Turkey’s continued confusion in internal and foreign policies
One of the historical errors in understanding the geography of the region and its secretions in the last century is that after 1923, specifically after the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkish state is the legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic Caliphate that was stolen from the Abbasids. It is important to analyze this important point, so it must be put forward and confirmed that the current Turkish civil state is a national state emanating from the collapsed Islamic empire or caliphate exactly like the rest of the countries that were formed after World War I in application of the English model of the narrow nation-state which defines one nationality, confines it to a specific geography, and demarcates borders on this basis. Turkey, after its loss with Germany and the other Axis powers in World War I, naturally yielded to the dictates of the victorious party. It was forced to sign several agreements and treaties that would, of course, be a surrender and according to the imposition of the victor’s conditions. There have been a lot of these treaties and agreements, including the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Treaty of Lausanne. Here, we particularly mention the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 because it is considered the most defeatist treaty of the Ottoman Empire, and it is also considered the beginning of the end of its era, and the starting point of the Turkish civil state in its current form. This treaty is also considered the most disadvantaged against the Kurdish people who lost their full rights to live on their historical land and practice their language and culture.
Turkish-Kurdish relations in the last century
Neither the agreements with the victorious countries nor the successive policies of repression of the Turkish governments were able to eliminate the Kurdish will to demand the rights of the Kurdish people to a decent life. Accordingly, the Kurdish revolutions did not stop for nearly a hundred years, starting with the revolution of Sheikh Said Piran in 1925, passing through the revolution of Ihsan Nuri Pasha in Ararat and Agri in 1937, reaching the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) revolution in 1978, which represented a qualitative leap in the history of the Kurdish revolutions in Turkey and all other parts of Kurdistan, the revolution that relied on ideology and modern thought far from the traditional leadership that was carried out by a tribal nationalist leader or a cleric dependent on the religious movement. It is no longer hidden from anyone how important this revolution is in the modern Kurdish history, where this movement, through its first theorists – led by Mr. Abdullah Ocalan – was able to achieve important steps at the regional and international levels, and to present the Kurdish issue in international forums as an issue of land and people, and that it is not what the occupier of Kurdistan wants to present it as an issue of state security and terrorism.
From “zero problems” policy to all problems
Since the emergence of modern civil Turkey and the separation of religion from the state, it has been under almost complete control under the dominance of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), of which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was considered the spiritual father. Accordingly, the Turkish public mood in general considered or saw in this party as its permanent savior. In 2002, with the Justice and Development Party (AKP) coming to power, it was a blow to the party leaders. Thus, it created question marks for this arrival and how to present this Islamic movement as an alternative to the puritanical nationalist movement. In fact, the AKP’s soft policies were a source of local, regional and international satisfaction, and the possibility of presenting this type of alternative to some nationalist leaders in the region. Accordingly, the term (moderate Islam) was actually circulated as an alternative to terrorism, which was attached to extremist radical Islam that was represented at the time and at its peak by al-Qaeda in Tora Bora in Afghanistan. Of course, this picture did not become clear until more than two decades had passed, and in fact, with the advent of the AKP, many things began to change, some of which were radical and some of which were temporary. It began with important economic steps at the level of the Turkish economy and paved the way for public freedoms. Therefore, the drawn up plan was moving in full swing until the start of what became known as the Arab Spring or the Spring of Peoples at the end of 2010, which started from North Africa all the way to the Middle East. With Turkey’s deviation from the line drawn for it, the policy of “all problems” began with its intervention in the crises of the region and neighboring countries, and returning to the starting point in creating crises starting with drawing water borders with neighboring Greece, direct intervention in the Syrian crisis, direct support for the Muslim Brotherhood in both Egypt and Libya, direct intervention and support for Azerbaijan at the expense of the Armenian neighbor, and border problems with the Iraqi neighbor under the names and arguments of combating terrorism. All of the above were direct reasons for the departure of Turkey’s AKP with its moderate Islamic face from the path of the line drawn for it.
Erdogan’s survival grace or curse
Anyone who follows the recent legislative and presidential elections in Turkey, and through its analysis, finds that Erdogan may have been reappointed more than re-elected, and this is clearly evident through the lack of electoral transparency or international or even local follow-up of the progress of the election process and the skepticism of many parties about the extent of its credibility. This is most clearly evident through the very close results between Erdogan and his competitor in the CHP. Therefore, it seems that Erdogan’s functional role in global politics has not yet ended. Based on this, Erdogan’s remaining at the top of the pyramid of power is a necessity for reasons that can be mentioned, some of which are countless:
– The Islamic world does not have a head of the Sunni doctrine, unlike the Shiite one, which relies mainly on the presence of the highest religious authority.
– Providing an opportunity to create or find the appropriate alternative with the defection of many of his comrades from him, including Abdullah Gul, Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan. Names such as his son-in-law Birat Albayrak, his current Foreign Minister and his former first intelligence man Hakan Fidan were put forward.
New Turkish policy: rapprochement and understandings, or acquiescence and concessions
As we mentioned earlier, Turkey’s policies during the last decade in particular have always been characterized by aggravation, confrontation, and opposition, and therefore it was creating crises from nothing and for nothing. Therefore, it has become a regional and international pariah, and one of the most important contradictions it has experienced during it is the rapprochement with the Second World at the expense of the West, to which it belongs mainly through international systems and alliances represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). With its conclusion of the S400 missile deal with Russia, it has placed itself in an armament maze from which it cannot be easily exited, because these missiles are essentially directed to defend any attack by the coalition to which they belong. Therefore, this contradiction would create more gap between Turkey and the West, and in the end it is necessary to define strategic policy and identify one party at the expense of the other, and the policy of “skating on thin ice” cannot last indefinitely.
Erdogan’s recent visit to Egypt confirms the extent of its importance as one of the important Arab and regional countries in formulating the region’s policies, so rapprochement with it is a given, especially since Egypt has a historical role in Turkish-Arab relations, and the Cairo Agreement was important in setting the broad outlines of the Treaty of Lausanne. It also had the main role in ending the crisis between Turkey and Syria at the end of 1998, following the dispute between them over the Kurdish issue, and sponsoring the Adana Security Agreement between the two sides at the expense of the Kurdish rights.
Relations with the Iraqi neighbor, shuttle visits by Turkish officials – on or without the occasion – and the constant emphasis on combating terrorism and controlling borders, knowing that Turkish points and bases within Iraqi territory have become a subject of doubt and unrest for the Iraqi Kurdish and Arab people alike, but they are overlooked because of some of the narrow interests of some beneficiary groups, materially and economically.
As for the AKP policy towards the central Arab and Islamic issue (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), it has become crystal clear, as it does not go beyond taking a media group to benefit from it before any electoral entitlement, or to mobilize some voices calling for trafficking in the issue alone.
As for the Syrian issue, it has also become clear to every follower the extent to which the defeatist and submissive Syrian opposition is dependent on Ankara’s decisions, its exit from the course of the revolution and Syrian demands, its complete submission to Turkish dictates, and the transformation of the opposition military force into mercenaries from whom it benefits in its military files in both Libya and Azerbaijan.
Turkish ambitions in Syrian energy
It has become self-evident to every follower of Turkish affairs that the head of the regime – and before any electoral entitlement – is carrying out some acrobatic movements and Donquixote wars with neighboring countries, most notably the arena of northern and eastern Syria and southern Kurdistan, with flimsy arguments in which Turkey claims to preserve its national security, and perhaps the statements of the leader of the extremist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Devlet Bahcali about the necessity of penetrating into Syrian territory for a distance of 60 km is the best evidence of this. Also, the recent targeting of the Turkish war machine for service and civilian infrastructure, including oil and electrical power plants, to cover up its military failure against the PKK fighters in the mountains of Kurdistan. Turkey is certainly considered at the top of the pyramid of countries that had a close relationship with ISIS according to what has appeared publicly in terms of concrete documents and books by huge financial transactions that occurred through it, its companies, banks, and remittance and banking offices, after ISIS lost the direct border with Turkey, the stolen Syrian energy resources that ISIS was selling at the lowest prices to finance its terrorist operations, which directly affected the already dilapidated Turkish economy, were cut off from Turkey. Therefore, all this pressure is probably a kind of bargaining to obtain a share of Syrian wealth, even the issue of bargaining over the waters of the Euphrates can also be linked to this axis.
As a result, it seems that the AKP and the head of its pyramid have deviated from the line drawn for them, and it seems that they have become a source of unrest for the dark rooms that formulate international policies, and therefore the lifespan has ended and the issue of change has become a matter of time, especially with the presence of this huge amount of internal crises and external affairs, most notably internal Kurdish demands, freedoms and economy. Therefore, municipal elections may be his last chance.
