing the causes of internal crises, and more.

o Conclusion:

In 2024, the nature of the war in Syria changed as result in the Syrian crisis shifted their tactics in managing their conflicts. Northeastern Syria was subjected to unconventional warfare methods in an effort to force it into submission. This indicates that it holds a special place in the strategies of global and regional hegemonic powers in the Middle East. At the same time, the Autonomous Administration lacks an offensive strategy against the forces attempting to undermine it. It works to maintain the strength of its defensive position, which requires developing its means and methods in line with confronting the challenges stemming from the strategic shift in the positions of some countries, ISIS’s attempts to continue its activities, the growing capabilities of organized crime networks in the Middle East, and the continuing repercussions of climate change. This can be achieved by formulating a new or advanced approach to preventative military, security, political, and development operations, enabling Autonomous Administration officials to operate with greater responsibility and develop a clear strategy to confront the hostility of regional ruling regimes, especially the Turkish regime, and other challenges. The security challenges facing the Autonomous Administration have become factors that hinder the achievement of its strategy, and it is likely that it will continue to face these challenges. It may need to reconsider its political, security, and economic approach to security and defense issues relevant to it, despite its success in establishing itself as a moderate force in Syria and the region, and its transformation into a stabilizing factor for regional and international security, unlike regional regimes that have become a source of regional crises. The Autonomous Administration was established in a context that was not taken into account by global and regional hegemonic powers and has managed to survive in a complex and risky security environment. Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, and other communities have formed its main pillars. This administration will continue as long as it maintains the trust of these communities. Therefore, it is essential to consolidate the principles of good governance and equate the threat of corruption and neglect of office with the dangers of ISIS, organized crime, and the agendas of extremist regional regimes. It is expected that matters will head in this direction. Security and defense issues in the northeastern region of Syria are an existential issue for the autonomous administration system, with all its political, administrative, military, cultural, and social institutions and bodies.

o Sources and references:

1. Studies and analyses.
2. Dr. Ayman Ibrahim Al-Souqi; Strategic Hedging in the Middle East; Publisher: International Politics Journal – Issue 215 – January 2019 – Volume 54.
3. James Sladen et al.; Russian Strategy in the Middle East; Publisher: RAND Corporation/2017; Link:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236z1.arabic.pdf

3. General Robert Smith; The Usefulness of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World; Translated by: Mazen Jandali; First Edition 2008; Publisher: Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and Arab Scientific Publishers/Beirut.
4. Zainab Hosni Ezz El-Din; The Impact of Fourth Generation Wars on Arab National Security: A Case Study: The “Islamic State” Organization; Publisher: The Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic and Political Studies; Publication Date: 07/24/2016; Link:

https://democraticac.de/?p=34525

5. Salim Qasoum; New directions in Security Studies (A Study of the Evolution of the Concept of Security in International Relations); Publisher: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi/United Arab Emirates; no edition number or publication date.
6. Dr. Shahrazad Adamam; Violent Non-State Actors: A Study of Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks; Publisher: Arab Policies Magazine – Issue 8 – April 2014; Link:

https://siyasatarabiya.dohainstitute.org/ar/issue008/Pages/Siyassat08-2014_Edmame.pdf

8.. عبد الله أوجلان؛ مانيفستو الحضارة الديمقراطية- المجلد الخامس (القضية الكردية وحل الأمة الديمقراطية)؛ ترجمة: زاخو شيار؛ الطبعة الثانية 2014؛ بلا ناشر.

https://almaarefcs.org/4749/339

9. Dr. Ali Al-Hajj Hassan; Fifth Generation Wars; Publisher: Maaref Center for Cultural Studies; Publication date: 06/09/2022; Link:

https://almaarefcs.org/4749/339

10. Muhammad Hassanein Heikal; The Psychological Complexities Governing the Middle East; First Edition – April 1958; Publisher: Arab Printing and Publishing Company – Cairo.
11. Carl von Clausewitz; On War; Translated by Salim Shaker Al-Imami; First Edition 1997; Publisher: Arab Foundation for Studies and Publishing – Beirut.
12. Social Science Research Committee of the Academies for a Democratic Society; Special Warfare and Its Applications; First Edition – November 2017; Publisher: Social Science Research Committee – Qamishli.
13. Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA); “Generations of War” as defined by American Colonel William S. Lind; Publication Date: November 21, 2020; Link: https://igsda.org/أجيال-الحرب-كما-ضعها-الأمريكي-كول/?lang=ar
14. Dr. Mansour bin Saeed Al-Qarni; Sleeper Cells: Terrifying Weapons; Publisher: Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition / Issue 6 of the Terrorism Issues Issue – January 2024; Link:

https://www.imctc.org/ar/eLibrary/TerrorismIssues/Pages/TerrorismIssues05.2.2024.aspx

1. b) Interviews:
2. Rojava Center for Strategic Studies/NRLS: Interview with Ms. Ilham Ahmed, Co-Chair of the Foreign Relations Department of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. Interview date: September 13, 2024.
3. Baraa Sabri; A Journey to Northeast Syria: A Special Interview with Syrian Democratic Forces Commander General Mazloum Abdi; Publisher: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Publication date: January 6, 2022; Link:

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/rhlt-shmal-shrq-swrya-hwar-khas-m-qayd-qwat-swrya-aldymqratyt-aljnral-mzlwm-bdy

3. Regional Media Office in Dubai/U.S. Department of State; Special Briefing on the Mission to Defeat ISIS; Publisher: U.S. Embassy in Syria; Publication Date: 2023.02.28; Link:

https://sy.usembassy.gov/ar/إيجاز-خاص-حول-مهمة-هزيمة-داعش/

4.AL-Hadath; A Special Interview with the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi; Publisher: Al Arabiya Al Hadath Website; Publication Date:

 12/28/2023; Link: https://youtu.be/2vd3hVA_aXU

1. c) Dictionaries, glossaries, and encyclopedias:
2. Paul Robinson; Dictionary of International Security; First Edition 2009; Translated and published by the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi.
3. First Dictionary: What is the Investment Environment? Link:

 https://www.firstbankeg.com/16636

3. Al-Maany Comprehensive Dictionary of Meanings; Defense; Link: https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/دفاع/?
4. Manal Jaroud; The Concept of Good Governance; Publisher: Political Encyclopedia; Publication Date: May 31, 2022; Link:

 https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/

مفهوم%20الحكم%20الحكيم

5. Encyclopedia of Sciences and Technology; Environment (Deterioration); Publisher: Arab Encyclopedia; Link:

https://arab-ency.com.sy/tech/details/773/6

6. The Political Encyclopedia, quoted from the “Qada’a” magazine published by the College of Political Science at Al-Nahrain University; Link:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/library/1487/download

7. Wikipedia/The Free Encyclopedia

.

1. d) Websites of human rights organizations:
2. Paul Robinson; Dictionary of International Security; First Edition 2009; Translated and Published by: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi.
3. First Dictionary: What is the Investment Environment? Link:

https://www.firstbankeg.com/16636

3. Al-Maany Comprehensive Dictionary; Defense; Link: https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/دفاع/?

4. Manal Jaroud; The Concept of Good Governance; Publisher: Political Encyclopedia; Publication Date: May 31, 2022; Link:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/مفهوم%20الحكم%20الحكيم

5. Encyclopedia of Sciences and Technology; Environment (Deterioration); Publisher: Arab Encyclopedia; Link:

https://arab-ency.com.sy/tech/details/773/6

6. The Political Encyclopedia, quoted from the “Qadaya” magazine published by the College of Political Science at Al-Nahrain University; Link:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/library/1487/download

7. Wikipedia/The Free Encyclopedia.

1. d) Websites of human rights organizations:
2. 1. Syrians for Truth and Justice; 158 Syrian organizations condemn Turkish targeting of civilian facilities in northern and eastern Syria; Publication date: 2023.12.28; Link: https://stj-sy.org/ar/158-منظمة-سورية-تدن-الاطلاق-التكتيكي-لل/

2. Amnesty International; Syria: Mass Deaths, Torture, and Other Abuses Against Detainees in the Aftermath of ISIS Defeat – New Report; Publication date: 2024.04.17; Link:

https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2024/04/syria-mass-death-torture-and-other-violations-against-people-detained-in-aftermath-of-islamic-state-defeat-new-report/

3. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: A pro-Turkish faction arrests 5 civilians in the “Peace Spring” area on charges of attempting to enter Turkish territory. Publication date: 05/16/2024; Link:

https://www.syriahr.com/بتهمة-محاولة-دخول-الأراضي-التركية-فصي/714161/

4. Violations Documentation Center:

Special file: Information and names of ISIS leaders and fighters currently fighting within the ranks of Turkish-backed factions in northern Syria; Publication date: 08/19/2024; Link: https://vdc-nsy.com/archives/27336

Turkish gendarmerie continues to kill and abuse Syrian refugees seeking safe haven; Publication date: 08/04/2024; Link:

https://vdc-nsy.com/archives/68266

1. هبة زيادين؛ القصف التركي يعيث خرابا في شمال شرق سوريا؛ الناشر: Human Rights Watch؛ تاريخ النشر: 02.09؛ الرابط: https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2024/02/09/turkiyes-strikes-wreak-havoc-northeast-syria
2. e) Institutional Websites:

1. A collection of reports published by the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria on its official website from December 2023 to September 2024.
2. United Nations Website:

UN Commission Warns of Escalating Syrian War, Amid Worsening Humanitarian Crisis, Continuing Patterns of War Crimes, and Fears of a Large-Scale Regional Conflict; Publication Date: September 10, 2024; Link:

https://www.ohchr.org/ar/press-releases/2024/09/un-commission-warns-syrian-war-intensifying-amid-continuing-patterns-war

Hate Speech; Link:

https://www.un.org/ar/hate-speech/understanding-hate-speech/what-is-hate-speech

3. United States Embassy in Syria; Special Briefing on the Mission to Defeat ISIS; Publication Date: February 28, 2023; Link:

https://sy.usembassy.gov/ar/إيقاف-خاص-حول-مهمة-صعب-صعب-ضد-ISIS/

4. Official Website of the Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria:

Statement of the Conference on the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking; Publisher: Official Website of the Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria; Publication Date: June 26, 2024; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=12342

Arrest of ISIS Cell Members in Al-Hawl Camp and Stopping of Dangerous Operations About to Be Carried Out; Publication Date: April 24, 2024; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=11662

Arrest of 7 Individuals Involved in Armed Robbery and Robbery in the Hasakah Countryside; Publication Date: June 14, 2024; Link:

https://asayish.com/?p=12307

Arrest of ISIS Members Actively Collecting Extortion from Citizens in the Deir Ezzor Countryside; Publication date: September 21, 2024; Link:

https://asayish.com/?p=13176

A qualitative operation by the General Security Service succeeds in arresting a prominent ISIS emir in the Deir Ezzor countryside. Publication date: July 14, 2024; Link:

https://asayish.com/?p=12566

5. Democratic Peoples Council; General Budget Law for the Fiscal Year 2024 AD No.: (7); Publication Date: 06/09/2024; Link: https://smne-syria.com/gc/archives/3098

6.. CENTCOM Arabic; 03.09.2024; Link:

https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1830743843001582030?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

1. f) News websites:
2. Syrian Democratic Forces Media Center/SDF PRESS:

Regime forces’ massacres in the villages of Al-Dahla and Jdeidet Bakara; Publication date: 08/09/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=42808

Deir Ezzor Military Council forces avenge the martyrs of the Al-Dahla and Jdeidet Bakara massacre; Publication date: 08/12/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=42853

Results of security operations against ISIS during the first half of 2024; Publication date: 07/04/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=42544

Our forces dismantle an ISIS cell in Raqqa that was targeting fuel tankers; Publication date: 2024.08.17; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=42864

Final statement of the third phase of the “Humanity and Security” operation in Al-Hawl camp; Publication date: 2024.02.06; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=41602

Outcome of security operations against ISIS during the first half of 2024; Publication date: 2024.07.04; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=42544

The General Command of our forces holds a meeting with the Army of Revolutionaries and the Northern Democratic Brigade; Publication date: 2024.09.18; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=43134

2. Hawar News Agency/ANHA:

In numbers… Losses of farmers in North and East Syria due to Turkish bombing and its mercenaries; Publication date: June 13, 2024; Link:

https://hawarnews.com/ar/

برقم-خساسي-منطقة-شمال-وشرق-سوريا-جرمّاء-القصف-التركي-ومرزقته

Frightening numbers and departments unable to accommodate poisoning cases at Al-Shaab Hospital in Al-Hasakah; Publication date: June 13, 2024; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/أعداد-مخيفة-وأقسام-لا-تتسع-لحالات-التسمم-بمشفى-الشعب-في-الحسكة

Intensive efforts by the Health Ministry in Manbij to combat leishmaniasis; Publication date: June 5, 2024; Link:

https://hawarnews.com/ar/Intensive-health-efforts-in-Manbij-to-combat-leishmaniasis

Water flow in the Khabur Canal and water stations enter service; Publication date: 07/01/2024; Link:

https://hawarnews.com/ar/

تدفق-المياه-في-قناة-الخبور-ونظم-المياه-دخل-الخدمة

Amouda Municipality translates its apology into tangible steps; Publication date: 06/26/2024; Link:

https://hawarnews.com/ar/بعد-الاذ-عن-القصاص-بدأ-أعمال-واسع-في-مدينة-أمودة

3. North Press:

Tayseer Muhammad; Mazloum Abdi: We are ready for dialogue with all forces, including Turkey; Publisher: North Press; Publication date: 07/20/2024; Link:

https://npasyria.com/189672/

Tayseer Muhammad; Accumulated Deficit and No Plans to Address It… Late Announcement of the 2024 Budget for the Autonomous Administration; Publisher: North Press; Publication Date: June 13, 2024; Link: https://npasyria.com/187769/

Robin Omar; Autonomous Administration Declares Hasakah a Disaster Area Due to Türkiye Cutting Off Water; Publisher: North Press; Publication Date: July 3, 2023; Link: https://npasyria.com/158014/

Tayseer Muhammad; Accumulated Deficit and No Plans to Address It… Late Announcement of the 2024 Budget for the Autonomous Administration; Publisher: North Press; Publication Date: June 13, 2024; Link: https://npasyria.com/187769/

Robin Omar; Autonomous Administration Declares Hasakah a Disaster Area Due to Turkey Cutting Off Water Supply; Publisher: North Press; Publication Date: July 3, 2023; Link: https://npasyria.com/158014/

Muhammad al-Qadi; The Autonomous Administration hands over 50 members of ISIS families to a delegation from the Republic of Tajikistan; Publisher: North Press; Publication date: 2024.04.25; Link: https://npasyria.com/184871/

4. Anadolu Agency:

Kan Bozdogan; Turkish worshippers in 90,000 mosques call for support for their army in “Operation Olive Branch”; Publisher: Anadolu Agency; Publication date: 2018.01.21; Link: https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/تركيا/المصلون-الأتراك-في-90-ألف-مسجد-يدعون-لنصرة-جيشهم-في-غصن-الزيتون/1037339

Mosques in Turkey and other countries resonate with prayers and Quranic recitation in support of “Peace Spring” forces; Publication date: 2019.10.10; Link:

https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/

السياسة/مساجد-تركيا-وبلدان-أخرى-تصدح-بالأدعية-وتلاوة-القرآن-نصرة-لقوات-نبع-السلام-/1608482

5. Turkey Now; New Details About the Military Academy Graduation Incident in Turkey; Publication Date: 2024.09.12; Link:

https://www.turkeyalaan.net/2024/09/12/تفاصيل-جديدة-حول-حادثة-تخرج-الأكاديمي/

6. Turk Press; Erbakan’s Son Stresses the Need for Syrians to Return to Their Country; Publication Date: 2024.06.27; Link:

https://www.turkpress.co/node/101984

7. TRT Arabic; Erdogan: There Are Those Trying to Create a Wave of Hatred… Our History Is Not Stained by Colonialism; Publication Date: 2024.09.13; Link:

https://www.trtarabi.com/now/اردوغان-هناك-من-يحاول-خلق-موجة-قواجة-واتاريخنا-لم-يتستيك-بوسمة-الاستثار-18207574

8. Alhurra website:

“Lions’ Leap” Topples Prominent ISIS Leaders… Details of the Anbar Operation; Publication Date: 2024.09.13; Link:

https://www.alhurra.com/iraq/2024/09/13/

وثبة-السود-تطيح-قيادات-سافية-تميز-تفاصيل-عملية-الانبار

Ahmed Munim and Mahmoud Al-Waqi’; Syria… the Capital of Captagon; No publication date; Link:

https://www.alhurra.com/shorthand-story/161/

سوريا-عاصمة-الكبتاغون

Diaa Odeh; After the Mekki Strike… What Remains for the “Guardians of Religion” in Syria? Publisher: Alhurra website; Publication date: 2024.08.26; Link:

https://www.alhurra.com/syria/2024/08/26/

ضربة-المكي-بقي-لـحراس-الدين-في-سوريا؟

9. Richard Fox; The repercussions of “Olive Branch” reach mosques in Germany; Publisher: DW; Publication date: 2018.01.26; Link:

https://www.dw.com/ar/أسرة-غصن-الزيتون-تصل-لمساجد-ألمانيا/a-42326838

10. Russia Today; Zakharova comments on the Kiev regime’s negotiations with terrorists in Syria; Publication date: 2024.09.10; Link: https://arabic.rt.com/world/1599280-زاخاروفا-تعلق-على-مفاوضات-نظام-كييف-مع-الإرهابيين-في-سوريا/

11. Samer Abu Wardeh; Syria’s Oil Fields: Promising Reserves and Low Production; Publisher: Energy Website; Publication Date: January 20, 2024; Link: https://attaqa.net/2024/01/20/حكور-النفط-في-سوريا-احتياطيات-واعدة-وإ/
12. Sputnik Arabic; Leader of a Party in the Turkish Parliament Calls for Sending Troops from His Country to Gaza; Publication Date: November 2, 2023; Link:

https://sarabic.ae/20231102/زعيم-حزب-في-الجمهورية-الجمهورية-يدعو-لإرسال-قوات-من-بلده-إلى-غزة-1082730189.html

Al-Alam Website; Turkish Mosques Participate in the Attack on Afrin! Publication Date: January 22, 2018; Link: https://www.alalam.ir/news/3307086/جوامع-تركيا-تشارك-في-الهجوم-على-عفرين

13. Nibal Ibrahim; Arab clans and tribes in Syria and the Arab world hold a tribal forum in Homs: We will not accept the presence of occupation forces on our land; Publisher: Al-Baath Newspaper; Publication date: 09/14/2024; Link:

https://newspaper.albaathmedia.sy/2024/09/14/العشائر-واقبائل-العربية-في-سورية-وال/

14. Hisham Al-Ghannam; Breaking the Grip of Captagon: How Syria is Using this Drug for Political Pressure; Publisher: Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center; Publication date: 08/07/2024; Link: الرابط:

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/border-traffic-how-syria-uses-captagon-to-gain-leverage-over-saudi-arabia?lang=ar&center=middle-east

15. African Defense Forum; The majority of ISIS attacks target African countries; Publisher: Africa Defense Forum; Publication date: 2024.07.16; Link: https://adf-magazine.com/ar/2024/07/مادومية-مغامرات-ديسا-تهدف-البلدان-الإف/

1. g) English websites, studies and reports:
2. Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur; He Warned Turkey About Earthquakes. Now He Fears for Istanbul; Posted:06.10.2023; Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/06/world/europe/turkey-earthquakes-naci-gorur.html
4. Cambridge; defense; Link: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/defense
5. The Economist; Is Syria’s drug-dealing dictator coming in from the cold? Posted: 11.09.2024; Link:

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/09/11/is-syrias-drug-dealing-dictator-coming-in-from-the-cold

5. The European Democratic Education Community (EUDEC); Link: https://wiki.eudec.org/Aims

IDEC 2005 Resolution; Link: http://en.idec2005.org/data.dl/resolution_en.pdf

6. Julia Collins and Others; Democracy education; Link:

https://democracyeducationjournal.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1432&context=home

7. Reuters; Turkey’s Erdogan calls for Islamic alliance against Israel; Posted: 07.09.2024; Link:

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-islamic-alliance-against-israel-2024-09-07/

8. Satbyul Estella Kim and Others; Positive Association of Aggression with Ambient Temperature; Published: National Library of Medicine; Published online 2023 Jun 30; Link:

 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10303254/

9. Syria INGO Regional Forum; Escalation of Hostilities in Northeast Syria, January 16th 2024; Posted: 17 Jan 2024; Link: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/escalation-hostilities-northeast-syria-january-16th-2024
11. World Meteorological Organization; July sets new temperature records; 13 August 2024; Link:

https://wmo.int/media/news/july-sets-new-temperature-records

1 Paul Robinson; Dictionary of International Security; First Edition 2009; Translation and Publication: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi; p. 28.

* SECURITY DILEMMA: A term that describes a situation in which a state’s efforts to enhance its security threaten the security of other states. Those states then take steps to protect themselves, which in turn contributes to threatening the original state. Thus, efforts to enhance security end up diminishing it… same source as above; p. 272.

[2] صباح بالة؛ النظرية الواقعية في تفسير الدراسات الأمنية – Realism Theory in Security Studies؛ تاريخ النشر: 2021.03.03؛ الرابط:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/النظرية%20الواقعية%20في%20تفسير%20الدراسات%20الأمنية

** The State of Oceania, around which the events of the novel 1984 by the English writer George Orwell revolve, this state embodies the class society and expresses governmental deception, secret surveillance, and the manipulation of documented history by the totalitarian authoritarian state, through four ministries whose names contradict the reality of their tasks, which are: the Ministry of Truth, the Ministry of Peace, the Ministry of Love, and the Ministry of Plenty, and the Ministry of Love was the most terrifying of them.

3 Amnesty International; Syria: Mass death, torture, and other violations against detainees in the aftermath of the defeat of the Islamic State – New report; Date of publication: 2024.04.17; Link: https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2024/04/syria-mass-death-torture-and-other-violations-against-people-detained-in-aftermath-of-islamic-state-defeat-new-report/

4 Autonomous Administration website: Clarification regarding what was mentioned in it. The Foreign Relations Department responds to Amnesty International’s report in a statement. Publication date: 2024.04.28. Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=11630

5 Dr. Shahrzad Adham, “Violent Non-State Actors: A Study in Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks,” Publisher: Arab Policies Journal – Issue 8 – April 2014; Link: https://siyasatarabiya.dohainstitute.org/ar/issue008/Pages/Siyassat08-2014_Edmame.pdf

6 Same previous source; p. 76.

7 Salim Qasum; New Trends in Security Studies (A Study in the Development of the Concept of Security in International Relations); Publisher: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi / United Arab Emirates; No edition number and publication date; p. 17.

8 Paul Robinson; Dictionary of International Security; Translated and Published by: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research – Abu Dhabi / United Arab Emirates; First Edition 2009; pp. 269-268.

* The Community Protection Forces (HPC, in Kurdish Hêzên Parastina Civakê) are a form of self-defense, which has been part of the Kurdish military doctrine since ancient times. Currently, these forces are small groups of volunteers from various components of northern and eastern Syria in villages, city neighborhoods, and towns, carrying out defensive activities at the local level in a decentralized manner and in coordination with the institutions of the Autonomous Administration. The essential forces – women are considered the women’s arm of the essential forces…

9 Abdullah Ocalan; Manifesto of Democratic Civilization – Volume V (The Kurdish Issue and the Solution of the Democratic Nation); Translated by: Zakho Shiyar; Second Edition 2014; No Publisher; p. 538.

10 Cambridge; defense; Link: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/defense

11 Comprehensive Al-Ma’ani Dictionary; defense; Link: https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/دفاع/?

12 Syrians for Truth and Justice; 158 Syrian organizations condemn the Turkish targeting of civilian facilities in northern and eastern Syria; Publication Date: 2023.12.28; Link: https://stj-sy.org/ar/158-منظمة-سورية-تدين-الاستهداف-التركي-لل/
To see the extent of the damage caused by the bombing; See: Hiba Ziadine; Turkish bombing wreaks havoc in northeastern Syria; Publisher: Human Rights Watch; Publication Date: 2024.02.09; Link:
https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2024/02/09/turkiyes-strikes-wreak-havoc-northeast-syria

13 Media Department of the Autonomous Administration; Toll of the Turkish occupation’s aggression against the north and east Syria region 2023/12/26; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Publication Date: 2023.12.27; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=9537

14 Syria INGO Regional Forum; Escalation of Hostilities in Northeast Syria, January 16th 2024; Posted: 17 Jan 2024; Link: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/escalation-hostilities-northeast-syria-january-16th-2024

15 Autonomous Administration Website; Result of Turkish Bombing.. the environment of Al-Jazira explains the reasons for the oil leak in the Jaghjagh River; Publication Date: 2024.03.02; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=10604

16 Autonomous Administration Website; Until the Chemical Effect in the River Ends.. the environment of the Euphrates calls on the residents of the area to use water wells for two months; Publication Date: 2024.03.05; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=10665

17 Autonomous Administration Website; Muhammad Al-Aswad.. Turkey Cuts Off Khabur Water to Weaken the Infrastructure of the North and East Syria Region; Publication Date: 2024.06.26; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=12926

18 Robeen Omar; The Autonomous Administration Declares Al-Hasakah a Disaster Area Due to Turkey’s Cutting Off Its Water; Publisher: North Press; Publication Date: 2023.07.03; Link: https://npasyria.com/158014/

19 Autonomous Administration Website; Due to Turkey’s Cutting Off of the Euphrates Water.. The Agriculture and Irrigation Authority of Raqqa Warns of the Inability to Provide Irrigation Water for the 2024 Agricultural Seasons; Publication Date: 2023.12.11; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=9171

20 ANHA: In numbers… Losses of farmers in the North and East Syria region due to Turkish bombardment and mercenaries; Published: 2024.06.13; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/بالأرقام-خسائر-مزارعي-إقليم-شمال-وشرق-سوريا-جرّاء-القصف-التركي-ومرتزقته

21 Taysir Muhammad; Cumulative deficit and no plans to address it.. Late announcement of the 2024 budget for the Autonomous Administration; Publisher: North Press; Published: 2024.06.13; Link: https://npasyria.com/187769/

22 For more, see: Democratic Peoples’ Council; General Budget Law for the fiscal year 2024 No.: (7); Published: 2024.06.09; Link: https://smne-syria.com/gc/archives/3098

23 Autonomous Administration website; During a press statement.. Agriculture and Irrigation clarifies the reason for the decrease in the price of wheat; Published: 2024.05.28; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=12377

24 SDF PRESS; Toll of the regime forces’ massacres in the villages of Al-Dahla and Jadida Bakara; Published: 2024.08.09; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=42808

25 SDF PRESS: The Syrian Democratic Forces’ Deir Ezzor Military Council avenges the martyrs of the Al-Dahla and Jadida Bakara massacre; Date of Publication: 2024.08.12; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=42853

* The General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, has affirmed in numerous dialogues that they do not wish to be involved in the regional conflict between states. For these interviews, see: Baraa Sabri; A Journey to Northeastern Syria: A Special Dialogue with the Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazloum Abdi; Publisher: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Date of Publication: 2022.01.06; Link: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/rhlt-shmal-shrq-swrya-hwar-khas-m-qayd-qwat-swrya-aldymqratyt-aljnral-mzlwm-bdy

26 Taysir Muhammad; Mazloum Abdi: We are ready for dialogue with all forces, including Turkey; Publisher: North Press; Date of Publication: 2024.07.20; Link: https://npasyria.com/189672/
The Hadath; A special interview with the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi; Publisher: Al-Arabiya Al-Hadath website; Date of Publication: 2023.12.28; Link: https://youtu.be/2vd3hVA_aXU

27 Autonomous Administration website; searching for ways to solve the country’s crisis… A tripartite meeting including the Autonomous Administration, MSD, and QSD; Date Published: 2024.05.10; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=11888

 28 د. أيمن إبراهيم السوقي؛ التحوط الاستراتيجي في الشرق الأوسط؛ الناشر: مجلة السياسة الدولية- العدد 215- كانون الثاني 2019- المجلد 54؛ ص30.

29 @CENTCOMArabic; 03.09.2024; Link: https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1830743843001582030?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

30 Regional Media Hub in Dubai/U.S. Department of State; Special Briefing on the Defeat-ISIS Mission; Publisher: U.S. Embassy in Syria; Date Published: 2023.02.28; Link: https://sy.usembassy.gov/ar/إيجاز-خاص-حول-مهمة-هزيمة-داعش/

31 James Sladden et al.; Russian Strategy in the Middle East; Publisher: RAND Corporation / 2017; p. 4; Link: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236z1.arabic.pdf

32 Samer Abu Wardeh; Oil Fields in Syria.. Promising Reserves and Meager Production; Publisher: Attaqa website; Publication Date: 2024.01.20; Link: https://attaqa.net/2024/01/20/حقول-النفط-في-سوريا-احتياطيات-واعدة-وإ/

33 “ISIS terrorist organization announced the implementation of 788 attacks worldwide in the first half of 2024, 536 of which were in Africa, in which the blood of 2142 Africans was shed…” For more see: Africa Defense Forum; The majority of ISIS attacks target African countries; Publisher: Africa Defense Forum; Publication Date: 2024.07.16; Link: https://adf-magazine.com/ar/2024/07/غالبية-هجمات-داعش-تستهدف-البلدان-الإف/

34 The official website of the Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria; A qualitative operation by the General Security Service succeeds in arresting a prominent ISIS emir in the Deir Ezzor countryside; Publication date: 2024.07.14; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=12566

35 SDF- PRESS; The outcome of security operations against “ISIS” during the first half of 2024; Publication date: 2024.07.04; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=42544

36 Al-Hurra; “Leap of the Lions” overthrows prominent ISIS leaders.. Details of the Anbar operation; Publication date: 2024.09.13; Link: https://www.alhurra.com/iraq/2024/09/13/وثبة-الأسود-تطيح-قيادات-داعشية-بارزة-تفاصيل-عملية-الأنبار

* One of these cells was arrested in the city of Raqqa in mid-August 2024… See: SDF PRESS; Our forces dismantle an ISIS cell in Raqqa that was targeting fuel supply tankers; Publication date: 2024.08.17; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=42864

 37 د. شادي عبد الوهاب منصور؛ حروب الجيل الخامس: أساليب التفجير من الداخل على الساحة الدولية؛ الطبعة الأولى 2019؛ الناشر: العربي للنشر والتوزيع- القاهرة؛ ص63.

Also: Violation Documentation Center; Special File: Information and names of ISIS leaders and fighters who are now fighting within the ranks of the Turkish-affiliated factions in northern Syria; Publication Date: 2024.08.19; Link: https://vdc-nsy.com/archives/27336

38 United Nations; The UN Commission warns of escalating Syrian war, amid a worsening humanitarian crisis, continuing patterns of war crimes, and fears of a wide-ranging regional conflict; Published: 2024.09.10; Link: https://www.ohchr.org/ar/press-releases/2024/09/un-commission-warns-syrian-war-intensifying-amid-continuing-patterns-war

39 SDF- PRESS; The final statement of the third phase of the “Humanity and Security” operation in Al-Hol camp; Published: 2024.02.06; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=41602

40 The official website of the Internal Security Forces of North and East Syria; Arresting ISIS cell members within Al-Hol camp and stopping dangerous operations that were about to be carried out; Published: 2024.04.24; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=11662

41 SDF- PRESS; The outcome of security operations against “ISIS” during the first half of 2024; Published: 2024.07.04; Link:
https://sdf-press.com/?p=42544

Also: Autonomous Administration website; The Office of Justice and Reform.. To the Public Opinion; Published: 2024.01.18; Link:
https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=10048

42 @CENTCOMArabic; 03.09.2024; Link:
https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1830743843001582030?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

43 Autonomous Administration website; Under the patronage of the Autonomous Administration and MSD (Syrian Democratic Council).. The Second National Unity Forum convenes; Published: 2024.05.25; Link:
https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=12303

44 Autonomous Administration website; Deir ez-Zor Executive Branch undertakes all necessary measures to secure and integrate families returning from Al-Hol camp; Published: 2024.07.29; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14327

45 Social Affairs and Labor Authority; Social affairs activities during the first half of 2024; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Published: 2024.08.10; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14503

46 Deir Ezzor Region Executive Council; For reintegration and providing necessary support… Deir Ezzor Executive Branch organizes a forum for families returning from Al-Hol camp; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Published: 2024.05.01; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=11714

47 Muhammad al-Qadi; The Autonomous Administration hands over 50 people from “ISIS” families to a delegation from the Republic of Tajikistan; Publisher: Nours Press; Published: 2024.04.25; Link:
https://npasyria.com/184871/

48 Autonomous Administration website; To clarify the results of the campaign to resolve infighting east of Raqqa… The General Command issues a statement; Published: 2024.01.30; Link:
https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=10412

49 Autonomous Administration website; To discuss the demands of the residents… The Raqqa Executive Branch holds a coordination meeting; Published: 2024.08.12; Link:
https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14604

50 Autonomous Administration website; Yasser Suleiman… The amnesty law is in response to the calls of the residents of the North and East Syria region; Published: 2024.04.06; Link:
https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=11313

51 Autonomous Administration website; In response to the recommendations of the Second Forum for Syrian Tribes and Components… The Democratic Peoples’ Council issues a general amnesty law; Published: 2024.07.17; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=13839

52 Ahmed Mounem and Mahmoud Al-Waqea; Syria… Capital of Captagon; Publisher: Al-Hurra website; No publication date; Link:
https://www.alhurra.com/shorthand-story/161/سوريا-عاصمة-الكبتاغون
Also: Hisham al-Ghannam; Breaking Captagon’s Grip: How Syria Uses This Drug for Political Leverage; Publisher: Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center; Publication date: 2024.08.07; Link:
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/border-traffic-how-syria-uses-captagon-to-gain-leverage-over-saudi-arabia?lang=ar&center=middle-east

53 Internal Security Forces Media Center; Statement of the Conference on the International Day Against Drug Abuse; Publisher: Official website of the Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria; Publication date: 2024.06.26; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=12342

54 For further information, see: Alan Meîş آلان معيش; DESTÊN TARÎ – XELEKA 3 FÎNAL; 24.09.2024; Link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UY-6JaqxYsQ

55 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; On charges of attempting to enter Turkish territory.. A faction loyal to Turkey arrests 5 civilians within the “Peace Spring” area; Publication date: 2024.05.16; Link:
https://www.syriahr.com/بتهمة-محاولة-دخول-الأراضي-التركية-فصي/714161/

56 Violations Documentation Center; The Turkish Gendarmerie continues to kill and abuse Syrian refugees seeking safe haven; Publication date: 2024.08.04; Link:
https://vdc-nsy.com/archives/68266

57 The official website of the Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria; Arrest of 7 individuals involved in armed robbery and banditry in the Hasakah countryside; Published: 2024.06.14; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=12307

58 Internal Security Forces – North and East Syria; Arrest of ISIS members active in collecting tributes from citizens in the Deir Ezzor countryside; Published: 2024.09.21; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=13176

59 Autonomous Administration website; The work of the General Oversight Authority during the first half of 2024; Published: 2024.08.17; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14639

60 For more, see: د. شادي عبد الوهاب منصور؛ حروب الجيل الخامس: أساليب التفجير من الداخل على الساحة الدولية؛ الطبعة الأولى ٢٠١٩؛ الناشر: العربي للنشر والتوزيع- القاهرة.

* Autonomous Administration, through the Electoral Commission, later issued a decision authorizing each district to conduct its elections according to the circumstances it deems appropriate….

* Investment Environment: The environment in which all investment requirements are met, and based on which the investment decision is made by the investor. The investment environment plays a fundamental role in determining the volume of existing and future investments and projects in the market. When an investor makes a decision to invest in a country, they make their decision based on the availability of a favorable investment environment, in which the relationship between achieving return and the risks associated with the investment is a direct relationship.

“First” Dictionary.. What is the investment environment?; Link: https://www.firstbankeg.com/16636

** From the repercussions of the Turkish bombing: The total destruction of the central oxygen station adjacent to the kidney dialysis center, which supplied oxygen to dozens of private and public hospitals and many health centers, in addition to significant damage to the kidney dialysis center, the only one in the region, which provides services to approximately 100 patients at a rate of 250 sessions per week. This is due to damage to vital components of this center, such as the desalination plant, which led to the cessation of all dialysis machines. In the city of Kobani, the complete destruction of one of the main health centers has led to the cessation of the continuous provision of health services to approximately 400 patients per day who benefited from the services of that center, in addition to the out-of-service status of the existing ambulances.

Health Authority; Public Statement; Publisher: Self-Administration Website; Publication Date: 2023.12.28; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=9555

*** Environmental degradation is the decline in the quality of the environment as a result of the introduction of pollutants or the misuse of its resources of living organisms, water, air, and soil. It is a description of the regressive change in the environment and its ecological systems due to the depletion of its resources, the destruction of its habitats, and the extinction of its organisms by human activities. Environmental degradation is one of the most important threats facing humanity in this century, as its pace and extent have increased significantly since the Industrial Revolution.

Encyclopedia of Science and Technology; Environment (Degradation-); Publisher: The Arab Encyclopedia; Link: https://arab-ency.com.sy/tech/details/773/6

**** Extreme weather is any exceptional weather in terms of severity, frequency, or suddenness compared to local weather. In the era of climate change, extreme weather entails more heat waves, droughts, heavy rains, storms, and even completely unusual cold weather; in northern and eastern Syria, heat waves and droughts were the most prominent.

61 World Meteorological Organization; July sets new temperature records; 13 August 2024; Link:

https://wmo.int/media/news/july-sets-new-temperature-records

62 ANHA: Frightening numbers and sections in Al-Shaab Hospital in Al-Hasakah are not sufficient for poisoning cases; Published: 2024.06.13; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/أعداد-مخيفة-وأقسام-لا-تتسع-لحالات-التسمم-بمشفى-الشعب-في-الحسكة

63 Satbyul Estella Kim and Others; Positive Association of Aggression with Ambient Temperature; Published: National Library of Medicine; Published online 2023 Jun 30; Link: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10303254/

64 Autonomous Administration website; As a result of the depression… Agriculture and Irrigation for Al-Jazira reveals the percentage of damage to agricultural areas in the city of Amuda; Publication date: 2024.04.09; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=11385

65 Ahmed Younes (Co-Deputy of the Agriculture and Irrigation Authority in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria); The work of the Agriculture and Irrigation Authority during the first half of 2024; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Published: 2024.08.19; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14674

66 Autonomous Administration website; To reduce the spread of the phenomenon.. The People’s Council of Raqqa issues a decision stipulating legal accountability for the phenomenon of scavenging through garbage; Published: 2024.06.27; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=13000#main

67 ANHA; The municipality of Amuda translates its apology into concrete steps; Published: 2024.06.26; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/عقب-الاعتذار-عن-التقصير-بدء-أعمال-نظافة-واسعة-في-مدينة-عامودا

68 ANHA; Intensive efforts by health authorities in Manbij to combat leishmaniasis; Published: 2024.06.05; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/جهود-مكثفة-للصحة-في-منبج-لمكافحة-اللشمانيا

69 For some information about the project, see: Autonomous Administration website; The local administrations of Al-Jazira launch a project to retrieve drinking water after declaring the city of Hasakah as a disaster area; Published: 2023.08.03; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=5918

70 Autonomous Administration website; The local administration of Deir Ezzor launches a campaign to deliver drinking water to the residents of Al-Sour town; Published: 2024.06.12; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=12716

71 ANHA; Water flows in the Khabur canal and water stations enter service; Published: 2024.07.01; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/تدفق-المياه-في-قناة-الخابور-ومحطات-المياه-تدخل-الخدمة

72 Autonomous Administration website; Agriculture and Irrigation launch soil and water analysis lab services at the Agricultural Scientific Research Center; Publication date: 2024.07.03; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=13161

73 Environmental Authority; Environmental Authority projects in the first half of 2024; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Publication date: 2024.08.10; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=14506

74 Autonomous Administration website; North and East Syria Water Analysis Project.. Highlights of the Environmental Authority’s projects for 2024; Publication date: 2024.01.21; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=10098

75 Health Authority; Health Authority for North and East Syria holds its semi-annual meeting; Publisher: Autonomous Administration website; Publication date: 2024.07.11; Link: https://aanesgov.org/ar/?p=13418

76 Zainab Hosni Ezz El-Din; The Impact of Fourth-Generation Warfare on Arab National Security: A Case Study: The Islamic State Organization; Publisher: The Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic, and Political Studies; Publication Date: 2016.07.24; Link:

https://democraticac.de/?p=34525

77 For more, see: General Robert Smith; The Usefulness of Force: The Art of War in the Contemporary World; translated by Mazen Jandali; first edition 2008; published by the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Foundation and Arab Scientific Publishers/Beirut.

*Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) This term first appeared in 1989. It was defined as conflict in an unclear area between the spheres of war and political action, occupied by combatants and/or politicians. It was also defined as “asymmetric warfare,” meaning conflict characterized by unequal armaments and decentralized operations. The fourth generation has evolved into 6GW, utilizing the media, civil society organizations, political opposition, and intelligence operations.

For more, see: Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA); “Generations of Warfare,” as defined by American Colonel William S. Lind; publication date: November 21, 2020. Link: https://igsda.org/Generations-of-wars-as-developed-by-the-American-colo/?lang=a

** The fourth generation of warfare is “what is known as asymmetric warfare, occurring between a military entity and organized groups possessing high combat skills in addition to other non-military capabilities… The various media outlets, non-governmental organizations, and security companies play a pivotal role in the realization of this generation of warfare.” Fifth-generation warfare, on the other hand, is “warfare conducted primarily through non-kinetic military action, such as social engineering, disinformation, and cyberattacks, along with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and fully autonomous systems…” It relies on unarmed violence by creating extremist groups and organized gangs that operate between the economy, politics, and society, contributing to the creation of internal tensions within them…

Dr. Ali Al-Hajj Hassan; Fifth Generation Warfare; Publisher: Maaref Center for Cultural Studies; Publication Date: June 9, 2022; Link:

https://almaarefcs.org/4749/339

78 ا لجنرال روبرت سميث؛ جدوى القوة: فن الحرب في العالم المعاصر؛ ترجمة: مازن جندلي؛ الطبعة الأولى 2008م؛ الناشر: مؤسسة محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم والدار العربية للعلوم ناشرون/ بيروت؛ ص29.

79 كارل فون كلاوزفيتز؛ عن الحرب؛ ترجمة: سليم شاكر الإمامي؛ الطبعة الأولى 1997؛ الناشر: المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر/ بيروت؛ ص103.

80 Previous reference; p. 106

81 For more on special warfare, see: Social Science Research Committee of the Democratic Society Academies; Special Warfare and Its Applications; First Edition – November 2017; Publisher: Social Science Research Committee – Qamishli.

 82كارل فون كلاوزفيتز؛ عن الحرب؛ ترجمة: سليم شاكر الإمامي؛ الطبعة الأولى 1997؛ الناشر: المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر/ بيروت؛ ص528

 83د. شادي عبد الوهاب منصور؛ حروب الجيل الخامس: أساليب التفجير من الداخل على الساحة الدولية؛ الطبعة الأولى 2019؛ الناشر: العربي للنشر والتوزيع- القاهرة

84 Bozdogan; Turkish worshippers in 90,000 mosques call for support for their army in “Operation Olive Branch”; Publisher: Anadolu Agency; Publication date: 2018.01.21; Link:

https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/تركيا/المصلون-الأترك-في-90-ألف-مسجد-دعوون-لنصرة-جيشهم-في-غصن-الزيتون/1037339

Richard Fox; The repercussions of “Operation Olive Branch” reach German mosques; Publisher: DW; Publication date: 2018.01.26; Link:

https://www.dw.com/ar/تداعيات-غصن-الزيتون-تصل-لمساجد-ألمانيا/a-42326838

موقع العالم؛ جوامع تركيا تشارك في الهجوم على عفرين !؛ تاريخ النشر: 2018.01.22؛ الرابط:

https://www.alalam.ir/news/3307086/جوامع-تركيا-تشارك-في-الهجوم-على-عفرين

85 Anadolu Agency: Mosques in Turkiye and other countries resound with prayers and Quran recitation in support of the “Peace Spring” forces; Publication date: 10/10/2019; Link:

https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/السياسة/مساجد-تركيا-وبلدان-أخرى-تصدح-بالأدعية-وتلاوة-القرآن-نصرة-لقوات-نبع-السلام-/1608482

86 James Sladen et al., Russian Strategy in the Middle East; Publisher: RAND Corporation/2017; Link:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236z1.arabic.pdf

 87د. شادي عبد الوهاب منصور؛ حروب الجيل الخامس: أساليب التفجير من الداخل على الساحة الدولية؛ الطبعة الأولى ٢٠١٩؛ الناشر: العربي للنشر والتوزيع- القاهرة؛ ص١٩

 88 الجنرال روبرت سميث؛ جدوى القوة: فن الحرب في العالم المعاصر؛ ترجمة: مازن جندلي؛ الطبعة الأولى 2008م؛ الناشر: مؤسسة محمد بن راشد آل مكتوم والدار العربية للعلوم ناشرون/ بيروت؛ ص30.

89 Zainab Hosni Ezz El-Din; The Impact of Fourth-Generation Warfare on Arab National Security: A Case Study: The Islamic State Organization; Publisher: The Arab Democratic Center for Strategic, Economic, and Political Studies; Publication Date: 24.07.2016; Link:

https://democraticac.de/?p=34525

* The principle of “constructive ambiguity”: This principle is one of the characteristics of American foreign policy towards the crises in the Middle East. It was adopted by Henry Kissinger in America’s negotiations with China in 1973 and has been adopted by most countries trying to emulate the American experience as a hegemonic power. Constructive ambiguity allows the stronger party to impose its interpretation of its relationship with the other, weaker party, especially in the context of interpreting agreements and memoranda of understanding according to what its pragmatism dictates. This means that the strategy of the stronger party is unclear and the shifts that may occur in its positions cannot be predicted. For example, the Russians’ betrayal of the Afrin region in their deal with the Turkish regime and the American failure to address the operation to combat ISIS, with the Turkish regime occupying both Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain) and Gire Spi (Tal Abyad).

** It is a policy that became famous in international forums after the First World War. This policy is attributed to the former US Secretary of State Dulles, who described it in a press interview as: “My method of action is to push events into an intractable crisis, then push the intractable crisis to the brink of war. When everyone approaches the terrifying brink, and holds their breath in terror and fear, and begins to retreat despite themselves so that it is not the end, I get what I want and achieve my goals completely.” … For more see: Muhammad Hassanein Heikal; The Psychological Complexes Governing the Middle East; First Edition – April 1958; Publisher: Arab Printing and Publishing Company – Cairo; p. 45.

90 Sputnik Arabic: Leader of a party in the Turkish parliament calls for sending troops from his country to Gaza; Publication date: November 2, 2023; Link:

https://sarabic.ae/20231102/زعيم-حزب-في-البرلمان-التركي-يدعو-لإرسال-قوات-من-بلاده-إلى-غزة-1082730189.html

91 Turk Press; Erbakan’s son stresses the necessity of Syrians returning to their country; Publication date: 06/27/2024; Link:

https://www.turkpress.co/node/101984

92 Reuters; Turkey’s Erdogan calls for Islamic alliance against Israel; Posted: 07.09.2024; Link:

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-islamic-alliance-against-israel-2024-09-07/

93 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur; He Warned Turkey About Earthquakes. Now He Fears for Istanbul; Posted:06.10.2023; Link: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/06/world/europe/turkey-earthquakes-naci-gorur.html

94 TRT Arabic; Erdogan: There are those who are trying to create a wave of hatred… and our history is not tainted by the stain of colonialism; Publication date: 09/13/2024; Link:

https://www.trtarabi.com/now/أردوغان-هناك-من-يحاول-خلق-موجة-كراهية-وتاريخنا-لم-يتلطخ-بوصمة-الاستعمار-18207574

95 Turkey Now: New details about the military academy graduation incident in Turkey; Publication date: 09/12/2024; Link: https://www.turkeyalaan.net/2024/09/12/تفاصيل-جديدة-حول-حادثة-تخرج-الأكاديمي/

96 SDF PRESS; The General Command of our forces holds a meeting with the Revolutionary Army and the Northern Democratic Brigade; Publication date: 09/18/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=43134

97 To learn more about these methods, see: Social Science Research Committee of the Democratic Society Academies; Special Warfare and Its Applications; First Edition – November 2017; Publisher: Social Science Research Committee – Qamishli; p. 226.

98 Nibal Ibrahim; Arab clans and tribes in Syria and the Arab world hold a tribal forum in Homs: We will not accept the presence of occupation forces on our land; Publisher: Al-Baath Newspaper; Publication date: 09/14/2024; Link:

https://newspaper.albaathmedia.sy/2024/09/14/العشائر-والقبائل-العربية-في-سورية-وال/

99 For an analysis in this context, see::

The Economist; Is Syria’s drug-dealing dictator coming in from the cold? Posted: 11.09.2024; Link:

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/09/11/is-syrias-drug-dealing-dictator-coming-in-from-the-cold

100 Diaa Odeh; After the Mekki strike… What remains for the “Guardians of Religion” in Syria?; Publisher: Alhurra website; Publication date: 08/26/2024; Link:

https://www.alhurra.com/syria/2024/08/26/ضربة-المكي-بقي-لـحراس-الدين-في-سوريا؟

101 For the full interview, see: U.S. Embassy in Syria; Special Briefing on the Mission to Defeat ISIS; Publication Date: 2023.02.28; Link:

https://sy.usembassy.gov/ar/إيجاز-خاص-حول-مهمة-هزيمة-داعش/

102 CENTCOMArabic; 03.09.2024; Link:

https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1830743843001582030?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet

* “The term refers to a man or woman who, until recently, belonged to a poor social class, but for whom new money has allowed them to ascend the social ladder and the means of consumption to purchase goods and services typical of the wealthy class…” Wikipedia; The New Rich.

  103للمزيد انظر: منال جرود؛ مفهوم الحكم الراشد – The concept of good governance؛ الناشر: الموسوعة السياسية؛ تاريخ النشر: 2022.05.31؛ الرابط: https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/مفهوم%20الحكم%20الراشد

104 Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA); “Generations of Warfare” as defined by American Colonel William S. Lind; Publication date: 2020.11.21; Link:

https://igsda.org/أجيال-الحروب-كما-وضعها-الأمريكي-كولو/?lang=ar

* * Electronic flies are virtual accounts on social media that are operated by specialized programs that work to intensify the dissemination of specific posts or tweets in huge numbers, which include incomplete or false information with the aim of falsifying facts and misleading public opinion… For more see: Ali Saadi Abdul Zahra Jubair; The Impact of Electronic Flies on Public Opinion Trends; Publisher: Political Encyclopedia, quoting from the magazine “Issues” issued by the College of Political Science at Al-Nahrain University; Link:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/library/1487/download

** Sleeper cells: a limited group of individuals, formed secretly, blending into society and operating silently, after being intellectually and behaviorally qualified to carry out various tasks, according to the plan drawn up for them by the organizational leadership, such as gathering information and carrying out murders and assassinations… For more, see: Dr. Mansour bin Saeed Al-Qarni; Sleeper Cells: Terrifying Weapons; Publisher: The Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism/ Issue 6 of the Terrorism Issues Issue – January 2024; p. 6; link

https://www.imctc.org/ar/eLibrary/TerrorismIssues/Pages/TerrorismIssues05.2.2024.aspx

*** The United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech defines hate speech as… “any type of communication, verbal, written or behavioral, that attacks or uses derogatory or discriminatory language with reference to a person or group on the basis of identity, in other words, on the basis of religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factor…”. For more see: United Nations website; Hate speech; link:

https://www.un.org/ar/hate-speech/understanding-hate-speech/what-is-hate-speech

105 Institute for Global Security and Defense Affairs (IGSDA); “Generations of Warfare” as defined by American Colonel William S. Lind; Publication date: 2020.11.21; Link:

https://igsda.org/أجيال-الحروب-كما-وضعها-الأمريكي-كولو/?lang=ar

106 SDF PRESS; The General Command of our forces holds a meeting with the Revolutionary Army and the Northern Democratic Brigade; Publication date: 09/18/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=43134

107 SDF PRESS; The General Command of our forces holds a meeting with the Revolutionary Army and the Northern Democratic Brigade; Publication date: 09/18/2024; Link:

https://sdf-press.com/?p=43134