Dimensions of Turkish FM statements on Syrian crisis

Speaking to reporters on the final day of the 13th Ambassadors Conference in Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said that he had held a brief chat with his Syrian counterpart Faisal Mekdad, during the meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in the Serbian capital Belgrade, which took place on October 11, 2021. “We have to somehow bring opposition and the regime in Syria together to reach an agreement. Otherwise, there will be no lasting peace,” Çavuşoğlu said. It is not surprising for the Turkish state as is the case with the Syrian opposition, but on the popular side, massive demonstrations took place in most of the cities under Turkish occupation.

The Turkish state is now reviewing its calculations according to a purely pragmatic vision, especially in the political, military and economic files in which it deals with the Arab countries, emphasizing that any of them is different from the other. Turkish-Egyptian relations were not at their best with the explicit support of the Turkish state for the Muslim Brotherhood to reach power in the wake of the September revolution in Egypt in 2011. The situation was repeated with Saudi Arabia against the backdrop of the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey, and in Libya where it supported the Government of National Accord by confronting the forces of Major General Khalifa Haftar, in a dispute over legitimacy and authority in the oil-rich country.

It is noticeable in the Turkish motives for this volatile political programming in the region, that it wants to consider itself – according to its claim – after losing regional leadership, which is shown by the Arab popular decline of the Turkish role as a factor of crisis and discord rather than a positive factor, in addition to its attempt to restore its faltering economy, as a result of inflation which strikes the Turkish lira at the expense of its interference in the internal affairs of countries.

In Syria, it cannot be said that the Turkish state behaves according to the same policy it pursues with the aforementioned Arab countries, but rather it moves according to the proverb “I kill the person and walk his funeral.” After all the dilemmas it caused, starting with the de-escalation agreement and Astana and then Sochi in the political aspect, and its military intervention in Syria on the military aspect, in addition to supporting ISIS by all means of weapons and equipment, Turkey reaped the fruits of its intervention in the areas seized by multiple times of money, resources and wealth. There is no doubt if the theft of collectible, antiques, equipment and machinery of laboratories and industrial or commercial companies is listed, the matter may not end to this extent, but rather amount to theft issues at the state level.

The protests that took place under the title “No Reconciliation” were in the areas under the Turkish occupation in response to the statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. These protests have created the ground for normalization or rapprochement between Turkey and Syria with Russian support against the backdrop of the recent Astana and Sochi meetings, but the Syrian popular position prevails in a state of anticipation or caution over the unknown. This leads us to the following:

1- If there is a rapprochement or normalization between the presidents of the Turkish and Syrian countries, as promoted by media or social networking sites, this means the rehabilitation of the regime, which considers this a diplomatic victory in light of its attempt to return to the Arab League or to correct its relations with some countries, including Turkey in particular, especially since it is aware of the difficulty of restoring the lands Turkey occupies by military action only, except according to the Russian vision of the Syrian solution, which goes away from military action, in addition to its desire to show its restoration of international legitimacy by reducing the distances and tense diplomatic relations with some countries, especially if its calculations include that the return of refugees from Turkey to the Syrian state may increase its international position, especially if we take into account that the return of Syrian refugees has become acceptable to Turkey in the recent period as well.

2- Taking such step by the Turkish state in its delinquency to end disputes with neighboring Syria shows that it won a deal during its recent meetings in Astana and Sochi, which prompted it to soften the tone, especially when it was demanding, with the start of the Syrian revolutionary movement, the necessity of Assad’s departure and then to ease the speech shortly after to the necessity of finding a political solution for Syria and then surprising everyone recently about its desire to conclude reconciliation with Syria. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Turkey swallowed the Russian bait according to the language of politics by dragging it around its muddy stadium, this is what Turkey wants now that the refugee issue has become a political burden on it and in a stronger economic way.

3- It seems that the Syrian opposition, both political and armed, is in the weakest condition ever after the Turkish coup against itself in view of the media tone that was once promoting as a supporter of the Syrians in their plight and the Turkish land is ready to receive the Syrians. If this is thorny, the opposition will be faced with vague options after failing to abide by the following determinants:

a. The opposition has completely entrusted itself to the Turkish state, whether inside or outside Syria, in the form of mercenaries, which contradicts the true patriotic feeling that all Syrians reject; by harming the people and the land.

2. The opposition’s lack of a political project, which made it a scattered and self-limited splinter, whether at the level of political or military vision as well.

3. The Syrians lost their confidence in the opposition after its inability to achieve any political progress that would fulfill all their demands.

4. The opposition did not accept the calls made by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) to sit at the dialogue table.

In sum, if the Syrian opposition wants to save itself from its predicament and get out of it with the least damage and losses, it has only to return to the above-mentioned determinants before the Syrian regime devours it with one bite at a time and returns from its political disappointment with nostalgia.

Returning to the statement of the Turkish Foreign Minister, in which he singled out the Syrian opposition and caused a state of popular upheaval in the areas under Turkish occupation, although it is impossible for them to do this procedure without any return or to obtain a deal, and based on the above, what is the case for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) regarding the declaration: Are they immune from everything that is going on, and what should they do about it?

In fact, it is not possible to distance ourselves from the political developments that knock on our door without paying attention to what they want from us or what we want from them both. Accordingly, the Turkish state appears to be in the context of its review of the political reading of its relationship with the Syrian regime at the governmental and popular levels; demanding the restoration of relations between both countries.

Based on the foregoing, the AANES should take these hot political developments seriously and look at their possible repercussions from all angles, which in one way or another can be determined according to a number of tracks, as follows:

1. The Turkish track: The Turkish regime never ceases to declare its hostility to the AANES, even if it costs it a contract of rapprochement with the Syrian regime, which was once openly hostile as well. The Turkish policy is aware of the reality of the democratic nation’s project, which establishes a single solution to all the issues of the region, including the internal issues of the Turkish state, chief among them; the issue of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, and thus the solution of the Kurdish issue, which is divided into their freedom of identity, belief, political representation and political participation, and because Turkey does not want this, it is fighting the Kurds, not inside Turkey, but abroad by concluding a reconciliation with the Syrian regime according to the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” to pressure the AANES, and perhaps to geopolitically besiege it, to be able to collect more papers, primarily; pushing the American forces to withdraw after everyone reconciled. Then, there will be no justification for the presence of these forces as long as Syrian sovereignty has returned to square one.

2. The Syrian track: The Syrian regime is well aware that the international community has no confidence in its presence on the pyramid of power in light of its reluctance to a political solution, in accordance with the Geneva provisions, so it resorts to a policy of showing flexibility with its traditional opponents, including; the Turkish state, of course. The Syrian regime is reaping through its rapprochement with the Turkish state an economic openness with the huge agricultural potentials that these areas possess in the occupied city of Afrin, for example, and it relieves it of the economic hardship it is experiencing now, and thus it meets with the Turkish regime in the same economic orientation apart from benefiting from funds of the expatriates, which, if this happened, generate money in hard currency, which is needed in this difficult time, as well as stifling the opposition more, especially if this matter is in their own backyard. It is clear that the rapprochement between the two countries is not new. Since 2017, there has been talk about the existence of “indirect” relations between the Turkish and Syrian regimes, despite the two parties denying this. Later, the two states began to admit that there was “intelligence coordination” between the intelligence services on security files. Five years later, emerged the Iranian Foreign Minister’s talk about Tehran’s efforts to “remove tensions between Ankara and Damascus,” until recent Turkish official statements came, which may indicate the restoration of relations between the two countries.

3. The Russian track: Russia seeks to play the role of a traffic policeman in Syria with all parties, as it is still increasing its profitability due to its explicit support for the regime politically, militarily and economically. As for the Turkish state, it is trying to co-opt it as a political pawn in front of the West, especially since it is a member of NATO that supports Ukraine and desires it to use it whenever it wants. As for the Autonomous Administration, it will be within the reach of Russia’s attempts to gain more fruits, driven by the fact that it is the only player who secures its safety – according to its claim – in the region.

4. The American track: Although the United States of America (USA) believes that Assad has not yet fulfilled his international political obligations with regard to the Geneva provisions, it requires for his survival to initiate a comprehensive political process in the presence of all Syrian parties, and this has not happened now. This American condition makes any attempts to normalize with any party, whether people, companies or countries, fraught with risks, especially that there are sanctions affecting those who do so, not to mention that the American presence, within the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS is considered a center of gravity in the region now, makes normalization between the Turkish and Syrian regimes, it does not have a significant impact on the areas of the Autonomous Administration, although it is difficult to be certain that there are no possible repercussions as well.

5. The AANES track: It is clear that the statements of the Turkish Foreign Minister about his country’s intention to reconcile with the Syrian regime, is related to the following statement: “There is no enemy in politics.” The Autonomous Administration is facing radical political changes in the region. As a result of changing international alliances, especially after the Russian-Ukrainian war, the European shift in the energy field to the Middle East, the Iraqi and Lebanese crises, the faltering Iranian nuclear file, and Turkey’s attempts to revive ISIS in Syria, confirms that nothing is fixed in politics. On the other hand, the AANES is actively seeking to promote the democratic nation’s project among the various segments of the people, as the main base for confronting any external projects that threaten the AANES by intensifying lectures and seminars. In the event that an axis against the AANES is formed by the guarantors of Astana, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Global Coalition may raise the level of their relations to the level of a strategic partnership not only in the military field, but in the other field such as the political sphere, for example. The strategic partnership is a strong factor for the SDC in any political process, and its impact will be positively reflected in any future negotiations, in addition to trying to expand its diplomatic relations, especially in the active Arab environment, because of its great role in influencing the region in general.