Turkey is Deceiving itself with Military Solutions

After the formation of the modern Turkish state on the ruins of the Ottoman state following World War I, and as a result of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the issue of the existence of the Kurdish people and the Kurdish issue became a matter of life or death for the republic. Therefore, Turkish policy towards the Kurdish issue took on a military form and a security solution, by denying the existence of the issue, confronting the Kurds and their activities, language, culture, national existence, Kurdish revolutions, and uprisings with iron and fire, alongside systematic efforts to assimilate the Kurdish people through Turkification policies, displacement, extermination, and accompanying demographic change policies in Kurdistan. Turkish governments, as a result of these policies and exterminations, became fully convinced that the Kurdish issue in Turkey would never resurface, that it had been buried forever. This was clearly expressed by the Turkish press during the Ağrı rebellion, where in 1930, the Turkish newspaper “Milliyet” published a picture of Mount Ağrı, the stronghold of the Kurdish rebellion led by General İhsan Nuri Pasha, with a tombstone bearing the inscription: ” Here buried the imaginary Kurdistan “. Several years later, there was the Dersim rebellion 1937-1938, which faced brutal massacres at the hands of the Turkish army after its suppression, with the number of victims reaching, according to some sources, 75,000 men, women, elderly, and children. At the time, Turkish President Erdoğan stated that ten thousand had been killed and offered an apology in 2011 for the massacre, holding the Republican People’s Party responsible as they were in power at that time. The policies of extermination and displacement reached their peak after the elimination of the last Kurdish uprisings in northern Kurdistan, specifically the Dersim rebellion of 1937.

However, Kurdistan, which Turkey announced its burial, has returned to the forefront after a long period of silence that lasted from 1939 until 1978, when the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (founded by Mr. Abdullah Ocalan in 1978) declared that Kurdistan and the Kurdish issue exist and must be resolved. Following Turkey’s attempt to eradicate the party and crush it militarily, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party announced armed struggle in 1984, leading Turkey into a new confrontation with the Kurdish issue. The ’80s and ’90s witnessed bloody clashes, and Turkey was unable to end the revolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, whose struggle took on a local, regional, and international character. Turkey was no longer able to contain it, prompting NATO and Western allies, in cooperation with some Arab countries, to carry out an international conspiracy to arrest Mr. Abdullah Ocalan and imprison him on Imrali Island in 1999. However, the revolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party continued, during which Mr. Ocalan called for peace and a resolution to the Kurdish issue. Prior to that, there were unilateral ceasefires in 1993, 1995, and 1998 by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to pave the way for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue, but there were no similar initiatives or tangible steps from the Turkish side to build trust.

The functional role of Turkey and the peace tactic:

Turkey cannot be isolated in its foreign and domestic policies from the role assigned to it by NATO, led by the United States. Therefore, the coming of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2002 was not just an electoral victory or a democratic situation, but rather the requirements of a new stage of regional and international conflicts over dominance. The United States, according to its project seeking to enhance its dominance as a single pole in the world and confront both China and Russia, sought to present “Justice and Development,” marketed as a moderate Islamic reformist movement that could be emulated in the Islamic world, and contain the region through it. Therefore, the Justice and Development Party attracted the attention and support of the West. Indeed, Turkey rapidly transformed into a model and a magnet, gaining wide popularity in both the Arab and Islamic worlds. Internally, there was a qualitative leap in economic aspects, and discussions about democratic changes began, including opening up to the Kurdish issue. In 2005, Turkey entered into direct negotiations with Mr. Ocalan and party leaders, resulting in what became known as the Oslo negotiations in 2009, concluding in 2015. Turkey was not seeking peace as much as it was seeking to buy time, calm tensions, and weaken the Kurdish Workers’ Party, while building its own strength, both militarily and economically, during the years of calm. Since the Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey, its ambition has been to resolve the Kurdish issue before 2023, the centenary of the Treaty of Lausanne and the declaration of the second republic imbued with an Islamic Brotherhood character, by annexing the countries that were separated from the territories of the Ottoman state after World War I due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 and then the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and achieving the expansionist Turkish century. This became apparent with the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010-2011, as Turkey followed a policy of soft power (economically, culturally, and commercially) and through a “zero problems” policy with its neighbors to achieve its Ottoman goals.

But after the start of what was called the Arab Spring revolutions, and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic movements in the region, and the tragic fall of Arab regimes, the policy shifted from “zero problems” to a policy of igniting problems and direct intervention in the region and Arab Spring countries. It followed a policy of direct intervention and military force, where it found the opportunity ripe, so it had to reveal its true face towards the Kurdish issue, and end the peace process with Mr. Ocalan, in addition to getting rid of its functional role within the Western strategy as a moderate Islam, to contain the region and implement its own project in achieving the dream of reviving the Ottoman state as an alternative to the Kemalist Republic. However, despite Turkey’s success in investing in the Muslim Brotherhood movements and Islamic factions, including al-Nusra and ISIS, and its ability to manipulate them according to its agendas, reaching its ambition to overthrow the Damascus regime and empower Islamists to rule it, along with expansion in North Africa (Libya, Egypt, Tunisia). However, regardless of the Russian role and the international coalition in curbing its great ambitions, the main factor in Turkey’s retreat from achieving its grand ambitions was the Kurdish factor and the Kurdish issue, especially in light of the emergence of the Kurdish Workers’ Party as an effective force in Southern Kurdistan, confronting ISIS in Sinjar and protecting the Yazidi Kurds from genocide, and the rise of the Kurdish forces (YPG-YPJ) in Western Kurdistan and liberating wide areas from northern Syria and Rojava from the Islamic factions supported by Turkey, and these forces turned into a partner for the international coalition in fighting ISIS, and defeating its ally ISIS in Kobani. Turkey feared that the peace process with the Kurds domestically and the rise of Kurdish power in Rojava would force it to make more concessions, and take the Kurdish issue out of the narrow and formal solutions frame that Turkey had planned for “throwing dust in the eyes” and gradually eliminating the Kurdish workers later on. Therefore, Turkey shifted all its focus and capabilities towards preventing the Kurds in Syria from gaining any gains, working on destroying and occupying the region, and openly revealing its intention to fully occupy northern and northeastern Syria. It began to tighten the noose on the Kurdish political movement in northern Kurdistan, carrying out airstrikes on PKK sites to provoke confrontation and push the Kurdistan Workers’ Party to resume fighting. The party warned against this, but Turkey was determined to push towards destroying the peace process. Following Turkish airstrikes on PKK sites in the province of Şırnak in 2015, Reuters reported that the PKK had stated that the airstrikes, carried out simultaneously with strikes against ISIS fighters in Syria, had emptied the peace process of its content, but they did not officially withdraw from it. Erdogan said in a press conference in Ankara before leaving the country for an official visit to China: “It is impossible for us to continue the peace process with those who threaten our national unity and the bonds of brotherhood between us” (Reuters).

Destroying the Kurdish issue is an old-new ambition:

The recent statements by the Turkish President Erdogan about ending the Kurdish Workers’ Party are an expression of old ambitions, not new ones. The successive governments in Turkey since the military coup in 1980 (the coup of Kenan Evren) have declared that they will eliminate the Kurdish workers and end the Kurdish issue! However, all those governments have come and gone, but PKK remain, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party remain, and the Kurdish issue remain. Under the “Justice and Development” government, since 2015, Turkey has launched dozens of military campaigns against PKK inside and outside Turkey. These campaigns, based on the preparations, the quality of weapons, and the size of the forces involved, have been sufficient to confront the armies of countries in the region. With each military campaign, Turkey declares it as the final battle with the party, claiming that it will be eliminated once and for all. As the Turkish army incurs losses against the Kurdish PKK, Turkey resorts to new statements about a new campaign, the latest one to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Erdogan’s recent statements emphasizing that he will resolve the border issue with Iraq and build a security belt in Southern Kurdistan by summer 2024, alongside continuing what Erdogan calls the safe zone in Rojava (northeastern Syria), threatening and warning anyone who rejects his strategy. This came in a speech by Erdogan on 4-3-2024 during his meeting with members of his government, regardless of the fact that these threats and statements are old – new and have been crafted by the self-administration in northeast Syria, as well as by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. They are not unaware of Turkish politics and always expect Turkey to launch attacks and seek to occupy the region, but it carries several indicators; internal, regional, and international.

Internal Indicators:

– There is pressure on the “Justice and Development” government, which sought to hide and cover up the significant losses suffered by the Turkish forces in southern Kurdistan at the hands of PKK, and under very harsh weather conditions, after previously claiming that it had almost completely eliminated the PKK. “Asharq Al-Awsat” newspaper reported, citing the Turkish Ministry of Defense on 23-12-2023, the killing of 12 Turkish soldiers in two days during separate attacks on two Turkish bases in southern Kurdistan, in Khakurk and Zab. The PKK media mentioned a much higher number. On 12-1-2024, the “Arab” website reported, citing the Turkish Ministry of Defense, the killing of nine Turkish soldiers and the injury of others in an attack on a Turkish military base in northern Iraq (southern Kurdistan). PKK websites mentioned much larger numbers. Therefore, Erdogan’s statements about the summer may be due to the end of winter and the melting snow, as the Turkish army often conducts military operations in this season. Erdogan threatens to retaliate against the army and seek revenge when winter ends, knowing that Turkish operations have not stopped at all since 2015.

– Dodging calls to resolve the Kurdish issue, pressuring the Kurdish political movement in Southern Kurdistan as the municipal elections approach, scheduled for 31/3/2024, which Erdogan considers crucial in terms of Turkey entering the Turkish century or, more precisely, Turkey entering the Erdogan era, and solidifying his rule which he finds lacking without the major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir). Kurdish votes are very important in these cities, and Erdogan seeks to obtain them through threats, intimidation, and pushing the Kurdish political movement to support him.

– Winning the votes of Turkish nationalists, by showing strength in fighting the Kurdish people and their political movement, and insisting on defeating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and undermining the democratic experiment in northeastern Syria (Rojava).

Regional indicators:

– It seems that Erdogan’s assertion of success in his upcoming military campaign against the fighters (guerrilla) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) stems from relying on the understandings he achieved with Baghdad and Erbil regarding the fight against the PKK. The visit of Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Guler to Baghdad on 24/2/2024 after the Turkish army suffered heavy losses by the guerrilla forces. This was nothing but evidence of the Turkish inability to resolve the war in the mountains of Kurdistan, and the need for Baghdad and Erbil to cooperate with it in this through a security agreement, which Turkey had prepared for following a visit by the Iraqi Defense Minister in October 2023 to Ankara. During that visit, the Iraqi minister discussed with his Turkish counterpart cooperation between the two countries in combating terrorism and enhancing border security. Turkey felt that it was a good opportunity to impose a security agreement on Baghdad after Iran did before to keep the Iranian Kurdish parties away from the border. It seems that the Turkish compensation will be in the economic aspects and increasing Iraq’s share of the Tigris waters in addition to commercial promises (the Development Road in Iraq or as it is known Dry Canal). There was a visit by Turkish security officials and the Minister of Defense to Erbil as well, and a meeting with the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). After those visits, Turkey expressed its satisfaction with KDP’s understanding and cooperation with them against the PKK, while it expressed its annoyance with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and even threatened its dealings with the PKK, for which the party’s leader, Bafel Talabani, stated that they do not consider the PKK an enemy or a danger, and that they have relations with the PKK, but it seems that Baghdad, as a result of the great Iranian influence over it, does not seem to go along with the Turkish requests as Turkey desires, and will not get involved in direct participation with Turkey against the PKK, at a time when Erbil’s position appears to be more in line with Ankara, and that Erbil did not issue any clarification or statement contradicting the Turkish statements about the readiness and acceptance of the PDK to work side by side with Turkey. Former Secretary-General of the Peshmerga Forces, Jabbar Yawar, did not hide the Turkish desire to ignite an intra-Kurdish war, as he stated that Ankara intends to use the Peshmerga in its war against the PKK to avoid major losses among its forces, and warned that the Turkish effort entails the risk of reigniting the conflict between the Kurdish brothers.

– Turkey views the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas from the perspective of its ability to imitate Israel in transcending international positions and the possibility of applying the Gaza scenario to the Kurdish people and their liberation movement. Therefore, Erdogan continues to criticize and attack Israel verbally, and calls for its trial, and through reactions in view of his statements and his public support for Hamas, one can sense the scenario that could be implemented against the Kurds and their democratic experience in Rojava and against the Guerrilla forces in the mountains of Kurdistan. The violent bombardment that he began at the beginning of 2024 against vital installations, security forces, and civilians in north and east Syria is only part of Erdogan’s vision of possible policies and the nature of international positions and reactions.

– The state of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) senses that the Middle East heading towards change where it carries the emergence of federal entities or a Kurdish state that may not stop at southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq) and Rojava (northern Syria), but may include southern Turkey and eastern Iran as well, and that the most capable of being active and agent of change is the PKK and the democratic experience in Northeast Syria. Turkey also fears the development of Western relations with the Kurds in Rojava and its turn from a partnership in fighting ISIS to a strategic partnership, and the possibility of changing its stance regarding the PKK and removing it from the terrorist list, which means a serious blow to Turkey’s denialist mentality, and the rise of the issue of solving the Kurdish issue and the release of Mr. Abdullah Ocalan. Therefore, Turkey is working very seriously to destroy Rojava and impede the crystallization of the democratic project there into a situation resembling northern Iraq.

International indicators: 

– Turkey, after having used most of its cards to put pressure on the West and investing in the Russian-American conflict, feels that it has lost its geostrategic importance to the West, especially after the official acceptance of Finland and Sweden into NATO, which came after bartering and economic and military blackmail operations, including the issue of its delivery of F-16 aircraft and lifting the sanctions against it. Well, it succeeded in doing so, but it failed to change the American position towards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and stop supporting them and the issue of American withdrawal from the region. So, Turkey – through recent threats – is putting pressure on the US and presenting its expansionist project and the tensions it will bring if the Turkish demands will not be met at a time when Turkey realizes that it is playing in the time-out of its opportunistic dual relations between Russia and the West, and the repercussions that this may bring to it after it began courting the US. This courtship that will only be at the expense of its relations with Russia, including the S-400 deal and facilitating Russian circumvention of Western sanctions, commercial investments, and its influence in northern Syria. Therefore, by creating these tensions, Turkey seeks to play more or gain more time in playing on both sides with Russia and the US, and to attract attention to it after it began to feel marginalized in many issues in the region, and its loss of prestige in front of regional countries.

– Turkey, after it was the most problematic NATO country, even with NATO itself, contributed greatly to obstructing the American project in the region, supported terrorist factions, created tensions and problems with its allies (Greece and Israel), entered into deals and bartering with Russia, and practiced opportunism in approaching developments in the region and the Ukrainian-Russian war, exploiting all of this to serve its agendas, in addition to its suspicious relations with Iran and Hamas movement, started to market itself as an indispensable American partner and ally in the region’s arrangements and the fight against ISIS, and a reliable partner capable of playing a greater role within the American project, especially after the Turkish presidential elections in 2023 and the installation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, which appears to have been achieved through Turkish concessions to the West. But its dilemma lies in the Kurdish issue, which Turkey cannot turn around under the AKP government as a result of the huge amount of nationalist and racist sentiment towards the Kurds under this government, and its building of its supporter base through the policy of genocide against the Kurds, and any turning around could mean a lot for the future of Erdogan and his party in Turkey, especially by Turkish nationalists, the main supporters of his repressive policy against the Kurds.

The result: 

Turkey played a functional role for the US throughout the years of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, as a factor of regional balance and deterrent force for forces threatening American interests, and a factor of support for Israel as a country besieged by the Arab world, which is the main reason for its entry into NATO. However, the Kurdish issue has always been the main concern of the Turkish state which has long been feared that it would become a fundamental reason for the fragmentation of Turkey, but instead of resolving the Kurdish issue in a democratic and peaceful manner, it chose the military and security solution to get rid of it, which is what caused Turkey to enter into successive crises, whether economic or political, throughout its history from its founding until now. The result of this policy was the recycling of violence and genocides, without achieving the result it was aiming for, which was the elimination of the Kurdish issue, at a time when it was supported by NATO and the US since Turkey being the guardian of NATO’s eastern borders. Therefore, in the current circumstances, and in light of Turkey’s loss of much of its strategic weight in relation to NATO and the US, especially after the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO, and Turkey’s loss of its credibility in the alliance after its opportunistic policies towards the alliance, and the practice of blackmail and dual stances with Russia and the US, it has become to lose that support, and at the same time the Kurdish issue is no longer an internal matter between the countries sharing Kurdistan, and the Kurds have become an important player in regional and international equations. Also, it is not easy for Turkey to portray the Kurdish issue as it was in the eighties and nineties (an issue of state security or an issue of terrorism), but it has become a people’s issue that must be resolved.

– The entry of the KDP into direct military participation against the PKK will mean entering northern Iraq into an intra-Kurdish war that will not be limited to the mountains or limited to two parties, but rather will extend into the region, and will drag other Kurdish forces into the conflict, and may be a reason and factor for intervention. The center (Baghdad) and Iranian factions also entered the conflict; This constitutes a real threat to the federal experiment in Iraq or the gains of the Kurdish people, in addition to the loss of the KDP’s national credibility with respect to the Kurdish people, and may be a reason for the Kurdish people to rebel against the authority of the KDP.

– Turkey’s waging – as it claims or as is clear from its statements – a major and comprehensive war on the Guerrilla will push the entire region into the chaos of a violent war that will include many countries, and will not be limited to a specific region, which means the risk of a conflict erupting that will not be easy to end even before it begins which will also affect the interests of the major countries in the region, and I do not think that Turkey is ready to bear this chaos, in addition to its impact on the Turkish interior, and the rise of the Kurdish issue in a stronger way there.

– ISIS returns with strength to destroy everything that was accomplished by the SDF and the International Coalition, which may bring terrorism and its threat in the region and the world back to the forefront, which means Turkey assuming full responsibility before the international community.

– The results of the Turkish campaign – if it carries out it – whether it is able to achieve its goals or not, will push the Kurdish issue and the issue of the Kurdish people and their fate to the forefront of global concern and the necessity of resolving it.