Erdogan and the hot summer

Erdogan doesn’t hesitate to make hostile statements towards the safe areas in northern and eastern Syria, the “Self-Administration areas”. His latest statement about a hot summer being prepared for by the Turkish occupation state against the Self-Administration areas in northern and eastern Syria and against southern Kurdistan, and the postponement of this aggression to the summer was based on reports from the Turkish operations room that did not complete all its plans and did not finalize its preparations enough for a massive military operation in these areas. His statements this time are not like his previous ones, except for the recent aggression that targeted the infrastructure and industrial facilities in the Self-Administration areas. Erdogan is trying to get the green light from the US and international and regional support to carry out such aggression, especially since the crises in the region, such as the Gaza war, military tension between Israel and Iran, the Ukrainian crisis, and economic projects in the region, could serve Erdogan in gaining the support of the relevant countries. Erdogan’s goal is to occupy the Self-Administration areas to connect them to the occupied areas in northern Syria and then connect them to southern Kurdistan, thus completing his Ottoman project “the Milli Pact” and forming a blue belt “a Turkmen state or influence in Syria and Iraq”. However, Erdogan has failed to break or weaken the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and occupy the legitimate defense areas despite dozens of aggressive military operations against them under various names. Therefore, as a result of his failure, Erdogan is trying to launch a wide-scale aggression with regional and international support through which he can achieve his Ottoman dream in the region. Erdogan’s recent statement and the fact of its confirmation may have been based this time on regional and international entities that support him in his aggression on the Self-Administration areas in Syria and the legitimate defense areas in southern Kurdistan. Erdogan’s upcoming visit to Washington may come to offer concessions “returning to the Western fold” and providing military and logistical support to Israel after tension between Israel and Iran in the region, in order to obtain the American green light and support in his military aggression on the mentioned areas.

What are the indicators pointing to Erdogan’s aggressive approach to the region? What concessions could he offer to get the American green light? What are the positions of regional and international countries towards the expected Turkish aggression? Who are the parties that may support Erdogan in his aggression?

Supporting indicators for Erdogan’s statements

1- The Israeli war on Gaza

Despite regional and international rejection of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, Turkey, which is considered one of these countries that reject war and is a supporter of Islamic groups and organizations, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and including Hamas, did not stand idly by like other regional and international countries. Instead, it supported Israel directly by supporting it economically; Turkish commercial ships loaded with goods and food headed towards Israel and supported the Israeli economy throughout the war against Hamas. The latter still believes that Turkey is the protector and supporter against any aggression that may affect its presence and status in Palestine. As the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip approaches its end, or more precisely, the end of major military operations in most areas of the Gaza Strip except Rafah, Erdogan began imposing economic sanctions on Israel. Looking at these sanctions, we see that they will not make any difference in the war and will not affect Israel even by 1%, unless these sanctions are just ink on paper for internal and external consumption that Turkey stands by the Palestinian people.

Therefore, Turkish support for Israel may come at a cost for Erdogan to receive Israeli support, despite Israeli support for Turkey in its aggressive military operations in legitimate defense areas. However, Erdogan wants to get Israeli support in his major aggression on the mentioned areas by pressuring the United States to get the green light and support in this aggression, which may affect the shape of the region’s map and the strategic interests of regional and international countries in the region in particular and the Middle East region in general.

2- The Israeli-Iranian tension in the region:

In addition to Erdogan exploiting the Israeli war on Gaza and standing by its side, the Israeli-Iranian tension serves him in launching a major aggression in the region. The military tension between Israel and Iran in the region serves the Turkish agenda; Turkey, an ally of the United States, has strong military and security relations with Israel. Due to Turkey’s strategic position, which serves Israel and the United States, Erdogan will not hesitate to exploit this tension to his advantage. After waiting for the Iranian response to Israel following the bombing of its consulate in Damascus, which resulted in the deaths of many people, including a senior commander in the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard “Mohammad Reza Zahedi” and seven other officers in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Erdogan deployed the Russian-made S400 system on the Iraqi-Iranian border, which the world believes will be used in its aggression on legitimate defense areas in the summer – it is unreasonable that such a defensive system to counter ballistic and strategic missiles, which the people’s protection forces do not possess?! – came to protect Israel’s security from Iranian ballistic and strategic missiles. Erdogan is working to legitimize it as it does not have the American Patriot system by putting it at the service of Israel’s security and obtaining Western approval for its aggression in the region.

3- The Russian-Ukrainian war

This war, between Russia and the Western alliance, Erdogan claims neutrality and rejects the Western policy of sanctions against Russia. However, Erdogan can’t stray too far from the Western camp, especially since his party has lost many areas in recent municipal elections to the Republican People’s Party and the Kurdish Democratic Equality Party, and his popularity has started to decline. Since the West has not achieved its goals of weakening Russia militarily and economically and sidelining it as a competitor to the West in the global system, Turkey’s return to the Western camp will increase pressure on Russia economically and militarily, which may change the military equation in Ukraine in exchange for Western approval and support for its anticipated aggression on one hand, and Western neutrality towards inhumane practices against opposition forces, especially the leaders of the Kurdish Democratic Equality Party, on the other hand.

The new Turkish-Russian relationship, which was established in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, is destined to return to square one and a return of tension between the two parties. Erdogan’s upcoming visit to Washington and the talks that the two parties will hold will revolve around key issues such as American support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Ukrainian crisis, protecting Israel, and obtaining American support for its anticipated aggression.

Regional and international stances on the anticipated Turkish aggression

Erdogan’s paradigmatic policy, the Middle Eastern crises, and the Russian-Chinese-Western conflict over the global system provide fertile ground for Erdogan in his anticipated aggression against the self-administration areas in northern and eastern Syria and the legitimate defense areas in southern Kurdistan. However, this does not mean Erdogan’s ability to garner full support from regional and international countries. The map of regional and international alliances and dynamics is no longer as it used to be. When it came to the Kurds in general, regional and international countries supported any move against the Kurds and united their stances. This was evident in 2019 when the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, held a referendum for independence from Iraq. However, this differs for several reasons, including:

1- The partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the United States in combating terrorism in Syria.

2- The US-Russian conflict, as the American presence in eastern Euphrates is linked to supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces. Any disruption, such as “Turkish aggression in the self-administration areas,” would weaken the American presence in Syria in favor of Russian influence and the Syrian regime. This occurred after the Turkish occupation forces entered the areas of Giresipi and Serekaniye in 2019, allowing Russian and regime forces to enter eastern Euphrates for the first time since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011.

3- The conflicting colonial projects of both Iran and Turkey. Turkey’s aggression on the targeted areas does not serve regional countries or even some major countries. The targeted parties by the Turkish occupation do not pose any threat to regional countries or touch what is called their national security. On the contrary, there are relationships between some regional countries and these parties. This process only serves Ottoman ambitions in the region at the expense of the Iranian project.

However, Turkey does not need support from all regional and international countries but rather from some countries and the green light from the US, alongside its support, to be able to launch its aggression against the self-administration areas in Syria and the legitimate defense areas in southern Kurdistan.

Some international and regional perspectives on the anticipated Turkish aggression.

1- The United States and Western countries

The United States and Western countries are going through a phase of conflict with both China and Russia, which threaten its existing global system – Russian military expansion and Chinese economic expansion. It’s almost like a third world war scenario; hence, it needs the support of its allies and partners to maintain its spheres of influence, especially in the Middle East region. Turkey is one of the main countries serving this purpose at this stage. However, the relationship between the two parties has deteriorated in recent years, particularly after the alleged military coup in Turkey in 2016. Turkey has turned towards Russia, establishing economic and military relations with them, alongside their differing strategies in Syria. The United States supports the Syrian Democratic Forces in fighting terrorism and preventing the strengthening of Russia and the Syrian regime through their presence east of the Euphrates River. On the other hand, Turkey, the US ally, occupies the entire northern regions of Syria up to 30 km deep, supports terrorist organizations, fights against the Syrian Democratic Forces (US partner), and undermines the self-administration and its democratic project. This is in addition to significant coordination with Russia and Iran (US enemies in the Syrian crisis) through the Astana conferences and Sochi summits. As for the legitimate defense areas in southern Kurdistan, which are considered a border region between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, they differ from the self-administration areas in northern and eastern Syria supported by the United States and some Western countries. The Iraqi government demands the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Additionally, the United States, along with Israel, supported the Turkish occupation state in its previous aggressive operations. Therefore, each of the two regions targeted by the Turkish occupation state has a specific significance for the United States. It may support the Turkish aggression on legitimate defense areas but not on self-administration areas, fearing a repeat of the 2019 Turkish aggression scenario and the entry of Russian forces and the regime east of the Euphrates. However, it may give them a new green light to bomb infrastructure and vital facilities again and on a larger scale.

The growing relationship between Turkey and Russia could impact American support, so Erdogan must make concessions to the United States regarding his relationship with Russia. This could negatively affect Russia, which turned a blind eye to the downing of the Russian aircraft, the killing of its ambassador in Turkey, and Turkey’s support for terrorist groups in Syria, among many other issues where Russia supported Turkey economically and militarily. Consequently, this will reflect on the understandings between Erdogan and Putin regarding the occupied northern Syria.

As for Western countries, Britain may support the Turkish aggression in legitimate defense areas, as it still supports Turkish aggressive military operations in these areas. France, on the other hand, will not support the Turkish aggression due to significant disagreements between the two countries. Regarding Germany, it may not oppose any Turkish aggression in Syria or Iraq, as it supported the Turkish army with Leopard 2 tanks used by the Turkish occupation state in shelling the Afrin area and causing civilian casualties. The new German government may not be like its predecessor, but economic relations between the two parties will influence the German decision to support or oppose Turkish aggression in the region.

2- Russia

Russia may not be as important as the United States in supporting Turkish aggression, but it has a significant influence on Turkey in Syria and on Iran’s decision if this aggression negatively affects its interests in the region. Therefore, the Russian position depends on the concessions Erdogan will offer to the United States and their impact on its interests and military presence in the region, especially in Ukraine and Syria. Despite the growing relationship with Turkey, Russia does not trust it and cannot rely on it. It fully understands that Turkey cannot stray from the Western sphere and will eventually return to the West. Therefore, Russia works as much as possible to benefit from Turkey, its neutrality, and to hinder Turkey’s return to the West, making it not so easy by linking it with economic and military files. From this perspective, Russia may exploit Turkish threats to expand its military presence in the self-administration areas and make the Syrian Democratic Forces make concessions to the Syrian regime, especially regarding oil, gas, and other files, especially if the Turkish aggression continues to target infrastructure and industrial facilities in the self-administration areas of northeastern Syria. As for Turkey’s ground invasion of the region, Turkey may be given the green light in some areas that are not of great importance to Russia, while at the same time affecting the partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the United States, such as allowing a ground attack on Kobani. However, for a broad ground invasion, Russia will not tolerate or allow Turkey to occupy strategically important areas such as the M4 highway, oil and gas fields, and agricultural lands, which are of great importance to Russia in securing its bills from the regime and strengthening the regime economically.

3- Iran

The relationship between the two neighbors “Iran and Turkey” has never been good throughout history; since the Turks appeared in the region. However, the Syrian crisis, the Astana conferences, and the Sochi summits created this temporary relationship. Each of the two countries has its colonial project in the region, the Iranian project (the Shia crescent), while the Turkish project is (the Ottoman crescent) “the Milli Pact ” and their attempts to become the strongest country in the region and the Middle East with a significant influence on regional countries. Therefore, each of them tries to establish control over areas that are still outside their control to complete their colonial project. Thus, Iran realizes that Turkey’s justification for its aggression in the self-administration areas and the legitimate defense areas in southern Kurdistan under the pretext of securing its southern borders – as it claims – serves only its Ottoman project and does not serve any regional state. On the contrary, military control over southern Kurdistan alongside its economic control will greatly affect the Iranian project and its influence in Iraq and its allies, especially since Turkey’s eyes are on Aleppo, Mosul, and Kirkuk, in addition to Turkey’s alliance with Israel by deploying the S400 system on the Iraqi-Iranian border to intercept Iranian missiles heading towards Israel. Therefore, Iran will not give the green light to the Turkish occupation state to launch its aggression, and may work to thwart it in response to the Turkish position, and this applies to the self-administration areas of northern and eastern Syria.

4- Iraq

The Iraqi government does not have political decision-making power and is subject to Iranian and American influence; therefore, any decision taken by the Iraqi government must first obtain Iranian approval. On the other hand, the relationship between the Iraqi government and the regional government is tense; the former is trying to control oil resources and border crossings, reduce the privileges of the regional government, and strengthen the central government, especially since Iraq is suffering from economic crises, including the water crisis resulting from the Turkish occupation state withholding water from neighboring countries, and its control within the framework of certain agreements may serve the central government in Baghdad in these files. However, Iranian influence and the Iraqi Shia rejection of Turkish military presence in southern Kurdistan may pose an obstacle to “Sudani” in supporting the Turkish aggression in legitimate defense areas.

As for the regional government, it is divided between supporters and opponents; the Kurdistan Democratic Party, due to its organic relationship with the Turkish occupation state, may facilitate the movement of the Turkish army and its mercenaries within its areas without directly engaging in this aggression, fearing Kurdish-Kurdish clashes and increasing popular rejection of its policies; which may affect its popularity in the region. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is not linked to the Turkish occupation state in any way; therefore, it rejects Turkish military presence in southern Kurdistan and does not support the Turkish aggression in legitimate defense areas; hence, the Turkish occupation state is trying to attract the National Union to its side as it represents an important element for the success of its aggression and the reduction of its losses.

In this context, it seems that the ground is not set for the Turkish occupation to get the green light from the US in Syria, and to gain the approval and support of regional countries for the Turkish aggression on legitimate defense areas. However, all possibilities remain open for Erdogan to launch his aggression on the region, depending on regional and international concessions and dynamics, and how much these countries benefit from this aggression to achieve their goals in the region. Each targeted area has its own specific characteristics, especially the areas of self-administration in northeastern Syria, which are of great importance in American policy in the region, and cannot allow Turkey to sabotage this project in Syria. Therefore, it is difficult for Turkey to invade the self-administration areas on the ground in the presence of two major powers, the United States and Russia; the former wants to establish its presence in Syria after Iraq demanded the withdrawal of US forces from its territory, and the latter aspires to control the region and restore the regime’s control over it. Therefore, the Turkish aerial aggression in targeting infrastructure and industrial facilities is its only option to try to weaken self-administration and create internal discord, by preventing the administration from repairing what the Turkish war machine destroys; thus, rendering it unable to secure the people’s needs for oil derivatives, gas, electricity, and basic food supplies. The approaching date of wheat and barley harvests with the expected Turkish aggression may turn the summer into a hot one; by burning agricultural crops in the region. Therefore, the region may witness large deliberate fires set by dormant cells affiliated with the ISIS organization supported by the Turkish occupation state, which may put the Syrian Democratic Forces and self-administration in a difficult test to maintain the farmers’ livelihoods and resist the Turkish aggression. As for the legitimate defense areas, they vary and the ground may be somewhat prepared for the Turkish occupation to launch its aggression on them; due to the continued support of some Western countries for the aggressive military operations carried out by Turkey in the region, but the failure or success of the Turkish aggression depends on the positions of regional countries and the Kurdish forces involved. However, the truth lies in Erdogan’s inability to end the Kurdish liberation movement no matter the scale and strength of the Turkish aggression and no matter how many supporting countries there are; as Turkey has failed for four decades to end this movement both domestically and internationally.