ISIS Crises in Syria

• Introduction

Syria lies at the axis of crises between East and West. The conflict within it has been characterized as a struggle between different opposing, conflicting, and contradictory ideologies with regional and international dimensions, resulting from political and economic crises and the hegemonic ambitions of states, political entities, and extremist organizations. This conflict influenced and is affected by the conflicts and crises witnessed by some Middle Eastern countries. Its scene is often dominated by the operational activity of ISIS, which has become one of the tools of destruction in the process of rebuilding the regional system in the Middle East and perhaps in other geographies. It has reserved an important place for itself in most security and political research and analyses, and has crystallized as a symbol of evil in the cultural heritage of local communities that have suffered from its horror, just as their ancestors suffered from the Mongols.

The organization (ISIS) has retreated in Syria and Iraq, and its remnants have been scattered among detention centers and hiding places in various regions. This is a result of its flawed approach, its brutal treatment of anyone who rejects its doctrine or differs from its beliefs, and its failure to keep up with its opponents, some of whom are more than 1,400 years ahead of it in civilization.

Syria is one of the arenas where the organization, in its current form, is facing difficulty in achieving its strategy of building its own authority pyramid under the name of the “Islamic State” in the area extending between Dabiq (*), Kirkuk, Baghdad and Damascus. The reason is the security conditions of the environments in which it is currently present. In northern Syria, the organization is subject to the conditions of Turkish intelligence, as Turkey is an occupying power according to Article (42) of the Hague Regulations of 1907([1]), which appears to have allowed the organization’s cells freedom of action as long as their activity is focused only on attacking civilian and military targets in the north and east of Syria. In the Syrian Badia, the organization has been carrying out, from time to time, surprise attacks against Syrian regime forces or affiliated armed groups from deep within the Badia. With the collapse of the Ba’ath regime, the organization appears to have withdrawn into itself to study the new security and political landscape in Syria, especially with the emergence of two new rivals in the Badia, represented by ‘’Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’’ and the ‘’Free Syrian Army’’ faction. However, the organization has become known for its mastery of the tactic of immersing itself in crises and tensions, and exploiting any opportunity to turn the situation in its favor. The best evidence of this is the dozens of members of its cells carrying independence flags in Deir ez-Zor and its countryside after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, as well as the fact that its groups launched attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces in coordination with Ba’athist cells. In southern Syria, the organization and the regime appeared to be more understanding, as reports indicate indirect coordination between them through the organization’s members who underwent security settlements in Daraa during 2018 and 2021, particularly those present in the Yarmouk Basin area. This was achieved through the assassination war waged against groups opposed to the Syrian regime and opposed to ISIS. Now, the security and political landscape in this region has also changed. The regime’s army has withdrawn, Israeli forces have entered parts of it, and local factions have become stronger than before. Meanwhile, in northern and eastern Syria, ISIS faces greater difficulties due to the close ties between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the international coalition, as well as the participation of local communities in the management of their security affairs with the Autonomous Administration. The organization finds itself forced to manage its activities within dormant cells that carry out attacks against whatever easy targets it can find and then exaggerate their description.

This new form of combat doctrine stems from the group’s shifts in strategy following its defeat in Baghouz in 2019. The failure of its project to establish an Islamic state in accordance with the approach of its leader, al-Baghdadi, along with the changing security situation in Syria and Iraq, the deaths of several prominent first-line leaders, and the success of some of its branches in establishing a foothold in the Lake Chad Basin and Afghanistan, all of which necessitated their need for additional personnel and funding. Anyone following the organization’s propaganda and practices on the ground can notice that the organization is engaged in a struggle for existence and survival, and has begun to pay greater attention to its combat operations in its propaganda, and less to its political project, especially after it kept secret the identity of its new leader, “Abu Hafs al-Qurashi.” On the other hand, it seems that the organization is finding it difficult to adapt to the increased pace of rebuilding the regional order in the region after the Gaza War and the fall of the Ba’ath regime, and to exploit what is happening as moral energy for staffing, increasing sources of funding, and carrying out operations. This is in addition to the security and political developments that have become evident in the ability of the Iraqi forces to rely on themselves in pursuing the organization based on the decision to withdraw the international coalition forces from Iraq in 2025, and the emergence of a new authority in Damascus that was not in the organization’s calculations, which will force it to reconsider its strategy that it followed in its fight against the regime forces and the factions loyal to Iran and Russia, and the increased ability of the Syrian Democratic Forces to discover the organization’s cells and arrest or eliminate them based on their resources( *)and their emergence as a local force guaranteeing the continued defeat of the organization(*) .All of these developments point to an evolution in the conflict environment in Syria at a time when the organization is suffering from infiltration within its ranks, weak funding for its activities, a mobilization failure, and increasing alienation from local communities. This clearly indicates that the organization is experiencing major crises in Syria. It has become clear that it is no longer able to impose its geographic hegemony, and it is constantly losing its members and leaders in Syria. It has been unable to regain the initiative seven years after losing control of Raqqa, which it had adopted as its capital, and after its gradual collapse. This is roughly the same period of time that the organization needed to rise in 2014, since the founding of the parent organization, the “Islamic State of Iraq”, in 2006.

This research presents a relatively new reading of ISIS’s organizational and operational situation in Syria. This approach suggests that ISIS faces a “survival challenge,” contrary to numerous reports and studies that portray ISIS as a “strategically intelligent” force. These studies are based on inaccurate approaches to local communities, the autonomous administration, and the evolution of the conflict environment in Syria. Most analyses of ISIS’s activities and movements are based on inaccurate data, or a lack of comprehensive and accurate understanding of the phenomenon. They rely on interpretations of events published in the media and reports by international organizations, drawing a general assessment from them, as opposed to any assessment based on spatial and temporal proximity to the event. This leads us to the dilemma of “survival bias (*),” where the focus is on the organization’s active status and the exclusion of its many failures. On the other hand, it seems useful to focus on the organization’s fragmentation across three main regions in Syria, and its need to adopt three types of security and political approaches (security and political doctrine) specific to each region: This requires changes in the organizational level of its entity.

o ISIS amidst ideological conflicts in Syria

Most political, economic and social studies and research with a historical dimension intersect at a point represented by the fact that ideological conflicts are the cause of the emergence of the phenomenon of states in the Middle East, such as the ancient Assyrian state, which declared the god “Ashur” the main god of the state after removing the god Marduk, the god of the Babylonian state, and the state of Alexander the Great (336 to 323), which worked to impose the Hellenistic culture on the East, and the Byzantine state (1453-324), which separated from Rome as a result of sectarian differences, and the Islamic Caliphate state (661-632) after the victory of the monotheistic faith over the pagan faith, and the Fatimid state (1171-909)… etc. In our contemporary history, the nation-states that emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; This process continues to this day, as any observer of political events can discern the political doctrine of the conflicting parties, whether states or organizations. There is always a party working to fuse another party with its ideology to establish a state system or expand its state. Therefore, ideological conflicts of an “authoritarian nature” constitute the fundamental feature of the global security landscape, and this can be confirmed by studying the circumstances surrounding the fall of the Ba’ath regime.

Since its founding, the Syrian state has been experiencing this conflict between Islamists and nationalists. This conflict expanded with the loss of many areas from the control of the Syrian regime and the migration of dozens of extremists to Syria after 2011. With the fall of the Baathist regime, the process of this conflict has reached a state in our current time in which five active forces are emerging in the Syrian crisis, each with its own ideological project, namely:

1. Remnants of the Ba’ath regime: Despite the announcement of the regime’s fall, thousands of its supporters will not abandon its extremist nationalist ideology (the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party), whose minds have been programmed with racist ideas for decades. This can be seen in their riding the wave of Syrians’ celebrations of the regime’s fall and their attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces motivated by ethnic hatred. The regime’s approach to resolving the country’s crisis has been based on this ideology, having shifted from a defensive stance to an offensive one, alongside Russia and Iran. In Syria’s new political situation, these individuals will likely be a major factor in destabilizing the country and inciting nationalist and religious strife, alongside ISIS cells, similar to the party’s experience in Iraq. In parallel, the party will continue to engage in conspiratorial operations (* )against the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration. Its political doctrine considers Syria a secular Arab state and a part of the Arab world. This term gained popularity among Arab nationalists in the twentieth century, who were influenced by the nation-states of Europe. The party not only denied the rights of non-Arab peoples but also worked to melt them into the crucible of Arab nationalism. In the 1970 and 1980, the party engaged in a bloody conflict with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and the conflict between them was renewed in the context of the current Syrian crisis. However, the direction of its conflict shifted toward the Salafists in Idlib after it appeased the Brotherhood through Turkish-Russian-Iranian deals at the Astana and Sochi meetings. At present, the remnants of the Ba’athist regime will work to absorb the shock of their fall and attempt to adapt to the new situation. We may witness a repetition of the Iraqi Ba’ath experience and the birth of a hybrid Syrian organization that combines nationalist and extremist ISIS ideology. This will pave the way for ideological struggles through a multi-front armed conflict against a number of political Islamist organizations and democratic forces.
2. The Muslim Brotherhood: Its ideology is based on the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, regardless of the identity of the potential caliph. This stems from the fact that the parent organization of the group was founded on March 22, 1928, in reaction to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1923. As it was considered an extension of the Arab Islamic caliphate. This completely contradicted the Wahhabi ideology that emerged in the mid-eighteenth century in the Arabian Peninsula, which challenged the legitimacy of the so-called “Ottoman Caliphate.” It appears that the group is still following the path of its predecessors through its declared alliance with the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey and the State of Qatar, and through its pragmatism in its relations with the West, which the group’s supporters describe in their political-religious discourse as the “infidel West” to achieve the group’s political goals. The two parties (Turkey and Qatar) coordinated their efforts to ensure the group’s control over a number of Arab countries, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, and Syria. However, they have largely failed. The group’s political project is to resolve the Syrian crisis by establishing an Arab-Turkish Islamic state, in which the Kurds, Syriacs, Salafists, nationalists, and secular democrats are excluded. Its bloody, unjustified attack on the Shahba and Manbij cantons, and the displacement of their residents without apparently coordinating with Operation ‘’Deterring of Aggression’’, points to this reality. Its political project is clearly evident in the political, security, economic, social, and educational situation it is managing in the Turkish-occupied areas of northern Syria behind the facade of the “interim government.” Because its political stance aligns with Turkish policy, it has shifted from an offensive stance against the Ba’athist regime’s forces to a defensive stance, in line with Turkish-Russian understandings.
3. Salafist organizations: They tended to focus mainly on Idlib and its countryside and the western countryside of Aleppo, after their failure to manage the battles and the political process in the rest of the Syrian regions where they were present, and their submission to the settlements formulated by the Astana and Sochi meetings since 2017. These organizations were divided between a Syrian current and a current affiliated with the so-called “Global Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders,” which has been led by Al-Qaeda since 1998(*). The Syrian movement is represented by ‘’Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’’ (HTS), which manages the political, security, economic, social, and educational situation in the areas under its control behind the facade of the “Salvation Government,” and currently the “Transitional Government” in Damascus. To repel ground attacks by regime forces, the organization has fortified itself with Turkish military points on the front lines with the Ba’athist regime and its allies. These points were established under security understandings called the “de-escalation zone,” based on an agreement between Turkish President (Erdogan) and his Russian counterpart (Putin) in the Black Sea resort of Sochi in September 2018(2). Therefore, many politicians refer to it as the “Erdogan-Putin zone.” After the fall of the Ba’athist regime, HTS took control of most of the areas previously under regime control and is moving toward becoming the official authority in Damascus. The political project currently ostensibly to resolve the Syrian crisis is to establish a Sunni state in Syria that implements Islamic law and is not hostile to the West.
4. ISIS: This organization is considered the third generation of extremist organizations (the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda) that emerge in Syria. Currently, its strength is mainly concentrated in the Syrian Badia, it has numerous cells operating covertly in northern Syria, which is under Turkish occupation, and in northern and eastern Syria. This follows its failure to manage political, military, security, and social operations in the areas it previously controlled in Syria and Iraq. From time to time, the groups carry out surprise attacks against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and previously against the forces of the Ba’athist regime and its allies. They have not yet expressed a position on the fall of the Ba’athist regime, and it appears that they attempted to capitalize on the collapse of the regime’s forces in the Badia. However, the intervention of the international coalition and the SDF has relatively thwarted their attempts, and no attacks have been recorded in northern Syria, which is under Turkish occupation.

The organization remains committed to its political project of establishing an “Islamic Caliphate,” in accordance with its exclusionary ideology. This represents the fourth element in the ideological conflict between the main political Islamist movements—the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and the Shiites—in their quest to establish authority over Muslims based on their respective ideologies. The organization follows pragmatism in managing its relations with some Islamist forces. This is evident in its presence in northern Syria, where most of its leaders were killed during international coalition strikes. It is also evident in its permission, before the fall of the regime, for the Baathist regime and its allies to trade through the desert in exchange for tribute. There is a problem with describing ISIS as a Syrian organization, given its strategy of combining the Syrian and Iraqi arenas and the Iraqi monopoly over the main leadership.

5. The Autonomous Administration: It administers the region of North and East Syria, adopting the principles of the “Democratic nation” in governing its territory in according to the social contract. Its political project for resolving the Syrian crisis is to establish “decentralized pluralistic governance” through a consensual democratic constitution that guarantees the interests of all Syrians. Its political doctrine is based on the principle of “positive neutrality ‘’ (3). It manages its political affairs through an integrated diplomatic system represented by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the Department of Foreign Relations, the Democratic Society Foundation (DEF), and other institutions. The Autonomous Administration’s ideological rejection of all forms of nationalist, religious, and sectarian extremism, and emphasizing women’s participation in the administrative system (political, military, economic, social, and cultural), and its relative adherence to democratic principles in various areas of governance and administration(* ),based on a relatively consensual social contract, places it in direct confrontation with the Syrian regime, political Islamist movements, and some regional totalitarian regimes .

These forces are engaged in ideological conflicts, with each side seeking the assistance of regional or international powers to manage its conflict. Reaching a consensus formula to resolve the crises between them is virtually impossible, as the survival of one side hinges on the demise of the others. The fall of the Ba’ath regime underscores this reality, and it explains the intractability of the Syrian crisis and the ongoing conflict.

ISIS is engaged in ideological conflicts with most of these forces, and is forced to engage in this conflict to preserve its human and financial resources and compensate for what it has lost (*). These resources play a key role in staffing, financing, operations, and consolidating power, as these forces are considered strong competitors. On the other hand, these conflicts provide the organization with an opportunity to export its internal and external crises, exploiting them as a diversionary strategy to divert followers’ attention from the organization’s major failure and divert public attention from the crises it is experiencing. At the same time, they distract its enemies with the crises it is causing, with the aim of easing the pressure on its cells. Therefore, the organization can be considered a key element in the ideological conflicts taking place in Syria, rather than a secondary player. It is in dire need of engagement for subjective and objective reasons related to the aforementioned reasons, in addition to the developments in the Syrian crisis and the weakness of the force currently dominating the Syrian Badia.

O   the spatial distribution of ISIS on the Syrian map

The crises that Iraq and Syria witnessed after 2011 caused a relative collapse in the security systems of the two states’ authorities, especially in northern and western Iraq and most of Syria. This enabled ISIS to expand into Syria through an alliance with Jabhat “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.” Following the tradition of power struggles, which are considered a fundamental feature of Islamic political history, the dispute over the organization’s leadership led to a large schism within its ranks, which was followed by the organization announcing its split from al-Qaeda. However, many Syrian jihadist groups remained within the organization’s ranks, and based on these groups, the organization acquired some of its Syrian identity and benefited from it in managing its activities and expanding outside the region.

ISIS worked to expand horizontally in Syria by integrating Syrian jihadist groups within the organization, spreading geographically, and presenting itself to local communities as a “liberator” and a “saved sect.”)*( On this basis, it began to kill anyone who did not believe in or adopt the organization’s interpretations of the Quran and religious matters, even if they were Muslims. It also worked to expand vertically by establishing its own power pyramid by attacking organizations that rejected its ideology and forcing tribes to pledge allegiance to it. In doing so, it became a key player in the Syrian political, security, and social landscape. With the exception of Kurdish, Druze, Christian, and Alawite regions, the organization had a presence in most of Syria’s geography, either directly through control, or indirectly through its affiliated cells.

After the elimination of the ISIS state in the Battle of Baghouz in the southern countryside of Deir ez-Zor in 2019, the political and social entity it had established retreated and dispersed in different directions, and its fighters were divided into three groups: the first took refuge in the Syrian Badia and the Iraqi Desert, where the US Central Command, in a statement, estimated their numbers in Syria(4 )at approximately 2,500 members. The second group surrendered to the international coalition forces and their local partners. According to the Central Command statement, their number is estimated at approximately 9,000 members, and approximately 70,000 of its social milieus in the Al-Hawl and Roj camps in Al-Jazeera Canton. The third group underwent security settlement operations in the north and east of Syria through tribal and social mediation, or by taking refuge in the areas occupied by Turkey in northern Syria, or by being present in the form of groups cooperating with the Baathist regime forces before its fall in southern Syria.

In Syria, the organization is under the command of the so-called “Blessed Land Office” (**)which also manages the ISISI operations in Iraq. It is not possible to know whether the areas occupied by Turkey in northern Syria are under this office, or whether they are under the Farouq Office, which manages the organization’s activities in Turkey. However, based on the nature of the organization’s activities in the occupied areas, which are identical to the nature of its activities in Turkey, represented by not targeting the Turkish state, which is supposed to be the organization’s close enemy and which considers the “Turkish State” to be one of its states that it does not rule, it can be believed that the two offices coordinate their actions or share in managing the organization’s activities in Syria .

In general, its armed elements and military leaders are distributed as follows:

1. In central Syria, its forces were immersed in the Syrian Badia( 5), which provides suitable military geographic components for the organization’s operations due to its weak demographic spread and lack of movement, the presence of hills, the Palmyra Mountain range, limestone caves, and tunnels built there, in addition to its relatively similar nature to the Iraqi desert. There is another geographic advantage that the ISIS benefits from, which is its location between the three vital regions in Syria: the region of northern and eastern Syria, the occupied north of Syria, and the regions of western Syria, in addition to its proximity to Jordan and Iraq. Therefore, the organization’s greatest weight is concentrated in this region, which can be considered the organization’s new stronghold and its main base in Syria. This is what gives special character to the combat operations that it carried out in this region. It was attacking convoys and points of the Baathist regime forces and the factions loyal to Iran, as well as attacking trade routes in the event of non-payment of tributes. With the fall of the regime, it appears that its cells were immersed among the armed groups that suddenly appeared in Deir ez-Zor and its countryside, which called the “Joint Operations Room” to the west of the Euphrates, and launched attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces, which intervened to expel the regime forces from Deir ez-Zor and its countryside and prevent the exploitation of the security vacuum by ISIS cells. This was in an attempt by the organization to complicate the security situation in the region. However, the communication channel between the Syrian Democratic Forces and “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” via American forces relatively thwarted this plan.

ISIS also operates in the form of local armed cells in the Daraa countryside. They have been collaborating with Ba’athist regime forces in their hostility toward local armed factions in southern Syria, which continue to support either the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda, or Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. The organization’s presence in this region is usually exposed through assassinations carried out by local factions or documented in human rights reports.

2. North and East Syria: This region constitutes a barrier separating the ISIS groups in Syria and Iraq. The organization operates secretly there, operating in the form of cells in remote rural areas and, to a lesser extent, within cities and towns. Dozens of its members and leaders are languishing in detention centers run by the Autonomous Administration with support from the International Coalition, while thousands of its members have taken refuge, mainly in the al-Hawl and Roj camps, also run by the Autonomous Administration with relative support from international organizations. In this region, ISIS cells announce their presence by launching surprise attacks on civilian targets (6 )and easily targeted military vehicles, or they are exposed through operations carried out against them by local security and military forces.
3. Northern Syria under Turkish occupation:

According to a study published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (7), Turkey has become a hub for ISIS plots and a key node in its global network. Its financial networks in Turkey provide support to the ISIS cells in Syria (8). The International Crisis Group confirmed in a study9 that ISIS is active in the areas occupied by Turkey in northern Syria, where it benefits from the miserable conditions of the displacement camps, exploits the competition between factions, and the incoherent security structure to find transit routes and temporary refuge. It operates differently in each area, depending on the policies of the controlling power:

-In the areas controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood (*), ISIS follows “Taqiyya” in managing its activities. On this basis, it appears that its members are joining the ranks of some factions loyal to the Turkish forces. The organization benefited from the good-neighborly relationship with the Turkish regime during its control of the cities of Jarabulus, al-Rai, Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) and their countryside before their liberation by the Syrian Democratic Forces. This is in addition to the common hostility towards both the Kurdish issue and the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria. The organization’s presence in this region is usually exposed through assassinations carried out by the international coalition, or through the confessions of some members of the organization’s cells who were arrested by the Syrian Democratic Forces or the Internal Security Forces, or through research and studies published by international research centers.

– In the areas of northwestern Syria controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, (**)the organization is likely operating secretly within cells, embedded among the region’s predominantly extremist Salafi milieu. Its relationship with this milieu is generally unfriendly due to its ideological differences with both al-Qaeda and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The organization’s presence in this region is usually exposed through assassinations carried out by the international coalition, which have seen the deaths of several of the organization’s leaders, or through arrests carried out by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members. During the advance of the “Deterring of Aggression Operations Room” forces to wrest western Syria from the grip of the Ba’athist regime, numerous video clips emerged showing masked or unmasked members wearing the organization’s insignia or chanting its slogans.

Anyone following the organization’s activities in these areas can notice that the organization is trying to adapt to the specific security conditions in each region, forming dormant groups that are ready to seize any opportunity provided by the deteriorating security situation to launch bloody operations that could lead to gains for the organization. This completely negates claims about its ability to withstand, its willingness to adapt to circumstances, and its ability to renew itself. Its presence is limited to desert pockets and remote areas in the form of dormant cells that occasionally become active. What keeps it going are the conspiratorial operations carried out by local, regional, and international forces against each other in the Syrian arena, and the resulting widespread poverty, lack of a sense of national belonging, and the arousal of local extremists’ feelings toward its detained members and families in the camps. All of these factors are also used by the organization in its staffing operations. Therefore, the return of peace and stability to Syria is considered the reason for the organization’s demise. What indicates this is the organization’s benefit from the Turkish airstrikes on civilian objects and military targets in the northeastern region of Syria, and the preoccupation of the SDF and internal security forces with confronting them. It launched an attack on Gweiran prison in early 2022, and later on al-Hawl camp, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. According to a statement by the US Central Command (10), “From January to June 2024, ISIS claimed responsibility for 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria. At this rate, ISIS is on track to double the total number of attacks it claimed responsibility for in 2023.” The statement emphasized that this increase in attacks indicates that the organization “is trying to reconstitute itself after several years of declining capabilities.” It is worth noting that during this period, the Turkish state and its mercenaries escalated their attacks on civilian objects and military and security facilities in the northeastern region of Syria, distracting the Syrian Democratic Forces and security forces from pursuing the organization’s cells (11). What confirms this is that the Syrian Democratic Forces were forced on 12/10/2024 to temporarily suspend their operations against the organization’s cells (12)after transferring many reinforcements to the Manbij front to repel attempts Turkish forces and their mercenaries are trying to seize control of the city and its countryside. However, when the fronts calm down, the organization hardly seems capable of carrying out its operations, based on what is being observed on the ground. This has become a given, and the same tactic has been repeated in the Daraa countryside amid the conflict between local factions and the Baathist regime forces. It seems that the organization is anticipating similar conditions in northwestern Syria.

Based on the above, the Syrian Badia has become the rear base for the organization’s combat, training, and ideological operations in Syria. In northeastern Syria, it focuses on raising funds, storing supplies, and undermining public confidence in the autonomous administration. In the north and northwest, it maintains hideouts for mid-level and senior leaders, who are highly concerned with maintaining their anonymity among the hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians living in temporary settlements (13). This new security and military doctrine of the organization is a reliable indicator of urgent shifts in its strategy, distinct from its strategy before 2019.

o Emergency transformations in ISIS strategy between 2023-2024

Exploring the organization’s internal situation is very difficult due to the difficulty of securing reliable sources of information from within its ranks. Furthermore, the organization keeps its internal problems and fabricates fictitious victories in its propaganda. Its image as a brutal killer that plagues the rural communities in which it operates and appears to want to perpetuate them remains. This requires a different approach: analyzing its behavior and activities and what it is required to do but is unable to do. To achieve this, it is useful to present a narrative of the organization’s activities in Syria during the months of October and November, and then discuss and analyze them. This is based on reports from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and assuming their accuracy, since the media of the SDF and the Autonomous Administration have not expressed a clear position towards them, in addition to their reports regarding their operations against the organization’s cells14.

1. a) For northern and eastern Syria.

• Targeting civilian objects:

During October and November, ISIS cells carried out 19 attacks on tankers carrying petroleum derivatives belonging to the Autonomous Administration, as well as local traders and contractors. They also targeted the ‘’Jazara Bu Hamid’’ silos on the road between Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, and the gas pipeline in the village of ‘’Shamsani’’, located in the town of Shaddadi in the southern Hasakah countryside. Most of the attacks were concentrated in the Deir ez-Zor countryside, with five attacks recorded in the southern Hasakah countryside.

The tactics used in the attack and the area: The attacks were concentrated in the countryside of Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor, and were carried out through ambushes, as this facilitates determining the arrival time of the tankers after their departure, and firing bursts of small arms fire to damage or disrupt the shipment of the transported material, or planting mines in its path. These attacks resulted in the loss of the lives of a contractor and two tanker drivers, and the serious injury of the guard of the “Jazrat Bu Hamid” silos (a civilian), as well as causing significant material damage, financial losses, and creating difficulties in the delivery of diesel and gasoline to citizens.

Assassinations:

Three assassinations were carried out against local council officials: the head of the civil council in the town of Al-Sabha, east of Deir Ezzor; the head of the local council in the Al-Sebha and Marat areas in the northern Deir Ezzor countryside (who lost his life during the operation); and a member of the reconciliation council in the town of Abu Khashab in the western Deir Ezzor countryside. One assassination was successful, and the operations were concentrated in the countryside of Deir Ezzor province. Motorcycles were used in two of the operations, and a civilian car in another. Light weapons were used in the operations, and direct targeting was resorted to.

• Targeting media and military forces:

Twenty attacks were carried out on military and security forces’ checkpoints and vehicles, causing minor injuries and material damage. All of these operations were concentrated in the Deir ez-Zor countryside.

Attack Method: The attack was carried out by member riding motorcycles, and there were supposed to be at least two other members to carry out the task of surveillance and covering the withdrawal during each operation. Machine guns were used, or explosive devices and mines were planted. One operation was carried out, which is believed to have been a suicide operation (*). Based on the extent of the losses, the number of attackers, and the type of targets, it can be asserted that these operations avoided entering a battle situation, and relied on the method of “firing bursts of bullets and then fleeing” and recording them as a “heroic” operation.

The organization’s (ISIS) failures and losses during October and November:

Security and military forces, with the support of local communities, arrested 18 ISIS cell members in various areas of northeastern Syria, including leaders and two Iraqi nationals. The arrests were carried out using the “raid and forced surrender” tactic and with the support of the international coalition. The most prominent of their plans were: planning to commit murder and sabotage in the region, attempting to smuggle ISIS families out of camps, providing funding by threatening people with murder and terror to extort money and impose tributes on civilians under the name of “the royal cost”**, organizing communication between cells inside and outside Syria, and supervising the indoctrination of followers with extremist ideas under the guise of “the call to jihad” with the aim of pushing them to commit attacks on civilian objects and law enforcement and security forces, as well as providing and distributing weapons and explosive materials to cells .

On 11/5/2024, the Autonomous Administration launched the “Permanent Security” (15) operation in the southern and eastern countryside of Hasakah, including al-Hawl camp. This operation resulted in the dismantling of the security environment that the organization was trying to create in that area, by arresting 79 members of the organization’s cells inside and outside al-Hawl camp, including dangerous leaders. The operation also resulted in the seizure of a large quantity of weapons, explosives, and communication devices, and the dismantling of an organized formation called “Women`s Religious Police (Hisbah),” which was involved in torture and killing of women inside the camp. Seventeen of these women were referred for investigation, and the dismantling of an organized formation called “Cubs of the Caliphate.” The organization expressed the extent of the blow it received from this operation by increasing the pace of its terror operations in its last strongholds in the Deir ez-Zor countryside.

As for the organization’s casualties during these two months, the US Central Command announced that it had carried out a series of airstrikes in the Syrian desert on October 11, which resulted in the deaths of at least 35 ISIS members, including several ISIS leaders (16), without providing coordinates for the targeted locations.

Based on the specializations and tasks of the arrested individuals and the type of targets attacked, the organization’s most prominent objectives in these attacks can be clarified, which are:

1) Using it in propaganda directed at foreign countries and even domestically to build the perception that the organization still exists and carries out its operations regularly. There is no doubt that this propaganda increases the further it is from the site of the event, which raises the morale of cells in other regions that have collapsed as a result of the organization’s continuous failures.

2) Imposing fees on tanker owners to prevent them from being targeted, thus providing another source of funding. This falls within the framework of organized crime.

3) Exercising a form of revenge against local communities and spreading terror among civilians, as threats were issued to drivers not to cooperate with the autonomous administration and to chant the organization’s slogans.

4) Undermining the stability and security of the targeted areas.

5) Keeping the security forces busy with extensive pursuits of a few elements. the organization is working on a strategy through which it forces the opponent to lose and expend large resources to confront its limited operations.

1. b) For areas that were under the control of the Baath regime:

The organization’s cells carried out more than 17 attacks on Ba’athist regime military vehicles and forces, including two assassinations, resulting in deaths and injuries among military personnel and members of pro-Iranian factions, in addition to material losses to the vehicles.

Tactics of attack and Tactics for the Region: The organization launched its attacks from the central Syrian Badia, targeting military transport routes, troop concentrations, and oil facilities, using light and medium weapons and the planting of mines. Movement was carried out via motorcycles and sometimes four-wheel-drive field vehicles. The organization benefits from the lack of rapid intervention forces of the Ba’ath regime in the Badia to provide rapid support to its forces, which are exposed to attacks by ISIS cells. At the same time, there is insufficient attention paid to protecting these points in terms of fortifications, communication systems, and air cover. This is also a problem faced by local communities in these areas, as they lack the strength to protect them from the brutality of the organization, or even confront it. Furthermore, the Ba’ath regime was more concerned with securing its supply routes through the Badia, especially the Damascus-Deir ez-Zor Road and the Rusafa-Athriya road, than eliminating ISIS cells. This explains the large number of ISIS operations in this region compared to the rest of northeastern Syria.

The organization’s attacks focused primarily on four axes: the area between the Sukhna desert and Palmyra in the eastern Homs countryside; the western Deir ez-Zor countryside, especially the Albukamal desert; the Salamiyah countryside between the desert and Hama; and the Al-Rusafa desert southwest of Raqqa. The greatest concentration was on the Homs desert, where there are oil and gas wells and roads that pass through rugged areas.

Response operations: Regime forces, with ground support from pro-Iranian factions and Russian air support, launched four combing campaigns in the areas between the Palmyra Mountain range, the Rusafa desert, the area between Al-Sukhnah and Jabal Al-Bishri in the eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside, and the eastern Salamiyah countryside.

The organization’s goal of its operations: The goals behind the organization’s attacks in these areas are almost identical to its goals for its attacks in the regions of the region, with the presence of two other goals: They are: exhausting the forces of the Baathist regime and inflicting heavy losses on it, while its operations in the north and east of Syria are considered acts of intimidation, and an attempt to present itself as a defender of Sunni communities, similar to its experience in Iraq, especially since it focuses its attack on the regular forces and elements of the factions loyal to Iran, while in north and east Syria there are no such forces, despite the fact that it has excommunicated both parties. What is more important to it is forcing the traders who are active on the roads passing through the areas where the organization is active to pay tributes. In this context, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (17) confirmed that the forces of the Baathist regime (the Fourth Division) provided tons of food supplies to ISIS in the Al-Maliha desert, south of Deir ez-Zor, in exchange for not attacking the trucks and oil convoys passing through the Al-Sukhnah desert, coming from Deir ez-Zor Governorate to Damascus.

1. c) For areas under Turkish occupation:

In areas controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, no activity by the organization has been recorded, despite the fact that these areas are considered strategic for the organization, as they are a gateway to Turkey and vice versa. Experts on Islamist groups 18 confirm that “the largest part of ISIS’s infrastructure in Syria is now located in areas controlled by Turkish forces in northern Syria…” As for areas controlled by Salafist groups in northwestern Syria, it appears that the organization is trying to exploit the Salafist-jihadist character prevalent in this region and build a position there. However, it is encountering difficulties in achieving this due to the strong presence of both Al-Qaeda and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the two most prominent competitors of the organization. Many of its leaders have been killed in this region (*), and in June 2024, US Central Command announced that it had killed senior ISIS official ‘’Osama Jamal Muhammad Ibrahim al-Janabi’’ in an airstrike.

In general, the organization’s operational pattern indicates that it is pursuing a policy of postponing the decisive battle and remaining in a state of dormancy until the conditions for victory are available, Field commanders were left to determine the nature of operations based on the information available to them in the battlefield environment. Therefore, it is difficult to develop a unified vision for uniform and similar tactics adopted by all of the organization’s cells in Syria. This means that it is conducting its operations based on the “battle between wars” tactic (**)on all fronts, focusing on low-cost operations against easy-to-hit targets, without any guarantee of positive results from them, especially in light of the organization’s suffering from the depletion of its human and material resources. It is likely that the organization is betting that these operations will benefit its psychological warfare against its opponents and provide room for movement for other cells after these forces are occupied with handling these operations. The concentration of these operations, particularly in the Deir ez-Zor countryside, indicates a shrinking environment that allows its cells to hide and blend in with civilians. The arrest and killing of dozens of its members is an indication that it is paying a heavy price to achieve its goals. The group’s covert cells cannot be reached without accurate intelligence. This is evidence of the growing involvement of local communities in confronting its activities. If we compare the strikes the group carries out, such as targeting oil tankers and military vehicles, which are among the easiest operations and incur no losses for the group, with the strikes it is receiving, it can be concluded that the group is in a strategic dilemma and is fighting for survival.

O ISIS and the struggle for existence

The organization’s continued avoidance of engaging in open battles, its inability to launch operations to control cities whose communities find it difficult to secure their own defense, such as Daraa, Albukamal, Aleppo, and Tal Abyad, its continued implementation of limited-scale operations with limited tactical benefits that do not provide an opportunity to achieve significant military, financial, or political gains, and its lack of emergency plans after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, all indicate that the organization is experiencing a strategic dilemma. In northern and eastern Syria, the organization’s operations did not result in strategic gains, as its most prominent operation failed to smuggle its members from Gweiran prison in 2022, and it also failed to militarize Al-Hawl camp, where the law enforcement and security forces affiliated with the Autonomous Administration, with the support of the international coalition, were able to launch two campaigns (19)against the organization’s cells in the camp, which resulted in the arrest of dozens of its members and the seizure of a large quantity of weapons and tunnels, in addition to the decline in the number of camp residents from its social milieu. As a result of the departure of dozens of Syrians, Iraqis, and many foreign nationals under settlement memoranda with the Autonomous Administration and the authorities of their countries of origin. The increasing arrest rate of its members also indicates an intelligence failure by the organization and the continued depletion of its strength. On the other hand, after the fall of the Ba’athist regime, American pressure on the Turkish regime increased, not to expand its operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces. This deprived the organization of an outlet to increase the pace of its operations or even the opportunity to carry out operations against detention centers and al-Hawl camp. On another level, the attacks launched by groups affiliated with the Ba’athist regime against Syrian Democratic Forces positions and civilian objects in Deir ez-Zor province, and the massacres they committed in al-Dahla and Jdeidet Bakara, caused local communities to sympathize more with the Syrian Democratic Forces, supported by the international coalition, which are practically considered the main defender of local communities. This greatly affected on the organization’s propaganda, while also providing a plausible explanation for the increasing arrest rate of its members in these areas. It also explains the decline in donations to the organization, which has apparently been forced to carry out assassinations, increase its threats against civilians, and increase its attacks on investors’ assets to pay the “sultan’s cost” tribute. The withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces from the western Euphrates has also thwarted the organization’s attempts, along with the remnants of the Ba’athist regime, to instill chaos in Deir ez-Zor and its countryside. This also points to the strategic dilemma facing the organization in this region.

In areas under the control of the Ba’ath regime, the organization made two attempts to achieve field gains, and it appears to still be pursuing them:

• Re-imposing its hegemony over the Sunni communities in Albukamal, Al-Mayadin, Deir ez-Zor, and Al-Rusafa, which are under the control of pro-Iranian factions, and which are witnessing systematic Shiite conversion operations. In addition, the Baath Party regained control over the region after supervising the security settlement operations for ISIS members and opposition factions during the years 2021 and 2022. It was even unable to carry out operations within the urban centers of these areas, and the operations it carried out were within the badia and targeted convoys on roads in rugged areas. It was also unable to make a breakthrough in the pillars of the regime’s authority in the areas under its control, represented by the Baath, clerics, the clan, and the corrupt, according to the confirmations of some citizens who move between the eastern and western Euphrates. Its attempt to ride the wave of celebration of the fall of the Baath regime, raising its cells to the flag of Syrian independence, and carrying out armed operations against the Syrian Democratic Forces failed after the coalition launched airstrikes on its strongholds in the badia, and the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces from the western Euphrates. The organization miscalculated that these forces would remain there and impose their control over the area. It appears that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s control of the western bank of the Euphrates River, along with the arrival of armed groups loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish regime, has put the organization’s cells before a difficult test. The longer it delays developing a strategy to control the region, the more unable it is to achieve strategic gains.
• In southern Syria, ISIS failed to achieve strategic gains despite its relative success (20) in creating a suitable environment for itself in the Daraa countryside through its former members in the “Khaled ibn al-Walid Army”)21( faction, which was stationed in the Yarmouk Basin, southwest of Daraa, where it had been dismantled after the settlement operations that Daraa witnessed in 2018. In this region, the organization attempted to repeat its experience with Turkey against the Autonomous Administration by striking a deal with the Baathist regime to confront a common enemy, represented by the nationalists and Islamists opposed to them, who were former members of the “Free army” factions. It appears to have taken steps in this direction; as local news reports in 2022 recorded the release of dozens of members of the organization by Syrian regime forces under the name of the settlement, with the goal – apparently – to fight opponents of the regime.)22( During this period, the organization carried out about 90 An assassination operation based on fatwas from field courts, but it did not last long, as local armed factions, with tribal support, were able to eliminate the organization’s military commander, Abu Salem al-Iraqi, on August 9, 2022, in the town of Adwan)23(, and then kill the organization’s leader, “Abu al-Hassan al-Qurashi” (an Iraqi national) on August 15 , 2022. October 2022 In Jasim City. In 2024 The organization attempted to exploit the deteriorating security situation in Daraa and its countryside, which had witnessed almost daily kidnappings, assassinations, and clashes, in the context of a multi-dimensional conflict between the Baathist regime, pro-Iranian factions, local groups opposed to them, ISIS cells, Israeli intelligence cells, and drug dealers. Each side is engaged in a conflict with one or more other parties, and what further strengthens this conflict is the poor economic situation and the absence of a political solution. The region has turned into an open battlefield that is neglected by the media. This deteriorating security environment has provided ISIS with an opportunity to infiltrate and establish a security, ideological, and financial system under the leadership of the so-called Wali of Hawran in the organization, “Osama Shahada Al-Azizi” (who hails from the town of Al-Shajara in the Daraa countryside). He is trying to take advantage of the tribal nature of the region to cover up the movements of his members and benefit from tribal protection to prevent them from being exposed to killing or arrest and to secure the necessary funding, as well as exploiting the grievances that the people of the region are exposed to due to administrative and financial corruption and the state of widespread security deterioration in the region.

The organization’s new cells attempted to impose security and ideological hegemony over areas in Hauran, by carrying out assassinations and imposing the organization’s authority over many issues. However, the regime’s attempts to use the organization as a pretext to invade cities and towns and eliminate its opponents prompted local armed groups to once again launch a campaign against the organization’s cells, which culminated in the killing of the governor of Hauran and several of his aides (all of them Syrian nationals)) 24(in a house in the city of Nawa in the Daraa countryside in early 2024. Following this new failure, the organization appears to have regressed, returning to limited covert activity and awaiting new opportunities while maintaining an ongoing channel of communication with the organization’s leadership in the Syrian Badia and attracting individuals with ideological leanings toward the organization. This situation has rendered it unable to exploit the security vacuum in southern Syria to its advantage following the fall of the Ba’athist regime. This also indicates that the organization is experiencing another strategic dilemma in this region, especially with Israeli forces crossing the Syrian border and the emergence of a new security and political equation in southern Syria.

As for the areas under Turkish occupation and the factions affiliated with it, the organization’s operational stagnation indicates that it is unable to implement its political and military doctrine in this region. This constitutes a dilemma in itself for ISIS, especially since it constitutes a breach of its strategy for fighting the near enemy (the Arab and Islamic regimes), and it is assumed that the Turkish regime and the Muslim Brotherhood fall within its context. Moreover, resorting to tactical excuses is no longer useful; Because it has not launched operations against them since declaring its state in 2014 , this adds an ideological dilemma to its strategic dilemma, and exposes the reality of the alliance between the two parties, despite the fact that many researchers or sympathizers with the organization justify this dilemma by claiming that the organization is waging what is called “jihad al-nakaya” )*(against its enemies by directing limited strikes at them, and then withdrawing and hiding until it reorganizes its ranks and capabilities, without taking into account the transformations that occurred in the organization’s process in the period following the collapse of its authority in 2019 and the difficulty of securing an environment receptive to its presence. Therefore, since the organization is unable to escape this dilemma, and is awaiting opportunities provided by the deteriorating security situation in some areas, and since it is unable to exploit the security chaos that followed the fall of the Baathist regime, in parallel with the growing capabilities of other forces opposing it, it is – without a doubt – in a position heading towards the abyss in Syria.

Based on what has been mentioned, a number of key facts can be identified about the current situation of the organization, and it is assumed that its analyses will be built upon them. They are:

1)The organization (ISIS) is in a state of permanent defeat and has made many enemies for itself, yet it still exists and poses a latent threat.

2)The organization’s current cell operations closely resemble those of organized crime (the mafia))25(, depending on several primary funding sources, including extortion and smuggling to purchase weapons and logistical supplies, pay the salaries of its members, and pay hired killers. The numerous operations against civilian objects and exposed, poorly fortified targets, which it announces, do not reflect its growing strength or its achievement of territorial control.

3)The organization continues to rely on crises and tensions to rise again, and its failure to exploit the fall of the Baathist regime raises many questions, even though many have likened this fall to the fall of Mosul, which represented the organization’s springboard.

4)The organization has lost its prestige, as uncovering the locations of its members and cells has become a source of political or material gain for many.

5)The political and security conditions upon which the organization relied for its rise in 2014 are no longer present today. It is no longer capable of providing the essential components for building its state: the territory to establish its power structures, the caliph as a religious and secular authority, and the army to conquer and spread its doctrine. The organization’s control over remote areas, its failure to announce the identity of its caliph, its decentralization of its various affairs, its reliance on cells operating covertly in the military sphere, and the ongoing losses it is incurring reflect the reality of this inability.

6)The organization has lost most of its top-tier leaders, and those who remain are struggling to communicate and reorganize. Many of its leaders are languishing in detention centers in northeastern Syria.

7)The communities that the organization sought to woo and build a popular base within have become increasingly aware that the organization is incapable of solving their problems, that it has caused them numerous calamities between 2014 and 2019, and that it continues to do so through its ongoing operations.

8)The organization’s decentralization of its groups in Syria and Iraq opens the door to the emergence of new leaders, free from the dominance of traditional leaders. The Ba’athists’ need to reorganize their ranks as cells after the fall of their authority will lead to the emergence of new competitors operating clandestinely within the social milieu they seek to dominate, and they may have to establish some sort of understanding with them.

9)The organization is forced to adopt different security and advocacy approaches in the areas where it is deployed, even though it is supposed to follow a single approach in Syria.

10)The organization failed to exploit the feelings of suffering caused by the Gaza war to its advantage, compared to the Iranian and Turkish regimes, despite the organization being launched in early 2024. A campaign to raise the level of its bloody operations through a speech by its spokesman, “Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari,” under the title “And kill them wherever you find them.” Based on this, the bloody operations were carried out in Iran on January 3, 2024. The speech also focused on the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip in an attempt to revive and raise the level of its terrorist operations)26(.

11)The organization failed to exploit the shock of the fall of the Baathist regime, and new forces entered the Badia from al-Tanf (the Free Syrian Army, which controlled Palmyra and other areas), which appeared more serious about fighting it than the Syrian regime and its allies. It also lost its bet on the Syrian Democratic Forces remaining in the areas west of the Euphrates, or on northeastern Syria being exposed to a Turkish invasion.

These facts reinforce the belief that ISIS is suffering from numerous crises that have led to urgent shifts in its strategy, particularly in 2023-2024. The battle for survival has become a priority in rebuilding the so-called caliphate. This situation has imposed, and will impose, new tactics on its advocacy, financing, and combat activities. This is evident in the form of operations it is currently carrying out to mitigate the worsening of its crises. The most prominent of these are:

ISIS is suffering from a crisis of confidence. It has lost the trust of the social milieu it relied on after failing to achieve a single accomplishment. At the same time, the community no longer trusts it due to the growing moral bonds between local communities and the civil and military councils affiliated with the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This is particularly true given the Autonomous Administration’s move to strengthen the role of civil councils in the local governance of cantonal affairs. Despite Turkish threats, it has successfully held municipal elections in the cantons of Tabqa, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, and will continue to do so in the other cantons. This factor is also indicated by the reluctance of its cells to raise the organization’s flags in attacks on SDF positions that crossed the Euphrates River to its western bank to liberate Deir ez-Zor and its countryside from the grip of the Ba’athist regime.

The crisis of confidence has negatively affected staffing operations, the ability to confront security breaches within its ranks, and the inability to replace first-line leaders who were killed by strikes by the international coalition and other forces with equally competent leaders. What exacerbates this problem is the independent and scattered work of the organization’s bloc in the Syrian arena due to the disruption of its security environment in Syrian regions, in addition to the difficulty of communication and the sometimes-erroneous efforts of field commanders. It is necessary not to marginalize the regional and Syrian-Iraqi ideological sensitivity that was instilled by the conflict between the two wings of the Baath Party in the two countries, especially since many of the organization’s leaders have Baathist backgrounds. For example, the Baath Party had a strong presence in southern Syria, and during the period of defections witnessed by the Syrian regime, the “Hawrani” regional identity played a prominent role in political, military and social organization, especially in Daraa and its countryside, from which the popular movement against the authority of the Baathist regime began. It appears that the organization failed to understand this reality, which led to its failure in 2022 to establish a stronghold in this region and its retreat toward the badia.

Another crisis threatening the organization’s survival is the growing power of other entities it opposes. The organization is likely to be deeply concerned as ideologies that contradict its own continue to take root in the areas where it operates, and its inability to curb them. Democracy has become a guarantee of civil peace and coexistence among the components of northeastern Syria. The Muslim Brotherhood and its ally, the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP), are working to create a new authoritarian model based on Ottoman principles in the areas under Turkish occupation. The organization’s ideology cannot be accepted in the governance of these areas, while the remnants of the Ba’athist regime will attempt to wage a battle for survival through the trinity of “the clan, the Ba’ath, and the security cells.” On the other hand, the leadership of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) appears, since 2021, to have mastered “pragmatic leadership,” which has led it to exert significant pressure on al-Qaeda, ISIS, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the areas it controls. This is particularly true with its attempts to open up to the West by ending the activity of “extremist jihadist organizations and Syrianizing the military sphere in Idlib.”)27 (This could lead to the evolution of the Salafist ideology adopted by this organization toward a liberal direction, something unprecedented among extremist groups. Its expansion into the western Euphrates will also place significant ideological pressure on the organization, and its position is strengthened by its control over state authority in Damascus after the fall of the Baathist regime.

The continued rapid progress of these developments will undoubtedly lead to an accelerated collapse of the organization’s political, security, and economic systems, contributing to its gradual demise.

These two crises will certainly lead to a decline in the number of fighters, sympathizers, and funding sources, and consequently, the organization will lose the necessary resources to regain its strength and rise again. This reinforces the belief that the organization is engaged in an existential struggle. However, what would give the organization a glimmer of hope for overcoming its crises is the collapse of Syria as a state, or a Turkish invasion of northeastern Syria.

• Challenges of the evolving conflict environment in Syria:

The US administration’s policy of maintaining the fixed borders between the Syrian forces has led to shifts in the course and direction of the conflict, with battles concentrated on the front lines, and operations targeting the enemy’s depth being limited to airstrikes and operations carried out by proxies. This has forced ISIS to adapt to the new conflict environment, using a relatively new tactic it employs across Syria. This tactic is based on the organization’s distortions of what it calls “jihad al-nikaya,” meaning “harming the enemy.” This tactic, as well as developments in the Syrian crisis that began with the fall of the Ba’ath regime, does not appear to be significantly contributing to moving the conflict in a direction consistent with its strategy. This is based on the increasing deterioration in its ability to weaken its enemies. This increases the difficulty of building a loyal social milieu and of creating a security environment suitable for its activities in a manner that serves its strategy and is consistent with the political and security developments witnessed in the region. Despite the continued state of tension in most of Syria, However, the conflict environment is moving toward relative stability in military operations after the Russian, Iranian, and Baathist regimes have all relatively withdrawn from the Syrian conflict equation, at least for the time being. This is also due to the emergence of the Western axis as the dominant force in Syria. Expansion into a given region now requires the approval of this axis. This was evident in the American intervention to establish a ceasefire in Manbij and maintain the Euphrates River as a dividing line between the east and west of the Euphrates. This portends a relative deepening of relations between these countries and local forces on the ground. This will push the Muslim Brotherhood and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham toward an institutional approach, as societies in a state of non-war refuse to submit to a factional mentality in managing their affairs. At the same time, the Turkish regime’s failure to undermine the Autonomous Administration will lead to stronger ties between the communities of North and East Syria and the Autonomous Administration’s institutions. This will also lead to a shift in political loyalties within other Syrian communities in the context of the country’s new security, political, and administrative situation. These communities will attempt to adapt to this situation, de facto, as a diplomatic maneuver to safeguard their interests after more than 10 years of suffering. ISIS’s threat to these interests and its inability to resolve social and economic problems will make communities more engaged in confronting it, based on the principle of self-protection.

The conflict environment created and maintained by ISIS faces numerous challenges. These challenges are based on factors shaped by objective circumstances and developments in the conflict environment in Syria and the region, including:

• Growing social awareness and growing national sentiment with the fall of the Baath regime.
• The organization’s enemies develop their governance style based on an understanding of the international and regional conflict environment and the pragmatism of states.
• The organization has become a cheap tool for implementing the strategy of some countries by attacking local Syrian forces. It has also become a means for some to achieve financial gain by informing on them in exchange for rewards.
• The likelihood of the Syrian branch of the organization splitting from its Iraqi branch is increasing, or a new extremist organization emerging through an alliance between the Syrian branch of the organization on the one hand and other extremist groups and remnants of the Syrian Ba’ath Party on the other. This is based on confronting common enemies: the international coalition, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Autonomous Administration, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

So far, the organization seems unable to respond effectively to these factors, or its ideology prevents it from thinking in this direction, especially since it is still trying to transform its political conflict into a social conflict, a conflict between the oppressed and the oppressors, or an ethnic conflict between Arabs and Kurds, or a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, or a religious conflict between Muslims and Crusaders, or between believers and infidels, in a way that presents itself as a movement that supports the cause of the “oppressed party.” However, it will once again collide with these three factors.

Analyzing these factors requires extensive psychological, social, political, economic, and security research. Therefore, it seems useful to present a set of facts on the ground that express their essence, as follows:

1.The Syrian crisis has exhausted local communities, leaving them in dire need of respite and reconstruction. ISIS’s ideology has failed to resolve their various crises; instead, it has created new ones. Building an Islamic state, under the leadership of ISIS’s leader, is no longer a national issue; it has become a personal matter for the organization’s followers, who have become more like an organized crime network. They carry out assassinations, attack civilian targets, and intimidate civilians to collect tributes and prevent them from engaging with local civil institutions in northern and eastern Syria. They have become a mercenary group in areas controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, a splinter group in areas controlled by Salafist groups, and bandits in the Badia regions. Areas with neglected services and weak security have become the only environment in which the organization can operate. This coincides with the decline in Middle Eastern societies’ trust in political Islamist movements following their failure to address crises and the increase in international military pressure on them in 2023-2024. This is what happened with Al-Qaeda, the Revolutionary Guard, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Turkish Justice and Development Party, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as a result of both subjective and objective factors.

2.The group’s operations have transformed its war against the autonomous administration into a war against local communities. The human and material losses it inflicts are more societal than they are self-inflicted. What exacerbates its harm are the taxes it imposes, its practice of anti-autonomuos-administration social representation through its interference in social matters between clans according to its sect, its targeting of local council members, and the prosecution and accountability of those who cooperate with it, whether willingly or unwillingly, by law enforcement agencies. This increases the problems the group causes for society, and the same pattern is repeated in various forms in other areas. The more local governments maintain the cohesion and credibility of the anti-ISIS social bloc, the weaker the influence of the group’s populist and demagogic rhetoric in its propaganda, and the more robust the intelligence information received about it.

3.The ‘’commune’’ system implemented in North and East Syria poses a significant threat to ISIS cells and activities. The less effective the commune, the greater the organization’s ability to move. In this context, researcher Charles Lister)28 (states that ISIS fighters “enter villages and towns at night and enjoy complete freedom of action, raiding places in search of food, and terrorizing and blackmailing local residents.” The likely reason lies in the failure to properly activate the self-protection committee within the commune in those areas. This is based on the relatively successful practical experience of this committee in the countryside of Derik, Qamishli, and Amuda, as well as in Serekaniye (Ras al-Ein) and Afrin before their occupation, for example. Moreover, with the remaining commune committees carrying out their duties, ISIS cells will be unable to do anything. Replicating this experience throughout Syria, or emulating it through local councils, will be sufficient to eliminate ISIS cells.

4.The organization has failed to provide the necessary elements for a renewed rise in Syria and Iraq. It has failed to achieve any of the following: gain a new social base, win the affection of local communities, free its detained fighters, build new alliances, increase recruitment rates, establish territorial control, carry out high-profile operations, reduce the number of arrests or killings of its leaders, maintain the loyalty of all its followers, secure reliable financial resources, curb the growing capabilities of its enemies and rivals, and create nationalist strife between Arabs and Kurds.

5.The international coalition and the United States are convinced that ISIS continues to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) play a role in confronting it)29(, and that more financial resources and military support will be allocated to the SDF and Iraqi forces, as announced at the ministerial meeting of the anti-ISIS coalition in Washington in September 2024.)30( Therefore, the maximum pressure campaign against the organization will continue locally and internationally; and it appears that it will lose its bet on a Turkish invasion of North and East Syria.

6.The Syrian Democratic Forces’ openness to dialogue with Turkey to reduce tensions and build friendly relations, as well as their openness to building strategic relations with the new authorities in Damascus based on the national interest, was confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi, and a number of Autonomous Administration officials in more than one media interview or official statement. The end of the hostility between the North and East Syria region and the Turkish regime, and the exit of the Baathist regime from the Syrian scene, would mean doubling the campaign directed against the organization’s cells and incurring greater losses. The same applies to building an understanding with the new Syrian

 Authorities (31(or increasing the level of military and security coordination with the Iraqi government. The same applies to the formation of a new military force from the ruins of the Baathist regime and with a new military doctrine, which would place significant pressure on the organization in the Badia.

7.The Autonomous Administration is working to provide human and material resources to overcome its weakness, represented by its inability to protect the entirety of the region’s rural areas. Matters are further complicated by the threats posed by Turkey and its mercenaries against the region. It is also working to dismantle ISIS’s ideological entrenchment within the communities formerly under its control by reviving the ancient cultural heritage of local communities and allowing tribes and local councils to govern their affairs according to their own morals. It is worth noting that tribal sponsorship has been behind the release of dozens of Syrians forced to work with the group, allowing them to return to normal life.

8.Iraq’s construction of a concrete wall along its border with Syria and tightening security there will hamper ISIS cells’ ability to move and transport supplies between the Syrian and Iraqi fronts. Furthermore, the Syrian Democratic Forces and the international coalition’s increased surveillance along the Euphrates River, through watchtowers, will weaken communication and links between the Badia, northern and eastern Syria, and central Iraq. This could lead to an evolution in the organization’s leadership hierarchy in Syria, and could also lead to a structural split within the organization.

Strategically, one should not be overly optimistic, as if the end of the organization is imminent. It is useful to recall that the factors that led to the emergence of ISIS are still present, for the most part. What is relatively comforting for ISIS so far is the lack of another organization with a new ideology to fill the void it has left or compete with it, similar to the extremist organizations that were copied from Al-Qaeda. It is also comforting that Turkey continues to threaten the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration, as well as the failure to find a radical solution to the problem of Al-Hawl camp and the detained ISIS members. There have been no indications yet from the new authorities in Damascus regarding its position on the organization. Syria’s future remains unknown, and many analyses indicate that it is heading towards chaos. The country’s economic and political crisis also continues. United Nations reports have described the crisis in Syria as one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world (32), indicating that more than 16.7 million people need assistance. Moreover, the areas of northern Syria under the control of Turkish mercenaries will remain a soft underbelly for any new authority in Damascus. The organization will leverage this area to relieve pressure on its cells, especially with reports of these mercenaries’ arrival in cities on the western bank of the Euphrates River, such as Manbij, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Mayadeen, and Albukamal.

O Conclusion:

ISIS’s inability to coexist with the different other and to work to exterminate them as a condition for its survival will ultimately lead to its demise. Despite this, the organization continues to pursue this approach through its ongoing operations in various regions. This raises many doubts about the underlying purpose behind the organization’s existence and the aims of its leaders. Gathering thousands of people on a ship and steering it along a course that will ultimately lead to its sinking is not something that logically accepts. This may spark conspiracy theories among some, but the organization, the project it fights for, and the presence of dozens of supporters are a reality on the ground.

In sum, the organization is experiencing numerous crises and is waging a struggle for survival using all available means. Regardless of its view of its cause, the organization is considered a symbol of evil by the majority of local communities. Indeed, it possesses the elements of this; evidenced by beheadings, the killing of innocents, the violation of honor, the annihilation of cultural heritage in areas under its control, the practice of brutal torture, the use of barricades behind civilians to confront aerial bombardment of its positions, the displacement of tens of thousands, the excommunication of Muslims, and other acts. The organization has not denied these practices; rather, it has filmed them and published scenes of them, boasting about them.

The rise of ISIS is one of the repercussions of the crisis facing the global order. What sustains the organization is not the power of its ideology, but rather the conflicts between states and extremist organizations, both nationalist and religious, based on power and wealth, which have stripped societies of their ability to protect themselves. The rise and fall of these conflicts affect the organization’s strength, fluctuating between rise and fall. This is at the general level. At the local level, however, the organization faces numerous crises that go beyond this equation, and a reality has been imposed on it, forcing it to engage in a struggle for survival. There are three things that it is worth reaffirming, as these crises are evident, and they will continue to erode the organization’s entity. It will not be easy for the organization to overcome them and divert its course toward the abyss. These are represented by:

• The organization is no longer able to market its cause as a national cause; rather, it has become a personal issue for its followers. Even the social milieu that had previously demonstrated its loyalty to the organization is now considering extricating itself from it and is no longer willing to defend it. The exodus of hundreds of its families from the al-Hawl and al-Roj camps, eager to return to their former lives, confirms this.
• As its capabilities and potential deteriorate, the organization’s enemies across Syria have become more powerful than ever. It will be unable to keep up with them and achieve strategic victories over them as long as the political and security situation in Syria continues unabated.
• The organization has failed to bring peace to the region, or even to its social milieu. Its activities in any given area have become a crisis for its communities. Its cells act as an occupying force, threatening, collecting tributes, forcibly subjugating communities to the organization’s ideology in their social, economic, political, and cultural affairs, and imposing guardianship over them. Turkish support for its strategy, through its hostility toward the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), does not appear to be sustainable.

The collapse of the security system in Syria and the spread of chaos there, or the Turkish regime’s escalation of its aggressive operations in northeastern Syria, remain the only two options for the organization to emerge from its crises.

* Dabiq: A village located between Azaz and Akhtarin in the northern countryside of Aleppo, only 10 km from the Turkish border. Islamic prophecies have predicted that this village will witness the end of the world battle between Muslims and their Roman enemies before the Day of Judgment. Prophetic hadith states: “The Day of Judgment will not come until Muslims defeat the Romans in a battle in Dabiq or the depths.” Therefore, the organization has exploited it in its propaganda, attempting to control it and using its name to name some of its media outlets. The beheading of the American hostage, Abdul-Rahman Kassig (a former American soldier), was carried out there as a propaganda display. The organization has concluded many of its propaganda films with an image of one of its armed members walking slowly carrying the organization’s black flag, with Dabiq in the background.

[1] Practical Dictionary of Humanitarian Law; Occupied Territories; Link:

ttps://ar.guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/5/rdin-mhtlw/

* What indicates the truth of this matter is the statement of the Commander of the Coalition Forces, Joint Special Operations – Operation Inherent Resolve, Major General Purberry, who said: “The Syrian Democratic Forces, with very little assistance from the Coalition, successfully planned and executed this operation against ISIS… Not only did they demonstrate the ability to synchronize effects across a large area of ​​northeast Syria, but their operations further degraded the limited capabilities of ISIS remnants in the area.”

See:

Staff Sgt. Brandon Ames; Syrian Democratic Forces Display Strength, Capabilities through Successful Operations; DVIDS CONTROL CENTER/U.S. Department of Defense; 07.20.2020; Link:

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/374202/syrian-democratic-forces-display-strength-capabilities-through-successful-operations

* During his visit to Ankara, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken considered the role of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) “vital” in preventing the return of ISIS to Syria after the ouster of former regime leader Bashar al-Assad…

Alhurra Channel; The role of the Kurdish-led SDF is “vital” in Syria; Publication date: 12/12/2024 (X Platform)

 Link:

https://x.com/alhurranews/status/1867311675810230702

* Survivorship bias: The logical fallacy of focusing on people or things that “survive” a process and inadvertently ignoring those that do not survive due to their lack of visibility… Wikipedia; Survivorship bias.

* Covert action is defined as: “A program that includes several coordinated intelligence operations, often conducted over a relatively long period of time, to influence the public or target group to do or refrain from doing something, or to influence public opinion (the general public, economic elites, or political and military leaders).”

Shadi Abdel Wahab; The Silent Option: Employing “Covert Actions” in Managing International Interactions; Publisher: Al-Mustaqbal for Advanced Research and Studies; Publication Date: 07/09/2017; Link:

https://futureuae.com/are/Release/ReleaseArticle/386/الخيار-الصامت-توظيف-العمليات-التآمرية-في-إدارة-الإنترنتات-الدولية

* This front was formed based on a fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was then the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other Islamic leaders. The fatwa stated: “The ruling on killing Americans and their allies, both civilians and military, is an individual obligation on every Muslim in every country whenever possible, until Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Grand Mosque are liberated from their grip, and until their armies leave all Islamic lands, their limits drawn and their wings broken, unable to threaten any Muslim, in accordance with the words of God: ((And fight aginst the disbelievers collectively as they fight aginst you collectively)), and His words: ((And fight them until there is no more persecution and religion is all for God))”

2 To view the terms of the agreement, see: BBC Arabic; Syria: What are the terms of the agreement to establish a demilitarized zone in Idlib? Publication date: 2018.09.18; Link:

https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-45549979

3 Positive neutrality: “A positivist political doctrine based on non-alignment with any of the conflicting blocs internationally. (Political terminology)”

Definition and meaning of positive neutrality in the comprehensive dictionary of meanings

*  This is clearly evident in the Social Contract of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, adopted on 12/12/2023, which can be viewed through the link:

https://aanesprod.wpenginepowered.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/العقد-الاجتماعي-المعدل.pdf

* The ISIS has lost many first- and second-tier leaders, either through liquidation or imprisonment, in addition to a decline in its financial reserves, ranging between $25 and $50 million, after being estimated at nearly $100 million in February 2021. Not to mention its territorial defeat and the shrinking geography of its operations in its traditional strongholds of influence… For more, see: Taqi al-Najjar; How can we understand the escalation of ISIS in Syria? Publisher: The Egyptian Center for Thought and Strategic Studies; Publication date: August 15, 2023; Link: https://ecss.com.eg/36051/

* Most political Islamic movements claim to be the ” saved sect,” it is a political term derived from a hadith: “The Jews split into seventy-one sects, the Christians split into seventy-two sects, and this nation will split into seventy-three sects, all of which will be in Hellfire except one.” It was said: “Who are they, O Messenger of God?” He said: “Whoever is like me and my companions.” Wikipedia; The Saved Sect.

4 U.S. Central Command; Defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria Mission January-June 2024; Posted on U.S. Central Command’s “X” platform, Posted: 2024.07.17; Link:

** In late 2017, the organization underwent a major restructuring with the creation of a series of regional offices under the so-called “ General Directorate of states”: Al-Sadiq Office, covering Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, and the rest of South Asia; Al-Karrar Office, covering Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mozambique; Al-Qarn Office, covering the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel; Al-Anfal Office, covering Libya and neighboring countries; Umm Al-Qura Office, covering Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf; Dhul-Nurayn Office, covering Egypt and Sudan; and Al-Faruq Office, covering Turkiye, the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe. For more, see: TORE HAMMING; The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network; COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER/ JULY 2023, VOLUME 16, ISSUE 7; Link:

The General Directorate of Provinces: Managing the Islamic State’s Global Network

5 According to the European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies, ISIS is seeking to restructure its ranks in the Syrian Badia in order to impose its power, reshaping its security and military structures, and expand its areas of influence. The area of the Syrian Badia is approximately (80) thousand square kilometers, and is distributed among the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Rif Dimashq, and As-Suwayda. The Syrian Badia occupies approximately (55%) of Syria’s area and is considered part of the Badia of the Levant, which is distributed between Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and connects to the Arabian Desert. Its mountainous masses extend over an area of (360) km… For more, see: European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies; ISIS and the “Jihadists” – What are the reasons for ISIS’s return in Syria? Publication date: 2023.08.21; Link:

https://www.europarabct.com/شارة-والجهاديون-ـ-ما-أسباب-عودة-عمليا/

6 Rule 9 of the ICRC Study on Customary Humanitarian Law states that “civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives.” For more, see: The Practical Dictionary of Humanitarian Law; Protected Property and Objects; link:

https://ar.guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/5/mmtlkt-wshy-mhmyw

7 هارون ي. زيلين؛ دولة إسلامية متكاملة عالمياً؛ الناشر: معهد واشنطن لسياسات الشرق الأدنى؛ تاريخ النشر: 2024.07.18؛ الرابط:

https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/dwlt-aslamyt-mtkamlt-almyaan

8 In April 2024, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured two ISIS financial facilitators, Ahmed Fawaz al-Rahman and Mohammed Amin Khalil al-Ubaid. They had received funds from the organization in Turkey (and Lebanon) via the’’ Rohin Money Transfer Company’’ for use in local operations through the al-Zubayr ibn al-Awam Battalion, a secret ISIS unit based in Hasakah…. (paragraph: ISIS’s external operations include all provinces).

9 International Crisis Group; Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria; 18.07.2022; Link:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-central-and-north

* These areas include the cities and countryside of: Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), Gire Spi (Tal Abyad), Jarabulus, Mare’, Al-Bab, Azaz, and Afrin…

** These areas include Idlib and its countryside, the western countryside of Aleppo, and parts of the northern countryside of Latakia and Hama…

10 U.S. Central Command; Defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria Mission January-June 2024; Posted on U.S. Central Command’s”X”platform, Posted:2024.07.17;

Link: https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1813340822009458756?lang=ar

11 International Crisis Group; Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria; 18.07.2022; Link:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-central-and-north

12  Alex Rossi; Kurdish US-allies halting anti-ISIS operations in Syria because of threat from Turkey-backed rebels, SDF commander warns; Sky News: 11.12.2024; Link: https://news.sky.com/story/kurdish-us-allies-halting-anti-isis-operations-in-syria-because-of-threat-from-turkey-backed-rebels-sdf-commander-warns-13271611

13 International Crisis Group; Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria; 18.07.2022; Link:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-central-and-north

14 راجع التقارير الخاصة بعمليات داعش خلال شهري تشرين الأول وتشرين الثاني على كل من:

الموقع الرسمي للمرصد السوري لحقوق الإنسان، الرابط: https://www.syriahr.com

الموقع الرسمي لقوى الأمن الداخلي- شمال وشرق سوريا؛ الرابط: https://asayish.com

الموقع الرسمي للمركز الإعلامي لقوات سوريا الديمقراطية؛ الرابط: https://sdf-press.com

*Two members on motorcycles took part in this operation at the southern entrance to Hasaka. One of them exploded, while the second one, which was following it, fled to the southern neighborhoods of the city. Its driver was arrested with the help of the residents. ANHA; The driver of the second motorcycle bomb was arrested in Hasaka; Publication date: 11/17/2024; Link: https://hawarnews.com/ar/إداء-القتل-على-سائق-الدراجة-النارية-المفخخة-الثانية-في-الحسكة

** The royal cost: a sum of money of no less than $300 imposed by the organization’s cells on wealthy Muslims by force and coercion. A message is sent via WhatsApp to the targeted individuals, threatening to kill anyone who refuses to pay. This is not based on any legitimate Islamic law. It is essentially a tax paid by Muslims and the caliph’s subjects by force and coercion, provided that the money the imam demands from the people is for a legitimate purpose. The organization uses its virtual caliphate as a pretext to justify obtaining it. Abu al-Mu’tasim al-Qurashi, a cadre of the Sharia Office of the Levant Province, formulated its fatwas and permitted the use of violence and force to collect money, saying: “There is no doubt that money is the backbone of jihad, and preparation cannot be achieved without it. Obtaining and providing it is an obligation upon the imam, even by force and coercion.” Whoever refuses to pay the “royal cost” is permitted by the imam or his representative to punish him in a way that deters him and others until he fulfills his financial obligations in this regard. Note that there are no definitive texts from the Qur’an or Sunnah to justify this “ISIS innovation.”

For more on the royal cost, see: Zad al-Tabiyan website; “The Royal Cost”… How ISIS Justified Robbing Citizens in the Name of Religion; Publication date: September 16, 2024; Link: https://zaadaltabiyan.com/post/6533

15 This operation was carried out through a joint operations room between the SDF, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and the Internal Security Forces, with the participation of 5,000 fighters, both male and female, and with the support of the International Coalition. The operation combed and searched 200 villages in the southern and northern countryside of al-Hawl city and its camp, 70 km from the Iraqi-Syrian border, and the surrounding desert areas, searching for ISIS cells and hideouts. Sixty ISIS cell sites and hideouts were raided in al-Hawl, Tal Hamis, Tal Kocher, and eastern Hasakah. For more, see: sdf-press; Final statement of the “Permanent Security” operation in the al-Hawl area and its camp; Publication date: 11/12/2024; Link: https://sdf-press.com/?p=43648

16 U.S. Central Command; #U.S._Central_Command (#CENTCOM) carried out airstrikes against several ISIS camps in #Syria; Platform X; Publication date: 10/30/2024; Link:

    https://x.com/CENTCOMArabic/status/1851625984564265072

17 Syrian Observatory for Human Rights: In exchange for halting attacks against its convoys in the Badia, the Fourth Division provides “food supplies” as a tribute to the “organization.” Publication date: 11/25/2024; Link: https://www.syriahr.com/مقابل-وقف-الاعتصام-ضد-قوافلها-في-البا/737885/

18 ديبة؛ “داعش” في سوريا..  هل انتهت القصة؟؛ الناشر: الشرق؛ تاريخ النشر: 2024.08.28؛ الرابط:

https://asharq.com/politics/98507/داعش-في-سوريا-هل-انتهت-القصة/

* The most prominent of these were Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019, Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi in February 2022, and Abu Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashemi al-Qurashi in August 2023, in addition to other leaders in the Idlib countryside…

** This tactic is attributed to the Israeli military doctrine after 2007, and it was adopted as a new strategy aimed at “confronting the challenge represented by the growing capabilities of the enemy, especially at the qualitative level. It adopted the “battle between wars” tactic on all fronts, with the aim of achieving what it called “prevention, deterrence, postponement, and preparation” for the next war…” Despite its downplaying, it enabled Israel to achieve its security better than before… See: Dr. Ihsan Mortada; “The Battle Between Wars”: The Israeli Tactic of Impotence; Army Magazine/Issue 405 – March 2019; Publisher: Official Website of the Lebanese Army; Link:

https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/«المعركة-بين-الحروب» -تكتيك-العجز-الإسرائيلي

19 In 2024, Al-Hawl camp witnessed the second and third phases of the “Humanity and Security” campaign, which resulted in the killing of the organization’s leader in the camp, “Abu Sufyan al-Luhaibi,” and the arrest of the camp’s top religious authority, “Abu Abdul Hamid.” For more, see: ANHA; 85 ISIS mercenaries, including a leader, are in the grip of security forces, and another was killed in Al-Hawl camp; Publication date: 02/06/2024; Link:

https://hawarnews.com/ar/85-مرتاً-من-شارة-الإسلام-بينهم-متزع-في-قوسة-قوات-الأمن-وقتل-آخر-في-مخيم-الهول

The “Permanent Security” campaign resulted in the arrest of 79 ISIS members, the seizure of a large quantity of weapons and tunnels, and the uncovering of a torture network belonging to the organization. For more, see: The official website of the Internal Time Forces – North and East Syria; The final statement of the “Permanent Security” operation in the Al-Hawl area and its camp; Publication date: 11/12/2024; Link: https://asayish.com/?p=13589

20 أرميناك توكماجيان؛ عودة حذِرَة إلى درعا: أبعاد تنامي نشاط «داعش» في جنوب سورية؛ الناشر: مركز الإمارات للسياسات؛ تاريخ النشر: 2022.12.06؛ الرابط:

https://epc.ae/ar/details/featured/alawda-alhdhira-ila-daraa-abaad-tanami-nashat-dayish-fi-janub-suria

21 The faction was formed by Daraa residents in 2016 in the Yarmouk Basin area in the western Daraa countryside. It was considered the arm of ISIS in southern Syria after pledging allegiance to the organization. It was eliminated in a joint operation between former opposition factions after the settlement agreement in 2018 under Russian supervision. Under an agreement with the regime, ISIS members were transferred via a bus convoy to the Badia in May 2018. The organization still relies on the remnants of this faction to secure a foothold in southern Syria. نفس المرجع السابق

22 To view the confessions of an ISIS member, see the Houran Free Gathering; Confessions of an ISIS leader arrested in the city of Jassem; link:

23 أحمد أبازيد؛ من يحكم الجنوب السوري؟؛ الناشر: موقع الجزيرة؛ تاريخ النشر: 2024.04.03؛ الرابط:

https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2024/4/2/من-يحكم-الجنوب-السوري

24 رياض الزين؛ مقتل «والي حوران» بتنظيم «داعش» في ريف درعا الغربي؛ الناشر: صحيفة الشرق الأوسط؛ تاريخ النشر: 2024.01.28؛ الرابط:

https://aawsat.com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/4818881-مقتل-والي-حوران-بتنظيم-داعش-في-ريف-درعا-الغربي

* It is called “fighting of spite” and its goal is to torment, irritate, harm, and terrorize the enemies of God, or to stop them from harming some Muslims. The organization has worked to create a fatwa that harmonizes its policy with the basic legal concept of this fighting, as the organization does not hesitate to kill Muslims who do not accept its ideology.

25 للمزيد انظر:

International Crisis Group; Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria; 18.07.2022; Link:

https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/syria/containing-resilient-isis-central-and-north

26 أحمد كامل البحيري؛ مغزى التوقيت: قراءة في كلمة المتحدث الرسمي باسم داعش؛ الناشر: مركز الأهرام للدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية؛ تاريخ النشر: 2024.01.06؛ الرابط: https://acpss.ahram.org.eg/News/21089.aspx

27 نجوان سليمان؛ الجهاديون الجدد ونموذج طالبان؛ الناشر: مؤسسة كارنيغي للسلام الدولي؛ تاريخ النشر: 2021.12.20؛ الرابط:

https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2021/12/the-new-jihadists-and-the-taliban-model?lang=ar

28 European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies; ISIS and “Jihadists” – What are the reasons for ISIS’s return in Syria? Publication date: 2023.08.21; Link: https://www.europarabct.com/ISIS-والجهاديون-ـ-ما-أسباب-عودة-عمليا/

29 U.S. Department of State; Remarks by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken at a Press Conference; Publication date: 12/14/2024; Link:

https://www.state.gov/translations/arabic/Statements-for-Secretary-of-State-Anthony-J-Blinken/

30 التحالف الدولي؛ البيان المشترك لوزراء التحالف الدولي ضد داعش: واشنطن، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2024؛ تاريخ: 2024.09.30؛ الرابط:

البيان المشترك لوزراء التحالف الدولي ضد داعش: واشنطن، أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2024

31 Mohammed A. Salih; Analysis: US Policy in Northeast Syria: Toward a Strategic Reconfiguration; 06.05.2024; Foreign Policy Research Institute; Link:

 https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/05/us-policy-in-northeast-syria-toward-a-strategic-reconfiguration/

32 United Nations; UN warns of repercussions of regional conflict on Syria and stresses need to resume political process; Publication date: 2024-10-23; Link: https://news.un.org/ar/story/2024/10/1135976