The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), born out of the Syrian crisis, represents a distinct model from other Syrian regions that emerged from the conflict\u2014politically, militarily, economically, socially, and in terms of security. It adopted a democratic project for all Syrians and has sacrificed tens of thousands of martyrs and wounded to reach this stage. This model could serve as the foundation for a broader project encompassing all Syrian territory, should Damascus choose to engage with the Administration.<\/p>\n
However, from the very first day of its establishment, and according to the claims of Turkey, Iran, and both the old and new Syrian regimes, the Autonomous Administration\u2019s democratic project has posed a threat to their national security and to the structure of governance in Syria. As a result, these actors have sought to undermine it through various military, security, social, and economic means. Despite this, the Administration has remained steadfast\u2014whether through the efforts of its own people and the solidarity of its communities, or through international interventions that have prevented the Turkish occupying state from carrying out a full-scale, brutal invasion of the region, following its occupations of Afrin in 2018 and Tel Abyad and Ras al-Ain in 2019.<\/p>\n
Following the collapse of the Baathist regime in Syria in late 2024, a new government was formed, built upon the foundations of the Salvation Government in Idlib. It adopted a single-color, centralized system\u2014contrary to the approach of the original Salvation Government, which was run by Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham and operated independently of the opposition coalition and its interim government, refusing to recognize them. Today, however, it calls for centralization and works by all means to bring all regions under its Islamist authority.<\/p>\n
Policy of the New Regime in Syria <\/strong><\/p>\n Since its establishment, the new regime in Syria has worked to build a new Syrian army. However, this newly formed army is closer in nature to a force of mercenaries, comprising terrorist factions formally affiliated with the Ministry of Defense but in reality operating under Turkey\u2019s direct command and receiving orders exclusively from Ankara. The current Ministry of Defense itself is not far from the Turkish agenda, with most ministers and government officials being former military leaders from Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham factions and other Turkey-backed mercenary groups. This explains the massacres committed against various Syrian communities, including the Alawites, the Druze community, and earlier, the Kurds.<\/p>\n Rather than adopting a national policy aimed at unifying Syria and alleviating the negative consequences of the Syrian crisis on its people, the new regime has pursued a course that undermines the unity of Syrian territory and fractures Syrian society from within.<\/p>\n The recent events in Suwayda, including massacres targeting the Druze community, have exposed the mindset driving this army and the new regime. These actions have drawn international pressure on the regime due to its aggressive policies toward Syrian communities. Some countries have even withdrawn recognition of the regime, returning it to the list of terrorist entities. In an effort to deflect blame, the regime has resorted to using the term \u201cuncontrolled\u201d or \u201cunruly\u201d factions\u2014a tactic that may have the backing of certain regional powers\u2014and has begun implementing this policy on a wide scale.<\/p>\n The real danger at this stage lies in the so-called \u201ctribal forces\u201d or \u201ctribal mobilization,\u201d not because of their inherent strength, as they do not represent all Arab tribes but only certain segments, but because they risk igniting ethnic strife\u2014both between Kurds and Arabs, and among Arab tribes themselves.<\/p>\n Arab Tribes in Areas Under the AANES <\/strong><\/p>\n Since its inception, the AANES has been the product of peaceful coexistence between the Kurdish and Arab components, alongside other communities in the region. It is governed inclusively, without exclusion, with Kurds and Arabs constituting its two principal components\u2014yet without any discrimination or preferential treatment toward any group, in line with the Democratic Nation project.<\/p>\n While most Arab tribes do not explicitly adopt the Democratic Nation project, some\u2014particularly west of the Euphrates\u2014reject the Administration altogether. This rejection stems either from the Baath Party\u2019s decades-long policy of fostering hostility and resentment toward Kurds, and even among Arab tribes themselves, to consolidate its control, or from the close ties these tribes historically maintained with the former Baathist regime and now with the new regime. In other cases, the rejection is driven by external agendas.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the majority of Arab tribes within the Autonomous Administration\u2019s territories believe in the democratic project and in self-administration. To undermine this project and dismantle the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), exploiting the \u201cArab tribes card\u201d becomes essential\u2014given that Arab tribes make up a significant proportion of the SDF\u2019s ranks.<\/p>\n Using the Arab Tribes to Undermine the AANES \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n There have been repeated attempts by the former Baath regime, as well as by Turkey and Iran, to activate and exploit the \u201cArab tribes\u201d card against the Autonomous Administration. These efforts have included convening tribal meetings\u2014whether in areas under the control of the former regime or inside Turkish territory\u2014aimed at undermining the AANES and the SDF. However, all such attempts have so far failed. These efforts have nevertheless continued even after the fall of the former regime, with each actor\u2014the new regime, certain Arab states, the Turkish Turanian state, and even Iran\u2014seeking to leverage this card to advance its own agenda in Syria.<\/p>\n The events in Suwayda, and the emergence of terms such as \u201cTribal Forces\u201d or \u201cArab Mobilization\u201d following the failure of the Public Security Forces to assert control over the province, can be seen as the first step toward activating this card against the AANES. This could serve either as a means of gauging the general response of Arab tribes across Syria or as a military maneuver to test the viability of this card for use at a later stage.<\/p>\n The developments in Suwayda cannot be dismissed as mere coincidence, nor as a simple outcome of the clashes between the Public Security Forces, in coordination with the new Syrian army, and the Suwayda Military Council, nor solely as a result of the new regime\u2019s failure to take control of the province. The revival of tensions between Bedouins and Druze was clearly intended to deflect blame from the new regime over its violations against the Druze community in Suwayda, by portraying Bedouin militants as unruly groups beyond the regime\u2019s authority. However, eyewitness accounts, prisoner testimonies, and field reports point to the opposite.<\/p>\n Thus, the events in Suwayda\u2014and the role played by certain Arab tribes and Bedouin militants in areas under regime control\u2014serve as a clear indicator of preparations for an operation targeting the east of the Euphrates, namely the territories of the AANES.<\/p>\n Although there is currently a ceasefire in place on the Tishrin Dam front north of Raqqa, which prevents that front from being activated, and a separate ceasefire agreement between the SDF and Damascus, the new regime and Turkey are capable of violating these arrangements. They could do so by mobilizing so-called \u201cuncontrolled factions\u201d to shell and attack military and civilian positions in AANES areas\u2014especially since the new regime\u2019s media has been engaged in systematic incitement of Arab tribes against the Administration, and against the Kurdish component in particular.<\/p>\n Activating the Tribal or Uncontrolled Factions’ Card West of the Euphrates <\/strong><\/p>\n Given the existence of a U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement between the SDF on one side and Turkey and its proxies on the other, as well as an agreement with Damascus, and because these arrangements do not serve the interests of either Turkey or Damascus, the term \u201cuncontrolled factions\u201d has been introduced under labels such as \u201cTribal Forces\u201d or \u201cBedouin Militants.\u201d Damascus claims these groups are beyond its authority, but their real purpose is to stir unrest along the entire Euphrates front.<\/p>\n Unable\u2014or unwilling\u2014to recognize and accept the current reality of the AANES and the SDF, both the new regime and states opposing the Administration\u2019s democratic project are working to destabilize its areas. They do this by targeting SDF military positions and striking civilian areas in Manbij\u2019s countryside or in western Deir ez-Zor, with the goal of activating all Euphrates fronts through these so-called uncontrolled factions. The aim is to terminate the ceasefire, create confusion, and impose a new political and military reality that serves their interests.<\/p>\n While the peaceful coexistence between the AANES’ communities\u2014especially between Kurds and Arabs\u2014has proven extremely resilient since the Administration\u2019s founding, this does not mean hostile actors are incapable of committing violations against the Arab component, or even massacres, to create chaos and push Arab communities to turn against the SDF. Such actions could also be used to justify the mobilization of these uncontrolled factions operating under the banner of Arab tribes west of the Euphrates.<\/p>\n However, this alone would not be enough. The factions labeled \u201cuncontrolled\u201d by the new regime\u2014which include the Public Security Forces, the new Syrian army, and Turkish-backed mercenaries\u2014are not strong enough to confront the SDF on their own. For the military balance to tilt in their favor, Turkish intervention or support would be required. The new regime\u2019s request for military aid to the Syrian army in the form of armored vehicles, weapons, and drones fits squarely within this strategy.<\/p>\n Consequences of Activating the Arab Tribes or Uncontrolled Factions’ Card Against the SDF <\/strong><\/p>\n Arab tribes in Syria can broadly be divided into two categories. The first\u2014and by far the majority\u2014are aligned with the AANES and the SDF and are located within the Administration\u2019s territories. The second are linked to the new regime and to various external agendas\u2014Arab, Turkish, and Iranian\u2014shaped by more than a decade of the Syrian crisis.<\/p>\n The matter is not merely about who controls a given area, but about the policies the controlling side adopts. There is a stark contrast between the governance approach of the Autonomous Administration and that of the new regime. Based on the new regime\u2019s conduct in Syria\u2019s coastal and southern regions, the likely outcome for any area it may take over\u2014should military operations erupt between the SDF and the new regime, along with its so-called uncontrolled factions\u2014is readily apparent. Such developments could also exacerbate tensions among Arab tribes themselves, potentially leading to killings, looting, and destruction, and ultimately triggering inter-tribal warfare that would seriously fracture Syria\u2019s social fabric\u2014particularly the Arab component, to the point of complete disintegration.<\/p>\n The AANES’ Response to the Intentions of the New Regime and Turkey (Conference on the Unity of Components) <\/strong><\/p>\n In the wake of the massacres in the coastal region and in Suwayda, the Autonomous Administration and the SDF are acutely aware of the threats being orchestrated against them and against the communities of the region, as well as of the potential social fragmentation this could cause\u2014both locally and across Syria. To reinforce national cohesion and block these malicious schemes, particularly those targeting the Kurdish and Arab components, the Conference on the Unity of Position of the Components of North and East Syria was held on August 8, 2025, in the Jazira Canton in the city of Hasakah, under the slogan \u201cTogether for Diversity that Strengthens Our Unity, and Partnership that Builds Our Future.\u201d<\/p>\n In its closing statement, the conference affirmed that the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of North and East Syria is a source of strength and enrichment, stressing the need to entrench this diversity within political and administrative structures, and to ensure full representation of all components as a means to reinforce social unity. The statement described the Autonomous Administration model as a participatory experience capable of growth and improvement, and as a living example of democratic community governance. It further declared that the atrocities committed against the people of the coastal region, Suwayda, and the Christian community constitute crimes against humanity that require impartial investigation, with transparency and integrity, to identify the perpetrators\u2014whoever they may be\u2014as these crimes amount to an attack on the entirety of the national fabric.<\/p>\n The conference also called for a comprehensive Syrian national gathering that would bring together all national and democratic forces, with the aim of defining a genuine, inclusive national identity for all Syrians. It concluded by emphasizing that the document emerging from the Conference of the Components of North and East Syria reflects a free will, a shared collective awareness, and a firm commitment to building a free, united, democratic, pluralistic, and decentralized Syria\u2014governed by the rule of law, preserving human dignity, and ensuring equality and freedom for all.<\/p>\n Despite the importance of this conference\u2014which united all Syrian components under one roof (Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Druze, Alawites, Sunnis, and others) for the sake of preserving Syrian territorial unity and social cohesion, and which envisioned a democratic, pluralistic, and decentralized Syria\u2014the closing statement was rejected by the new regime. The regime remains committed to a single-identity, centralized system, influenced by Turkish pressure and its own ideological orientation. Instead of supporting the conference, the regime denounced it, withdrew from the Paris negotiations, and stated that \u201cthe form of the state cannot be determined through factional understandings, but through a permanent constitution ratified by popular referendum, ensuring the equal participation of all citizens. Any citizen has the right to express their vision for the state, but this must occur through public dialogue and the ballot box, not through threats or armed force.\u201d<\/p>\n This stance, however, contradicts the regime\u2019s current policies, whether in holding its so-called \u201cnational\u201d conference in February 2025 without any representation of Syria\u2019s diverse components, issuing a unilaterally-framed constitutional declaration, committing massacres against the Alawite and Druze communities, or through its proposed mechanism for upcoming parliamentary elections.<\/p>\n In short, the new regime\u2019s post-Baathist policy is not a national strategy aimed at rebuilding Syria, but rather one designed to dismantle Syria\u2019s social fabric\u2014even within individual communities. The massacres committed against the Alawite and Druze communities were not motivated by territorial conquest\u2014since residents of those areas have declared their commitment to Syria\u2019s unity and to Damascus\u2014but by hatred, sectarian animosity, and the radical ideology embraced by these factions and their government. Such a path risks dragging the country into sectarian or civil war, rather than fostering unity and restoring the mosaic of coexistence that once characterized Syria.<\/p>\n The new regime cannot be absolved of responsibility for the widespread violations occurring across Syria against both individuals and communities. It cannot credibly claim that these abuses are solely the work of \u201cuncontrolled factions.\u201d The regime bears the greater share of responsibility: if it is unable to rein in these factions, this is a clear sign of its failure to govern\u2014necessitating the empowerment of national and military forces such as the SDF and the Suwayda Military Council to play their role in rebuilding Syria and restoring stability. Alternatively, if the regime wields direct influence over these events and acts on external orders, then it is actively\u2014whether directly or indirectly\u2014working to dismantle Syria\u2019s social fabric and divide the country into mutually hostile enclaves.<\/p>\n The postponement of the Paris meeting between Mazloum Abdi and Ahmad al-Sharaa by the new regime, and its withdrawal from the negotiations, are direct results of Turkish pressure on Damascus. Ankara does not want a final agreement between the two sides unless it serves its own centralized governance agenda and eliminates any form of autonomous administration in North and East Syria\u2014or anywhere in Syria. From this perspective, the failure or indefinite postponement of the meeting appears linked to preparations for the so-called \u201cTribal Forces\u201d or \u201cBedouin Militants\u201d (uncontrolled factions), which are being readied for deployment against the territories of the Autonomous Administration and the SDF. In this light, the new regime\u2019s exploitation of the Components Unity Conference is nothing more than a pretext for engaging in a military operation.<\/p>\n \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), born out of the Syrian crisis, represents a distinct model from other Syrian regions that emerged from the conflict\u2014politically, militarily, economically, socially, and in terms of security. It adopted a democratic project for all Syrians and has sacrificed tens of thousands of martyrs and wounded to …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":1991,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1987","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analizes"],"better_featured_image":{"id":1991,"alt_text":"","caption":"","description":"","media_type":"image","media_details":{"width":1600,"height":900,"file":"2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011.jpg","filesize":334456,"sizes":{"medium":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-300x169.jpg","width":300,"height":169,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":16168,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-300x169.jpg"},"thumbnail":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-150x150.jpg","width":150,"height":150,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":8701,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-150x150.jpg"},"medium_large":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-768x432.jpg","width":768,"height":432,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":69231,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-768x432.jpg"},"1536x1536":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-1536x864.jpg","width":1536,"height":864,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":196240,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-1536x864.jpg"},"wp_review_large":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-320x200.jpg","width":320,"height":200,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":19215,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-320x200.jpg"},"wp_review_small":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-65x65.jpg","width":65,"height":65,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":2502,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-65x65.jpg"},"jannah-image-small":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-220x150.jpg","width":220,"height":150,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":11880,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-220x150.jpg"},"jannah-image-large":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-390x220.jpg","width":390,"height":220,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":24755,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-390x220.jpg"},"jannah-image-post":{"file":"IMG-20250812-WA00011-780x470.jpg","width":780,"height":470,"mime-type":"image\/jpeg","filesize":74905,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011-780x470.jpg"}},"image_meta":{"aperture":"0","credit":"","camera":"","caption":"","created_timestamp":"0","copyright":"","focal_length":"0","iso":"0","shutter_speed":"0","title":"","orientation":"0","keywords":[]}},"post":1987,"source_url":"https:\/\/nrls.net\/en\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/IMG-20250812-WA00011.jpg"},"yoast_head":"\n