Sectarianism and its Repercussions on the Transitional Phase in Syria

o Introduction

The political crisis resulting from the ideological conflict between Islamists and nationalists, the conflict between political Islam movements, and the conflict between nationalists in the region, tops the list of problems that preventing stability and development in the countries of the region. It is a major factor in the phenomenon of extreme political polarization, as if every individual is bound by allegiance to a specific sectarian and political doctrine. This may explain the phenomenon of the “social rift”

(* )between communities within the Syrian state and the inability or unwillingness of political elites to build trust among themselves according to a social contract. The complex political and security situation currently experiencing Syria points to this reality. If we follow Samuel Huntington’s view that ([1]) “the tendency to think of two worlds has always recurred throughout human history. People are always tempted to divide each other into ‘us’ and ‘them,’ the preferred group and the other group,”that this is a natural tendency among humans based on cultural differentiation. However, the tendency toward violence cannot be explained by dividing each other into “us and them.” The human doctrine of fighting is primarily governed by innate drives centered around securing protection, food, and reproduction, and the human resort to force to construct this division cannot be achieved without the presence of an inciting party. It seems that sectarianism, religious extremism, or ideological wars provide some explanation for this problem; they all share one thing in common: the duality of “king and priest” or “leader and cleric,” who manage violence to achieve this division and build a pyramid of power that monopolizes wealth.

The sectarian violence in Syria is one manifestation of its seemingly intractable crisis.

 It has caused human security to deteriorate to dangerous and unprecedented levels, amid a clear inability to achieve reconciliation with the past and the present, and a significant capacity to commit acts of revenge and spread hate speech. This violence has revealed the fragility of the Syrian state and its inability to transform into a cohesive political, social, and economic entity. It has also demonstrated the failure of the nation-state system and the Islamic State to build states comparable to the states promoted by nationalist and religious ideologies, which they promised to establish but never did. Instead, they have divided what divided and destroyed what destroyed. Neither humanity nor the environment has been spared the evils resulting from the struggle for power and wealth. This research aims to shed light on the phenomenon of sectarian tension in Syria within its historical, political, and security dimensions, relying on a descriptive and analytical approach. This research attempts to construct a vision of the emerging state of sectarian tension in Syria after the fall of the Ba’athist regime and to analyze its factors in a way that may contribute to developing solutions. The concept of sectarianism, sectarian violence, and the issue of sectarian polarization in Syria were addressed, with the aim of identifying the most prominent characteristics of sectarianism in Syria. This paves the way for an examination of the sectarian violence crisis after the fall of the regime and the impact of sectarian tension on the new Syria. On the other hand, the research focused less on northeastern Syria, given the weaker sectarian tensions there compared to other Syrian regions, taking into account its exposure to sectarian-motivated attacks.

The following terms are intended:

▪ Autonomous Administration: The Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

▪ SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces.

▪ Ba’athist Regime: The regime that ruled Syria from 1963 until the end of 2024.

▪ Extremist Islamic Organizations: Syrian Islamic organizations that use excessive violence to establish an Islamic state or emirate, excluding non-Arab or non-Sunni Syrian components, and refusing to recognize the state of citizenship in Syria.

▪ Nation-state system or nation-state system: a totalitarian system of government that glorifies a single race.

o Sectarianism and Sectarian Violence

From a sociological perspective, the sect is an ancient social phenomenon. It forms as a social unit in the context of a group’s search for moral and material security within an intellectual framework based on its culture, in a way that grants it a unique identity and a sense of distinction from other groups. This identity is embodied through organization according to a social hierarchy. A sect can be defined as “a team or group of people united by a doctrine or opinion that distinguishes them from others…”([2]). The term “sect” is often associated with religious groups, as no religion is devoid of sects. Each sect has its own intellectual doctrine based on the principle of belief in a single creed. The difference with other sects lies in the approach taken to jurisprudential matters related to legislative, economic, cultural, social, and other issues. This phenomenon has undergone a historical transformation ([3]) represented by the exploitation of the sect to legitimize violence in order to build an authoritarian hierarchy. Which caused it to turn into a source of violence. Historical references indicate that most of the large sects were formed as a result of the political and ideological conflict between two groups of the same belief, such as the Muslim schism between Sunnis, Shiites and Kharijites after the Battle of Siffin in 37 AH (between 657 and 658 AD), and the sectarian tension between Christians in northern Syria([4] ) around 500 AD, and then what was called the “Great Schism” between Catholic and Orthodox Christians in 1054 AD, and later the Protestant sect’s schism from the Catholics in the sixteenth century AD.

Most religious sects engage in an intellectual struggle among themselves over the legitimate representation of belief and the challenge to the credibility of the other. This struggle has often turned into an armed conflict, in the course of which dozens of massacres and rights violations have been committed. In the process, moral concepts have become relative; the Sunni approach to justice towards his Sunni counterpart differs from his approach towards the Shiite, as the sectarian doctrine is what determines the components of justice applied. This problem extends to the issue of the Islamic system of government, where the jurisprudential dispute over the conditions of the caliphate or religious authority has led to political conflict for more than a thousand years, and this matter has been repeated relatively in the conflict between Christian sects. This issue has given rise to the term sectarianism, which refers to the “politicization of religious societal identity” ([5] ), meaning the transformation of religious doctrine into a political ideology that aspires to build an authority to which everyone is subject according to the “The dialectic of master and slave” (*), harnessing the sect to serve political interests and staffing its followers to impose authority over other sects. Religious sectarianism becomes the revered identity, and national, social, or patriotic identity pales in comparison. Once a sectarian authority imposes its sovereignty over a number of other sects, sectarian grievances begin to emerge as a result of persecution. This persecution has two causes: the first is giving the other, who is different, the choice between embracing the sectarian doctrine of authority and being killed, similar to what ISIS did to the Shiite sect in Iraq and Syria. The second reason is the condescending and excommunicating view of the other sect, similar to the stance of Iran’s Shiite extremists toward Sunnis. This reflects sectarian conflict.

The transformation of the sect from its devotional phase to a fanatical-political state, that is, the transformation into a means to reach absolute power or kingship, has caused various forms of violence and has often deviated towards brutality towards the different other, by canceling ethical dealings with him and violating people’s rights and lives. The source of this evil energy is always extremist demagogues brimming with political ambitions, who harness dozens of followers and the media to promote their propaganda. The paradox lies in their belief that they represent goodness and that morality guides them. What distinguishes these people, despite the pretense of virtue, is that they are pragmatists who are adept at manipulating religious identities to divide society in a way that enables them to better control. These policies may intersect with the interests of some international powers that… It is assumed that they will work to secure their interests by concluding some kind of agreement with the leaders of sectarian movements through coercion or enticement (6 ). This is consistent with the belief that “large-scale sectarian violence has always been the result of deliberate efforts by local and foreign actors to incite social conflict for their own political ends” (7 ). In contrast, the sectarian affiliation of others is intransigent as a type of self-defense of their identity and a rejection of domination in the name of another sect, and thus the wheel of sectarian conflict turns.

 Therefore, it can be said that the sectarian violence, in its various forms, witnessed in the Middle East is the result of sectarianism’s transformation from a social-devotional entity to a pragmatic-political state that is exploited to build an authoritarian regime. Most of the crises witnessed by Middle Eastern countries, especially Turkey, Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, are a result of this process.

o Sectarian Polarization in the Syrian Crisis

The phenomenon of sectarian tension has roots in the region’s political history. It was a reason why some Christian sects did not confront the Muslim invasion of their countries (8 ) due to sectarian tensions among them. The sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites after the Battle of Siffin evolved into an ideological conflict during the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258 AD). This conflict became part of the political doctrine of both the Safavids and Ottomans, and its repercussions continue to this day.

In our contemporary history, many Middle Eastern countries witnessed an escalation of their crises after World War II. This is due to the failure of national state systems to achieve prosperity in their countries, and the increasing rates of suppression of freedoms and human rights violations against ethnicities and sects. Despite labeling these systems with the term “republic,” such as the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian republics, they were in reality totalitarian regimes that, at times, were involved in committing massacres against Kurds, Alawites, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians, and Druze. Amidst the state of uncertainty associated with sectarian conflicts, the phenomenon of sectarian polarization emerges under the influence of psychological, cultural, and material factors. Most social and psychological research indicates that the state of oppression to which a person is exposed pushes him to search for a savior or supporter to support him in preventing his collapse under the weight of the misery he suffers. The best people who can provide this reassurance, even superficially, in Eastern societies are the clerics who manage charitable works and bring comfort to the soul through talks of justice on the Day of Judgment and descriptions of the amazing bliss in heaven. Naturally; Every person is drawn to the sect in which he was born or the doctrine he believes in. The emotional bond between a person and his sect increases the more the sect provides him with care and reassurance. It becomes like a clan to him, for which he takes revenge, defends it, and lives his social life according to its customs, not skimping on material support for it. It is the guarantee for achieving existential balance and self-realization in the context of the “master-slave dialectic.” In this context, Dr. Mustafa Hijazi says in his book “Social Backwardness” ( 9) that “to the extent that the oppressed person denies the oppressor and distances himself from him, he integrates into his original group, which shares his destiny and status to the point of dissolving into belonging to it.” In this dissolution, the oppressed person finds protection for himself and insurance against the dangers of nature and the harm of the oppressor. He finds in it a guarantee for the future through a system of participation and solidarity. Man’s orientation towards the past by adhering to traditions and customs instead of confronting the present and looking forward to the future is directly proportional to the degree of oppression practiced on man in his society by the tyrants10.

Sectarian polarization in Syria intensified after the development of hostility between the Ba’ath regimes in Syria and Iraq and the Sadat regime in Egypt ( 11). The Iraqi Ba’ath regime and the Sadat regime (12 ) transformed their conflict with the Syrian Ba’ath regime into a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Alawites. Jordan took a similar stance after the failed assassination attempt on Jordanian Prime Minister ‘’Mudar Badran’’ in 1981 and the Ba’ath regime’s support for Palestinian factions in the Black September events of 1970. This paralleled the Muslim Brotherhood’s increased hate speech against the Alawite sect in particular (13 ). Most of its attacks focused on Alawite officials and individuals within the Ba’ath regime, despite the presence of Sunnis and individuals from other sects within the structure of this regime. It seems that all Alawites found themselves forced to cooperate with the Ba’ath regime, and most Sunnis found themselves in a position closer to extremist Islamists. This polarization had major repercussions for the country. As divisions between local communities increased, the phenomenon of takfir emerged for the first time from a political standpoint (14 ) through the exploitation of sectarianism as a weapon or a means to undermine the regime. Horrific acts of violence occurred, the most famous of which were the mutual massacres in Aleppo and Hama (1976-1982). The authorities increased their security grip and suppressed freedoms, leading to the loss of trust between Syrian components. Sectarian polarization also turned into a social issue, and social life became framed by the political ideology of the sect. For example, within Syrian universities, before and after the Syrian crisis, youth groups were predominantly sectarian, religious, and ethnic. Alawites chose to share housing and recreational activities with each other, and the same was true for Ismailis, Sunnis, Christians, Yazidis, and Kurds. This problem is considered one of the repercussions of sectarian tension in the country for centuries, so that every society has in its cultural heritage a bitter memory towards one or more of the other sects or beliefs. Therefore, Sectarianism is not new in Syria, as many Syrian regions have witnessed many cases of sectarian violence, the most famous incidents of which have become known are the conflict between the Ayyubids and the Shiite Assassins, the massacres committed by the Ottomans against the Alawites, the Alawites’ demand for French protection after the liberation of Syria from the Ottoman occupation and then for British protection (15 ), and the conflicts that broke out between the Druze and the Christian Maronites ( 16).

The Syrian Arab national state project, which began with Prince Faisal (1919-1920), is one of the most prominent factors that strengthened sectarianism in Syria. It was met with opposition from the religious, ethnic, and sectarian components in Syria due to their lack of confidence in the ability or desire of the Arab unity project to respect their particularities, which they were keen to preserve (17 ). Dr. Bashir Zein Al-Abidin points out that the majority of the members of the sectarian minorities in Syria showed their desire to separate with their own independent entities from Faisal’s rule (18 ); as the Druze elites sought to form a state for themselves in Hauran after the arrival of the French General Gouraud to Beirut in 1919 AD and received promises to fulfill their demands, coinciding with the desire of the Alawites to form an independent entity for themselves.

As long as political Islamist movements continue to inject religion into politics, exploit past grievances for political goal, and promote hate speech as a means of domination, the problem of sectarian polarization will persist for decades to come. This aligns with the view of Dr. Nicholas Van Dam (19), who believes that “reliance on regional and tribal ties in countries like Syria is a prerequisite for maintaining power. Theoretically, regionalism and tribalism do not necessarily lead to the emergence of sectarianism, even if there is strong overlap between the three groups…” However, he sees the potential for curbing sectarianism despite the efforts made by groups excluded from power to encourage sectarianism for their own personal political goals.

In curbing sectarianism, despite the efforts made by groups excluded from power to encourage sectarianism for their own personal political goals, sectarian polarization has been and continues to be a cornerstone of the Syrian crisis. It has been exploited with great effectiveness in staffing and incitement to fighting between opposition factions and the regime. Numerous violations, killings, and forced displacement have been committed for sectarian reasons. This polarization has received material, military, and media support from some regional states with conflicting sectarian agendas, namely Turkey and Iran. They have even directed their loyal factions to attack Kurds, Druze, and Christians, as well as some Sunnis who have remained neutral in this conflict and refused to submit to the sectarian agenda.

o Characteristics of Sectarianism in Syria

Some studies indicate that religious minorities constitute approximately a quarter of the population, according to approximate statistics from 2015 (20 ). Sunnis constitute approximately 68.4% of Syria’s population, of various ethnicities, Alawites 13.3%, Druze 3.2%, Ismailis 2.1%, Shiites 1.1%, Christians 11.2%, and Yazidis 0.2%. The density of these sects increases within their historical regions and gradually decreases as they move away from their centers of concentration, where they live intertwined within cities.

Sectarianism in Syria has characteristics that distinguish it from the sectarianism present in neighboring countries. The most prominent of these characteristics can be identified:

• It is incited by political motives: Sectarian tension in Syria is linked to ambitions to reach power ( 21) and its continuity. With the exception of Sunni jurisprudential works, it is rare to find jurisprudential or theological works of a controversial nature among other Syrian sects, similar to those in neighboring countries. So, this tension is more ideological (political) in nature than doctrinal, and derives its energy from the sectarian tension in Iraq, Lebanon, and Iran. During the rule of the Baath regime, sectarian tension in Syria was confined primarily to Sunni political Islam organizations and the Alawite sect, secondarily to these organizations and the Druze sect, and thirdly to the Christian sects. With regard to the Christian religion; The sectarian tension there is not at a level that leads to violence, and it does not go beyond theological debates, despite the emergence of a political division between them, manifested in the Protestants’ support for the English and the Catholics’ support for the French mandate after the peace conference in 1919 AD (22 ), unlike the Islamic sects, which are apparently based on hatred with a historical-political background, especially since the Battle of Siffin between Imam Ali and the commander of his army in Syria, Muawiyah, took place in Syria. According to Michel Seura ( 23), the Muslim Brotherhood justifies its hostility towards the Alawites based on the accusation of conspiracy against Islam and considers the Baath Party a tool for them, and holds the Alawite sect responsible for all the crimes committed over a thousand years by all Shiite sects without discrimination. They are even accused of removing the Black Stone from the Kaaba by the Qarmatians in the tenth century AD. In the modern political history of Syria, the French mandate policy of supporting the Syrian sects and appearing as their protector played a role in the development of the sectarian issue in Syria (24 ), in addition to the repercussions of the policy it adopted in recruiting members of the sects into its forces known as the “Army of the East” to suppress its opponents, especially with many Islamic and Christian sects expressing their rejection of the Arab national state project. It can be asserted that the Arab nationalist movement paved the way for the exacerbation of sectarianism in Syria, and the adoption of the term’s minority, majority, and nationalism. Thus, there became a national majority unable to absorb the minority and coexist with it, in parallel with the growth of sectarianism among the Sunnis through Friday sermons and mosque lessons that incited fighting against the French, the English, the Jews, and everyone who cooperated with them. This was clearly evident in the popularity of the term “Mujahideen” from 1919 until the French withdrawal from Syria. It reappeared in the context of the war between the Ba’ath regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s, and later during the Syrian crisis that erupted in 2011.

B-Personalization or embodiment of sectarianism in the person of tyrants: Most of the regimes that succeeded to power in Syria were relatively totalitarian and framed by Arab nationalism and the Sunni sect, despite the pretense of secularism in government administration. Their inability to achieve human security for citizens, regardless of their sectarian and ethnic affiliations, and the practice of tyranny against them in most cases, created the perception of linking corrupt heads of government to the Sunni sect. This phenomenon was also present during the period of the end of the Ottoman era in the Levant, when poverty prevailed and the political, economic and security conditions deteriorated, as the members of the sects interpreted it as a type of sectarian discrimination against them, despite the Sunnis also suffering from these conditions (25 ). On the other hand, there was a type of social oppression practiced by Sunni feudal lords against the Alawite peasants: this was evident in the peasants’ revolution in the Alawite villages in the Hama countryside in 1953 AD (*). Despite the secularism of the Baath regime and its adoption of the extremist Arab nationalist ideology, it restricted security and military power after 1970 to Alawite officers, in parallel with the elimination of most of the Alawites who opposed this regime. The Alawite leaders tried to unify the Alawite sect to make it a “political sect” (26 ) through the “Ali al-Murtada” Association, and the head of the regime devoted all of his policy to “linking the fate of the sect to his personal future” (27 ). Despite the failure to apply “Alawite Sharia” in the administration of the state with a Sunni appearance, and the unification of the Islamic religious curriculum in schools for all Islamic sects, most of the opposing research, as well as the Sunni political Islam organizations, decided to call it “the Nusayri regime” or “the Alawite regime,” considering its tyranny as sectarian tyranny. This was also promoted by some Druze officers who entered into a power struggle with the Alawite officers (28 ). These organizations did not hesitate to carry out attacks motivated by sectarian motives whenever they had the opportunity, especially after 1976 and the start of the “Fighting Vanguard” organization, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, carrying out operations against Alawite officials in the Baathist regime and calling for an “Islamic-Sunni revolution” against the regime, which responded brutally to it. The response came with the commission of the “Artillery School” massacre in Aleppo on June 16, 1979, which resulted in the deaths of 83 An Alawite officer, as the sectarian tension developed later with the Hama massacre of 1982, and this speech was renewed at the beginning of the Syrian crisis after it had entered a state of hibernation as a result of international circumstances following the elimination of the power of the Muslim Brotherhood inside Syria. In a Friday sermon in a mosque in Qatar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Egyptian nationality), one of the preachers of the Muslim Brotherhood, attacked the Alawite sect and declared a “holy jihad” (29 ) to fight them and said: “The Nusayris are more infidel than the Jews and Christians, as Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah said about them. Today we see them killing people like mice and cats by the thousands and tens of thousands, and Assad has become the ruler, along with his Nusayri faction…”

On the other hand, despite the general peacefulness of Syrian Sunni communities and the lack of support for extremist Sunni organizations, as evidenced by the opposition of many Sunni tribes and communities to these organizations, the regime considered these communities part of its ranks and did not hesitate to use lethal weapons against them, whether barrel bombs, heat-seeking missiles, or chemical weapons.

• Concentration within specific geographic areas: There are regions in Syria that have historically been areas of concentration for a number of sects in Syria ( 30); The Alawites are concentrated on the coast, the Druze in the south, the Christians in central Syria, and the Ismailis in the Hama countryside, while the Sunnis occupy the remaining areas and constitute the largest sect in Syria, with overlap in many areas. Therefore, sectarian tension increases in western and southern Syria to a greater degree than in the northeast. When observing the communities of northern and eastern Syria, one can notice the weakness of sectarian sentiment, with the exception of those involved in political Islam organizations. Even religious tension between Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis is noticeably weak. However, in the communities of western and southern Syria, one does not have to bother to notice this tension.

C– It is more affected by external sectarian tensions than it is by external influences. That is, sectarian tension in Syria is based on fanatical organizations affiliated with larger organizations from outside Syria, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Sham, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and others. Therefore, sectarian tensions are also having an impact in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Palestine (**). This may be due to the lack of inspiring local sectarian leaders compared to those countries (*). This supports the belief that sectarian tensions in Syria are more political than religious.

D-The sectarian state project is confined to the Sunni sect: With the exception of extremist Sunni organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Sham, no sect or religion in Syria currently possesses an ideological project to build an Alawite, Christian, Ismaili, or Druze sectarian authority or state. Upon monitoring various popular and political activities, it can be noted that most of them accept coexistence with any political system as long as it does not interfere in their social lives and respects their religious beliefs.

o Sectarian tension after the fall of the regime:

 the Syrian regime is considered primarily responsible for the Syrian crisis and has committed numerous violations against Syrians of all ethnic and religious backgrounds, his fall was supposed to lead to an end to hate speech and the beginning of the construction of a state of citizenship that guarantees the rights of all Syrians, based on the political agendas of the Syrian opposition forces that claim to have led the “Syrian revolution” against the regime. However, the opposite happened. As incitement against the Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Ismailis, Shiites, and Christians, who are considered the authentic components of Syria, escalated, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham worked to monopolize power and exclude the rest of the Syrian forces from the process of rebuilding the country’s political, military, and economic system. To achieve this, it followed a policy of evasion by dissolving the factions by force and enticement and integrating them into the new Ministry of Defense. It then held a conference called the “National Dialogue Conference,” which was boycotted by the Autonomous Administration, the Kurds, Druze, Christians, Alawites, and a large number of Arab political forces. It then formed a committee to draft the constitution under the name of the “Transitional Constitution,” which excluded most of the Syrian political, social, and human rights forces. This policy, according to many analysts, mimics the policy followed by the father of Assad’s regime in order to consolidate its authority through what was called the “National Progressive Front” and subject the state to the ideology of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. The previous power bases, which were: the Baath, the army, and the sect, have now become: the Al-Nusra Front, the army, and the sect, according to the political debates among the Syrians.

During the three months following the fall of the Baathist regime, there were bloody attacks and systematic violations of the rights of the components that the new regime in Damascus called “minorities.” Amnesty International held the Syrian Interim Authority responsible for adhering to international humanitarian law (31 ), adding: “It must commit to defending the human rights of all those living in Syria. The authorities must take clear measures to firmly defend the equal rights of all Syrians, including ensuring that no person or group is targeted based on their perceived political affiliation…” A brief account of the most prominent of these operations can be provided:

1) Targeting the Kurds:

The attacks on the Kurds are based on sectarian principles, and Sunni extremists, including ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood, are the sole perpetrators of these attacks. Attacks on the autonomous administration areas continue, primarily targeting the Kurds. After the regime forces retreated in the face of the advance of the Islamist factions, exploiting the military imbalance caused by the withdrawal of the Iranians, the discontent of the Russians, and the distance of the Aleppo countryside from the Syrian Democratic Forces’ power centers and the range of ground operations by the international coalition forces, the Turkish state and its mercenaries from the “Syrian National Army” factions and extremist jihadist groups To launch bloody operations against the Kurds in the Afrin, al-Shahba, and Manbij district. These operations resulted in the loss of dozens of lives, the injury of hundreds, and the displacement of at least one million Kurds, most of whom were forced to seek refuge in Aleppo and the surrounding areas The safe zone in northeastern Syria, in parallel with the escalation of violations against the remaining Kurds in Afrin and its countryside, which are under the occupation of Turkish forces and their mercenaries.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were able to halt the advance of Turkish forces and their mercenaries on the outskirts of the Qarqozak Bridge, Tishrin Dam, and Deir Hafer in the southern Manbij countryside. battles are ongoing between the SDF and the mercenaries, backed by Turkish ground and air support and intelligence support, but they have so far been unable to breach the SDF defenses. In the context of the communities of North and East Syria expressing their support for the SDF and rejecting the attacks of the Turkish forces and their mercenaries on the Tishrin Dam, local civil society organizations organized an open sit-in on the dam on January 8, 2025. Dozens of civilians from different regions participated in the sit-in, demanding that the international community and international organizations intervene to halt military operations and protect the dam, which is a strategic source of energy for the region’s service infrastructure. However, these civilians were not spared from the attacks of the Turkish forces and their mercenaries, as they attacked convoys transporting protesters and sit-inners at the dam, causing dozens of injuries and the loss of dozens of lives, in parallel with the fall of civilian casualties in the bombing operations that targeted the countryside of Tal Tamr, Kobani, Ain Issa, and Manbij. The offensive operations are still ongoing at the time of writing. Commenting on these violations, Hiba Zayadin (senior Middle East researcher at Human Rights Watch) said:)32( “The Syrian National Army and Turkish forces have demonstrated a clear and disturbing pattern of unlawful attacks against civilians and civilian objects, and both sides appear to be celebrating these attacks. As the main backer of the Syrian National Army, Turkey has an obligation to deter violations by the Syrian National Army, or it risks complicity in its crimes.”

Despite most of the Kurds are considered Sunni, extremist Islamist organizations, especially al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Muslim Brotherhood, are dominated by nationalist tendencies, and many of their leaders have previously excommunicated the Kurdish political movement (33 ), whether in Iran, Iraq, Syria, or Turkey. Every Kurd who clings to his national identity and demands his cultural rights and self-administration of his affairs is considered, in their eyes, an enemy whose blood, money, and honor are permissible. This reality can be seen in the violations suffered by Kurds in the areas occupied by Turkey—in Afrin, Gire Spi (Tal Abyad), and Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain)—at the hands of factions affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. This is in addition to the horrific violations committed against the Kurds by ISIS, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar al-Islam group in Iraq, and the Turkish Hezbollah. Therefore, the attacks against Kurds by extremist Islamist organizations can be classified as sectarian-motivated attacks.

2) Targeting Christians:

Both the Ba’athist regime and political Islamist organizations attempted to exploit Christians. The regime portrayed itself as a protector of Christians, while numerous extremist organizations attacked them for sectarian reasons. The Orthodox Christian community was the most targeted. Bishop ‘’Yohanna Ibrahim’’, head of the Syriac Orthodox community in Aleppo and its environs, was kidnapped in April 2013. Bishop ‘’bulus Yazigi’’, head of the Greek Orthodox community in Aleppo and its countryside, was kidnapped the same year. Their fate remains unknown. The nuns of the Maaloula Monastery in Qalamoun were kidnapped by ‘’Jabhat al-Nusra’’ in 2014. Dozens of Assyrians were kidnapped in the Khabur Plain north of Hasakah that same year. Churches were destroyed in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, the Hasakah countryside, Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Tal Tamr (34). After the fall of the regime, the harassment and intimidation of Christians by extremist Islamists within the ranks of the new regime forces continued. The violations were concentrated in the countryside of Homs and Hama, where some Christians were forced to close the “Aya Sophia” Church in the city of Al-Suqaylabiyah in the northern Hama countryside. Their graves were also vandalized. It seems that the fear of revenge from international Christian forces was an obstacle to extremists committing violations similar to those practiced against the Kurds, Alawites and Shiites. However, many extremists accused many leaders of After the fall of the regime, the harassment and intimidation of Christians by extremist Islamists within the ranks of the new regime forces continued. The violations were concentrated in the countryside of Homs and Hama, where some Christians were forced to close the Hagia Sophia Church in the city of Al-Suqaylabiyah in the northern Hama countryside. Their graves were also vandalized. It seems that the fear of revenge from international Christian forces was an obstacle to extremists committing violations similar to those practiced against the Kurds, Alawites, and Shiites. However, the accusation by many extremists that many church leaders stood with the Baathist regime and the violations committed against the Alawites raises a state of anxiety among the ranks of the various Christian sects (35 ).

3) Targeting the Druze:

The Druze concentration in Sweida and its countryside, and their experience with the Ottomans and the French, has helped them protect themselves well. Since the days of the Ba’ath regime, they have adopted a form of self-protection by forming a group of factions with a predominantly Druze character, similar to the Ba’ath regime. The new regime in Damascus failed to impose its security, military, and even political hegemony over the Sweida Governorate. In the midst of the New Year’s celebrations of 2025, Islamist groups within the operations room to deter aggression, affiliated with “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” attempted to gradually infiltrate it. However, they were met with firm rejection by the Druze factions (*). It appears that they later tried to compensate for this failure by taking control of the city of Jaramana in the Damascus countryside, a city with a Druze majority. However, the “Jaramana Shield Brigade” faction confronted them, and violent battles took place. The Islamists present in the city of “Al-Maliha” attempted to support the Damascus government forces in storming the city. However, the Israeli government’s threat of direct intervention to defend the Druze thwarted the attempt to take direct control of the city. It appears that the Druze have practically become under direct Israeli protection (36).

4) Targeting the Alawites:

Despite the majority of Alawites suffering under the Ba’athist regime’s policies, all Syrian Islamist opposition organizations have considered the Alawites to be remnants of the regime. It appears that the Alawites have been held largely responsible for the massacres and violations committed by the regime against Islamists and Syrians in general, without any legal basis. This is in addition to the historical sectarian hatred of Sunni extremists toward the Alawites and their excommunication. For example, Ibn Taymiyyah’s 14th-century fatwa permitting the killing of Alawites, describing them as “more infidel than Jews and Christians,” remains the primary reference for these organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood ( 37). Therefore, the decision to exterminate them was taken in advance, and the extremists will not bother to find pretexts to justify the violations and killings against the Alawites as long as their leaders have issued fatwas permitting this. It seems that the Alawites were relying on the regime and its Iranian and Russian allies to secure their protection, and the leaders in their communities did not take strategic measures to secure their own protection, like the Kurds and Druze. Moreover, there was not enough time to remedy the situation after the collapse of the regime, Bashar al-Assad’s flight, and his allies’ abandonment of him. This left them powerless in the face of Islamic extremists. The Alawites, as well as the Shiites in the Damascus countryside, were subjected to violations that included humiliating treatment or arrest on charges of belonging to the remnants of the regime. However, these violations were not on the scale of the violations that the Alawites were subjected to during March 2025. At the beginning of the month, armed groups from the remnants of the regime launched a surprise attack against the forces of the Damascus government in the cities and towns of the Syrian coast. It appears that the scale of the attack, which included the entire region, was aimed at wresting control of the entire coast from the grip of the Damascus government. However, the reinforcements sent by the Damascus government, supported by thousands of Sunni civilian militants loyal to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (**) in the coast, Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Deir ez-Zor and Damascus, along with direct Turkish military support, foiled the goals of the remnants of the regime, and the situation was exploited to expose hundreds of civilians from the Alawite community According to the documentation of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), 62 massacres were committed on the Syrian coast and mountainous areas until March 22, 2025, forcing thousands to seek refuge in the surrounding mountains, the Hmeimim airbase, and northern Lebanon. By following the Arab and international statements regarding the operations witnessed on the Syrian coast, one can notice the lack of sympathy for the local community, and some reasons for this can be pointed out: The Baath regime, during its involvement in the conflict with Israel and the capitalist camp, alongside the socialist camp, relied on Alawite officers in command and decision-making positions. In addition, a large segment of Alawites sympathized with the Lebanese Hezbollah. The close alliance of Alawite officers with the Russians and Iranians, and the violations they committed against thousands of Syrians, all of these reasons caused them to remain defenseless, and thousands of innocent Alawites paid the price for the weak strategic thinking of their social, political, cultural, and religious elites.

The Impact of Sectarian Tension on the New Syria

The explosion of sectarian tension that followed the fall of the Ba’athist regime has had far-reaching repercussions on the geography enclosed by the Syrian state’s borders. It has made building a cohesive national state more difficult, and it has deepened divisions among local communities. Repairing these cracks in the structure of Syrian society will not be easy, and their repercussions could extend to neighboring countries and deepen further in the Middle East. Even if tempers are calmed, the grudges and resentments will persist and remain dormant until someone comes along to liberate them, whether future extremists or international powers seeking hegemony.

Returning to the political history of the Syrian state, we find that it was formed as a result of the division of the lands occupied by the Ottoman Empire by the victorious countries, France and the United Kingdom, in the First World War (1914-1918). Its current borders are based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Ankara Treaty of 1921, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and the Ankara II Agreement of 1926. The Syrian state was not formed as a result of a comprehensive popular uprising or ideological revolution. In the political history of the region, it is difficult to find a state or kingdom called Syria within its current borders. Dr. Bashir Zain Al-Abidin (40 ) sees a major contradiction between the concept of Greater Syria (the Levant) and the Syrian Republic, stressing that this discrepancy had a negative impact on the local and regional identity of the Syrian state. Therefore, there is a problem in attributing the Syrian national identity to historical foundations. On the other hand, the regimes that have ruled Syria, from the declaration of its independence in 1948 to the present day, have failed to build a Syrian national identity that can lower the moral barriers between the communities described as Syrian, and ensure protection and rights for the indigenous peoples there, including Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians, Alawites, Druze, Shiites, and followers of the Christian, Yazidi, and Jewish faiths. The Ba’ath regime (1963-2024) bears the greatest responsibility for this failure, as it was the longest-lived regime in Syria, in addition to its responsibility for the massacres and violations it committed against the Kurds and its Islamist and secular opponents.

There is no doubt that there is a major problem and a state of uncertainty in the so-called “transitional phase” that Syria is going through. The political and security landscape during March 2025 can be summarized as follows: A state divided between three local administrations: the Syrian Interim Authority, the Druze Administration, and the Autonomous Administration. The Interim Authority (formerly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) is working to monopolize power, extend its control over all of Syria, and transform its authority into a permanent one. Most of southern Syria is also under the control of Israeli forces, which recently occupied parts of Quneitra and the Daraa countryside. Meanwhile, Turkey occupies the areas of Afrin, Gire Spi (Tal Abyad), Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Manbij, and ISIS is active in the Badia and its surrounding areas. Regarding the combat operations, the following facts can be summarized:

1. Attacks by Turkey and its Syrian mercenaries continue on the countryside of Tal Tamr, Ain Issa, Kobani, Manbij, and Tabqa. Violations by Turkish-backed factions against the remaining residents of Afrin and al-Shahba continue.
2. Violations, massacres, and acts of revenge against Alawites continue on the Syrian coast and in the Homs and Hama countrysides. Remnants of the Baathist regime are attempting to reorganize themselves as a popular force defending the Alawites and launching retaliatory operations against the forces of the Syrian interim authorities.

3. The Druze feel threatened and refuse to surrender their weapons to the interim Syrian authorities. Attempts have been made to subdue them in Jaramana, but Israeli intervention on their behalf has helped their resistance.
4. ISIS continues to carry out attacks against civilian objects, security forces, and the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern and eastern Syria.
5. Assassinations, violent incidents, and acts of revenge continue in the Daraa and Deir ez-Zor governorates, increasing in frequency with the return of hundreds of militants from northern Syria to their areas after the fall of the regime, clashing with local communities that had previously supported the regime or whose members had joined its forces.
6. Mines and explosive devices continue to claim civilian lives, and there are reservations about the fact that most of them fall under the category of “remnants of war,” especially with the increase in assassinations and operational activity by ISIS and other extremist groups, and the return of dozens of mercenaries to areas inside Syria.
7. US Central Command and international coalition forces continue to carry out strikes against extremist Islamic groups designated as global terrorists, with strikes focusing on individuals from the Guardians of Religion Organization and ISIS in Idlib Governorate and the Badia.

These field conditions necessitate a reconsideration of the “transitional phase,” which has been described as the beginning of a breakthrough in the Syrian crisis. The crisis on the ground is still ongoing and appears to be worsening, and all that exists is a shift in the balance of power with the fall of the Ba’athist regime and the loss of influence of its allies, Russia and Iran, in Syria.

Syria is currently a divided country suffering from sectarian and social rifts, caused by the Ba’ath regime and now deepened by the interim authority in Syria, which appears to have chosen the path of ascending from the ashes of the regimes that ruled Syria. The problem lies in the fact that each of the Syrian parties wants the political, administrative, military, and economic system in Syria to be in accordance with its own political ideology, and works to exclude all those who disagree with it. The local political and security conditions indicate that the current situation in Syria revolves around two main political trends. The first is the Islamists, with their various sects, who receive sympathy from Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Qatar. The second one is the democrats, who receive sympathy from Egypt, Iraq, and some Western countries. There is a crisis of confidence between the two trends stemming from conflicting convictions and ideologies. In general; According to a survey conducted by the Rojava Center for Strategic Studies (NRLS) on the sidelines of the “Syrian Forum for National Dialogue: Towards a Free, Pluralistic and Democratic Syria,” most Sunni religious people lean toward the first side, while Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Shiites, Christians, Yazidis, and Arab leftists, liberals, and moderate Sunnis lean toward the second trend.

Based on these facts, the so-called “transitional phase” that Syria is going through faces many challenges, most notably the issue of unifying the country, ending the crisis, and eliminating hate speech. However, on the contrary, the jihadist factional mentality still dominates the military doctrine of many leaders of the interim authority (41 ). The policy pursued by the Syrian Interim Authority is the same as that followed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to control Idlib and form the Salvation Government (42). It dissolved a number of factions between 2018 and 2020, most notably Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Izza, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Jaysh al-Sunna, and others. Most of the Idlib factions were given the choice between integration, deportation, or surrender. Furthermore, the constitutional declaration announced by the interim authority, adopting Islam as the sole source of legislation and granting the head of state unlimited powers, is the closest thing to the constitution of a Sunni Islamic emirate. Therefore, Sectarian tension has numerous repercussions for the reunification of Syria, hinders the building of a Syrian national identity, and reinforces divisions among various religious sects. This crisis is fueled by the international community’s attempts to build trust with the Syrian Interim Authority and accept most of its domestic policies, which contravene the spirit of international human rights conventions. On the other hand, some countries with hegemonic agendas may have an interest in keeping Syria militarily weak, geographically divided, and in economic and political crisis, both to defend their national security and to control the country’s resources. Three countries with these agendas stand out in this context: Turkey, Iran, and Israel. Based on the above, sectarian tension has serious negative effects on the new Syria, and is being experienced on the ground despite some media outlets’ attempts to downplay it. The most prominent causes of this tension are:

1. It reinforces the division between Syrian sects., increasing ideological extremism, sectarian violence, and the lack of security and safety.
2. It prevents the building of a cohesive Syrian national identity and reinforces political divisions.
3. It reproduces a new authoritarian regime and causes the continuation of the policy of suppressing freedoms and human rights pursued by successive regimes in Syria.
4. It exacerbates the country’s economic and social crisis and prevents the achievement of transitional justice.
5. It strengthens the moral bonds between communities on both sides of the borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its annexes in various parts of the Syrian state. This was clearly demonstrated by the visits of Druze delegations to their Druze relatives in northern Israel, the refuge of Alawites with their Alawite relatives in northern Lebanon, and the growing sense of belonging among Kurds and their Kurdish relatives in northern and southern Kurdistan, in parallel with the growing sense of belonging among Kurds inside Syria and in northern and eastern Syria, in addition to the growing sense of belonging among Arab communities with Arab communities in Iraq and Jordan.

Conclusion:

The regime has fallen, and the Syrian crisis continues to escalate. The situation mirrors the proverb, “The oppressor has fallen, but oppression remains.” The nation-state system has proven its failure to build a human civilization, achieve peace and prosperity, and create a cohesive country in many Middle Eastern countries, most notably Syria. This regime bears the greatest responsibility for the sectarian tension and violence witnessed in Syria. Despite this, extremist organizations continue to adhere to this regime’s approach, seeking to subjugate everyone to its authority and then assimilate them into its ideological or sectarian approach. Therefore, a sectarian mentality cannot build a state of citizenship or a strong state without exterminating others who are different and opposed. Ultimately, sectarianism destroys the state of citizenship and tears apart homelands and societies. Civilization cannot be built under its shadow, as it revolves around the principle of “either us or them.”

Many powerful countries, such as the United States, France, Germany, and others, have overcome this problem. However, countries that follow a sectarian approach, such as Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon, remain unable to protect their internal cohesion. Undoubtedly, the migration of thousands of people from various sects from sectarian countries to Western countries and their integration into their societies is a strong indicator that societies are convinced that sectarian regimes cannot build a human civilization, that they are incapable of resolving crises, responding to scientific developments, and confronting environmental disasters, and that their destiny is to perpetuate violence in order to maintain their dominance.

In Syria, sectarian tension is a reality, but it is not a fate that Syrians must endure. At the same time, sectarian tensions cannot be ended without external support and without stopping regional states from inciting sectarian strife. The responsibility for internal peace lies primarily with the social elites of all sects. This must be achieved through adopting a national reconciliation policy, refraining from invoking past grudges in social education, rejecting sectarian extremism, and criminalizing hate speech. The experience of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in relatively neutralizing ethnic tensions between Kurds and Arabs, while simultaneously distancing itself from the sectarian conflict in Syria, serves as evidence that such peace is possible.

One may find it difficult to end the sectarian tension that has plagued hundreds of years of conflict, but based on the experience of the religious wars in Europe and the two world wars, it is not impossible. In our time, consensual democracy, based on a social contract, can achieve this, in accordance with the principles of separating religion from politics and science, ensuring human rights, and achieving human security. The intention here is not to marginalize a specific group for the welfare of another, but rather to make internal peace a source of strength for the country. For example, the state can be Islamic, in accordance with the “charter of Medina,” which the Prophet concluded with the communities of Yathrib—that is, an Islamic administration, not an Islamic authority. The state can also be democratic, in accordance with the principles of citizenship and communal life—that is, a democratic administration, not majority rule. In general, there is also a great responsibility on the part of human rights and democracy advocates, whether states or organizations, to stop sectarian conflicts in Syria. This serves a significant global purpose by achieving international peace and security. Peace in Syria would end or weaken the activities of extremist organizations such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Shiite and Baathist extremists in many countries. All countries could achieve significant gains in Syria; despite its small size, every country has a stake in the country.

o Sources and references.

1. Dr. Bashir Zein Al-Abidin; The Army and Politics in Syria (1918-2000); First Edition/2008 AD; Publisher: Dar Al-Jabiya/London – Britain;
2. ج.ب. سيغال؛ الرّها: المدينة المباركة؛ ترجمة: يوسف إبراهيم جبرا؛ الطبعة الأولى/1988؛ الناشر: دار الرها للنشر/ حلب؛
3. A message from the Emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Baghdadi, to the Kurds; link: https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/18/182C359B079FFB1A37BC363768E9FFB7.pdf

4- Samuel Huntington; The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of World Order; Translated by: Talat Al-Shaib; No edition number; Publisher: Hindawi Foundation – York House – United Kingdom/ 2024;

-5د. عبد القادر عبد العالي؛ التصدّعات الاجتماعية وتأثيرها في النظام الحزبي الإسرائيلي؛ الطبعة الأولى/ 2010؛ الناشر: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية/ بيروت؛

-6عبدالله أوج آلان؛ من دولة الكهنة السومرية نحو الحضارة الديمقراطية/ الجزء الأول؛ الناشر: دار شلير للطباعة والنشر/ قامشلو- شمال وشرق سوريا؛ بلارقم طبعة.

7- الإمام محمد بن عمر الواقدي؛ تاريخ فتوح الجزيرة والخابور وديار بكر والعراق؛ تحقيق: بد العزيز حرفوش؛ الناشر: دار البشائر للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع/ دمشق/ 1996؛ بلا رقم طبعة.

-8د. مصطفى حجازي؛ التخلف الاجتماعي: مدخل إلى سيكولوجية الإنسان المقهور؛ الطبعة التاسعة/2005؛ الناشر: المركز الثقافي العربي/ الدار البيضاء- المغرب

9. Michel Seurat; Syria, the Savage State; translated by: Amal Sara and Mark Bialo; first edition/2017; publisher: Arab Network for Research and Publishing – Beirut.

10. Dr. Nicholas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo
11. Heather M. Robinson et al., Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States; Publisher: RAND Corporation/California/2018; no edition number;

 Link: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1681/RAND_RR1681z1.arabic.pdf

 Research Centers:

1. King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; The Issue of Minorities in Syria: From Ban to Overwhelming Presence; Publisher: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Rabi’an 1438 AH (December 2016-January 2017).
2. Future for Advanced Research and Studies; Reproducing Chaos: Why Are “National Salvation” Governments Failing in the Arab Region? Publication Date: February 26, 2018; Link:

https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/3742/نسخ-الفوضى-لماذا-تفشل-حكومات-النجاح-الوطني-في-المنطقة-العربي

 Encyclopedias:

1. The Political Encyclopedia (electronic)
2. Wikipedia (the free encyclopedia).

 Human Rights Reports:

1. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; Thousands Missing and Hundreds of Unidentified Bodies… Massacres and Violations on the Coast Have Not Ended; Publication Date: March 22, 2025; Link:

https://www.syriahr.com/آلاف-المفقودين-ومئات-الجثث-المجهولة-م/754056/

2. Amnesty International; Syria: Horrific Killings of Civilians on the Northwest Coast Must Be Investigated; Publication Date: March 11, 2025; Link:

https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2025/03/syria-horrific-killings-of-civilians-on-northwest-coast-must-be-investigated

3. Human Rights Watch; Northeast Syria: Apparent War Crimes by Turkey-Backed Forces; Published: January 30, 2025; Link:

https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2025/01/30/northeast-syria-apparent-war-crime-turkiye-backed-forces

 News reports.

1. Ahmad Sourani; “Salvation Government” in Idlib Faces Widespread Popular Rejection; Publisher: Noon Post; Published: March 25, 2018; Link:

https://www.noonpost.com/22623/

2. Politics; Israel threatens to intervene militarily in Syria “if the regime attacks the Druze in the suburb of Jaramana”; Publication date: 03/02/2025; Link:

https://alseyassah.com/article/432934/Israel-threatened-to-intervene-militarily-in-Syria-if-the-regime-attacks-the-Druze-in-the-suburb-of-Jaramana/

3. Arabi21/London; Druze reject the entry of “Operations Command” forces into Sweida and threaten to resort to federalism; Publication date: 01/04/2025; Link:

https://arabi21.com/story/1652244/دروز-يرفضون-دخول-قوات-قيادة-العمليات-إلى-السويداء-ويهددون-باللجوء-للفيدرالية

 

-4كلاوديا منده؛ مسيحيو سوريا: خوف من القادم و”حرج” من مواقف الكنائس من الأسد؛ الناشر: موقع DW؛ تاريخ النشر: 2025.03.23؛ الرابط:

https://www.dw.com/ar/مسيحيو-سوريا-خوف-من-القادم-وحرج-من-مواقف-الكنائس-من-الأسد/a-71992967

* Social rift: a social division and conflict stemming from certain structural contradictions in society. It develops through the presence of conflicting groups whose interests are fundamentally opposing…

Dr. Abdul Qader Abdul Ali; Social Rifts and Their Impact on the Israeli Party System; First Edition/2010; Publisher: Center for Arab Unity Studies/Beirut; p. 56.

[1] صامويل هنتنجون؛ صدام الحضارات: إعادة صنع النظام العالمي؛ ترجمة: طلعت الشايب؛ بلا رقم طبعة؛ الناشر: مؤسسة هنداوي- يورك هاوس- المملكة المتحدة/ 2024؛ ص43.

[2]  إلهام ناصر؛ الطائفية- Sectarianism؛ الناشر: الموسوعة السياسية؛ الرابط:

https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/الطائفية

[3] Such as the conflict between the Sumerian city-states, the conflict between Akhenaten and the priests, the Persian split from the Medes, which manifested itself in the conflict between the Persian faction of Darius, son of Cambyses, and the Zoroastrian Medes priests, and Mani’s revolt against the Persian priests. The political history of Islam is replete with examples…

For more on the nature of this conflict, see: Abdullah Oj Alan, From the Sumerian Priestly State to Democratic Civilization / Part One; Publisher: Shiller Printing and Publishing House / Qamishli – North and East Syria; no edition number.

[4] سيغال؛ الرّها: المدينة المباركة؛ ترجمة: يوسف إبراهيم جبرا؛ الطبعة الأولى/1988؛ الناشر: دار الرها للنشر/ حلب؛ ص 117.

[5] See: Heather M. Robinson et al., Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States; Publisher: RAND Corporation, California, 2018; no edition number; Link:

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1681/RAND_RR1681z1.arabic.pdf

* The master-slave dialectic is a central thing in German philosopher Georg Friedrich Hegel’s 1807 book, “The Phenomenology of Spirit.” Hegel explains this matter by talking about the existence of two self-consciousnesses within humans that confront each other and view the other through themselves. He uses abstraction to discuss two types of self-consciousness: master consciousness versus slave consciousness. Hegel seeks to explain the differences between the master and slave consciousnesses, the dialectic between them, and how they interact reciprocally… Wikipedia; Master-slave dialectic.

6 في الحالة السورية انظر: د. نيقولاس فان دام؛ الصراع على السلطة في سوريا: الطائفية والعشائرية في السياسة (1961- 1995)؛ بلا مترجم؛ الطبعة الأولى/2006؛ الناشر: مكتبة مدبولي/ القاهرة؛ ص20

7 See: Heather M. Robinson et al., Sectarianism in the Middle East: Implications for the United States; Publisher: RAND Corporation/California/2018; no edition number; p. 3; link

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1681/RAND_RR1681z1.arabic.pdf

8 انظر: ج.ب. سيغال؛ الرّها: المدينة المباركة؛ ترجمة: يوسف إبراهيم جبرا؛ الطبعة الأولى/1988؛ الناشر: دار الرها للنشر/ حلب؛ ص236.

الإمام محمد بن عمر الواقدي؛ تاريخ فتوح الجزيرة والخابور وديار بكر والعراق؛ تحقيق: بد العزيز حرفوش؛ الناشر: دار البشائر للطباعة والنشر والتوزيع/ دمشق/ 1996؛ بلا رقم طبعة

9 . د. مصطفى حجازي؛ التخلف الاجتماعي: مدخل إلى سيكولوجية الإنسان المقهور؛ الطبعة التاسعة/2005؛ الناشر: المركز الثقافي العربي/ الدار البيضاء- المغرب؛ ص98

10 For more see: previous reference.

11 See: Dr. Nicholas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo

12 In many of his speeches, President Sadat referred to the Syrian regime as the “Alawite Baath” … In a speech on May 1, 1979, he said: “I was prepared to speak for the Jolani, but no… I will let these filthy Alawites speak for it. These people have lost all meaning in life, but, I swear, I will leave them to their people in Syria and let them solve it. We will see what they will achieve. I could have returned the Jolani to them, but I am not responsible for it as long as the Alawites are in power… We all know who the Alawites are in the eyes of the Syrian people. The Syrian people will deal with them, and after that, things will be different. Syria’s position is not suitable for us to say Syria because the Syrian people have no power in this. The position of the Alawites is well known… King Faisal of Saudi Arabia told me that Hafez al-Assad is an Alawite and a Baathist, and one of them is more cursed than the other… Faisal also told me, how can you put your hand in the hand of the Syrian Baathists? Assad is an Alawite and a Baathist, and one of them is more cursed than the other…”. The previous reference; p. 133.

13 The previous reference; p.157

14 Dr. Nicolas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo; pp. 128-140

15 . د. بشير زين العابدين؛ الجيش والسياسة في سورية (1918-2000)؛ الطبعة الأولى/2008م؛ الناشر: دار الجابية/لندن- بريطانيا؛ ص22.

16 Wikipedia: 1860؛ الرابط: https://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/مقتلة_الدروز_والموارنة_1860

17 د. بشير زين العابدين؛ الجيش والسياسة في سورية (1918-2000)؛ الطبعة الأولى/2008م؛ الناشر: دار الجابية/لندن- بريطانيا؛ ص33

18 For more, see the previous reference, p. 35.

19 Nicholas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo; p. 147.

20 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; The Issue of Minorities in Syria: From Ban to Overwhelming Presence; Publisher: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Rabi’an 1438 AH (December 2016-January 2017).

21 See: Dr. Nicholas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo.

22 Same previous reference; p. 34.

23 ميشيل سورا؛ سورية الدولة المتوحشة؛ ترجمة: أمل سارة ومارك بيالو؛ الطبعة الأولى/2017؛ الناشر: الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر- بيروت؛ ص31

24 انظر: د. بشير زين العابدين؛ الجيش والسياسة في سورية (1918-2000)؛ الطبعة الأولى/2008م؛ الناشر: دار الجابية/لندن- بريطانيا.

25 The previous reference, p. 61.

* Michel Seurat says, “The Kilani and Barazi families of Hama, along with their agents and servants, and aided by gendarmes, brutally oppressed the peasants, beating them, tying them to the tails of horses, and throwing their children naked into the snow. Many were also expelled.” Michel Seurat, Syria: The Savage State, translated by Amal Sara and Mark Bialo, first edition 2017, published by the Arab Network for Research and Publishing, Beirut, p. 55.

26 ميشيل سورا؛ سورية الدولة المتوحشة؛ ترجمة: أمل سارة ومارك بيالو؛ الطبعة الأولى/2017؛ الناشر: الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر- بيروت؛ ص33.

27 Previous reference; p. 86

28 Dr. Nicolas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo; p. 93

29 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; The Issue of Minorities in Syria: From Ban to Overwhelming Presence; Publisher: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Rabi’an 1438 AH (December 2016-January 2017).

30 Dr. Nicolas Van Dam; The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism and Tribalism in Politics (1961-1995); no translator; first edition/2006; publisher: Madbouly Library/Cairo.

** A number of inspiring leaders of the most prominent political Islamic organizations held citizenship in these countries, such as: Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Hassan al-Banna, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Khomeini, and others…

* In 1980, it was decided to send 200 Alawite students to the city of Qom to specialize in Ja’fari Shi’i jurisprudence, following the conclusion of a strategic alliance with the Iranian regime… Michel Seurat; Syria, the Savage State; translated by Amal Sara and Mark Bialo; first edition/2017; publisher: Arab Network for Research and Publishing – Beirut; p. 88.

31 Amnesty International; Syria: Horrific killings of civilians on the northwest coast must be investigated; Publication date: 2025.03.11; Link: https://www.amnesty.org/ar/latest/news/2025/03/syria-horrific-killings-of-civilians-on-northwest-coast-must-be-investigated

32 Human Rights Watch; Northeast Syria: Alleged War Crimes by Türkiye-Backed Forces; Publication Date: 2025.01.30; Link:

https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2025/01/30/northeast-syria-apparent-war-crime-turkiye-backed-forces

33 See the message of the Emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Baghdadi, to the Kurds; link:

https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/18/182C359B079FFB1A37BC363768E9FFB7.pdf

34 King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; The Issue of Minorities in Syria: From Ban to Overwhelming Presence; Rabi’an 1438 AH (December 2016-January 2017).

35 Claudia Mende; Syrian Christians: Fear of the Future and “Embarrassment” over Churches’ Positions on Assad; Publisher: DW; Publication Date: 2025.03.23; Link:

https://www.dw.com/ar/مسيحيو-سوري-خوف-من-القادم-وحرج-من-مواقف-الكناسي-من-الأسد/a-71992967

* In response to this attempt, the commander of the Druze operations in the Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria, Bahaa al-Jamal, said: “There was no coordination with any of the faction leaders in the operations room, nor with His Eminence the Sheikh al-Aql. We found that the timing was inappropriate, and people were busy with New Year’s celebrations, so they entered the area in a deceptive and malicious manner without informing anyone. We reject this.” He added, “We will not allow any organization or faction, regardless of its size, to impose decisions on us or interfere in the south, where we have an effective presence and a fundamental role.”

Arabi21/London; Druze reject the entry of “Operations Command” forces into Suwayda and threaten to resort to federalism; Publication date: 01/04/2025; Link:

https://arabi21.com/story/1652244/دروز-يرفضون-دخل-قوات-قيادة-العمليات-إلى-السويدة-ويحددون-باللتجؤ-للفيدرالية

36 Politics; Israel threatens to intervene militarily in Syria “if the regime attacks the Druze in the suburb of Jaramana”; Publication date: 03/02/2025; Link:

https://alseyassah.com/article/432934/Israel-threatens-to-intervene-militarily-in-Syria-if-the-regime-attacks-the-Druze-in-the-suburb-of-Jaramana

37 ميشيل سورا؛ سورية الدولة المتوحشة؛ ترجمة: أمل سارة ومارك بيالو؛ الطبعة الأولى/2017؛ الناشر: الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر- بيروت؛ ص166.

** Government channels on Telegram urged people to head to the coast to “support our brothers,” but this rhetoric quickly changed, with officials later confirming that volunteers were not needed…

Human Rights Watch; Northeast Syria: Alleged War Crimes by Turkey-Backed Forces; Publication date: 2025.01.30; Link: https://www.hrw.org/ar/news/2025/01/30/northeast-syria-apparent-war-crime-turkiye-backed-forces

40 Bashir Zein Al-Abidin; The Army and Politics in Syria (1918-2000); First Edition/2008; Publisher: Dar Al-Jabiya/London-Britain; p. 25.

41 Future for Advanced Research and Studies; Reproducing Chaos: Why Do National Salvation Governments Fail in the Arab Region? Publication Date: 26 February 2018; Link:

https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/3742/Reproducing-Chaos-Why-Do-National-Salvation-Governments-Fail-in-the-Arab-Region

42 Ahmed Al-Sourani; The “Salvation Government” in Idlib Faces Widespread Popular Rejection; Publisher: Noon Post; Publication Date: March 25, 2018; Link:

https://www.noonpost.com/22623/